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ABSTRACT 
The cultural imaginary in South Africa is, as Ashraf Jamal contends in Predicaments 
of Culture in South Africa, still imprisoned within boundaries of difference 
established by the past and still insists on rigid notions of the “national”. For this 
reason, the South African cultural imaginary is unable to imaginatively engage with 
that which is unthinkable and unnameable in order to overcome the moral 
determinism that has burdened critical considerations of cultural production. To this 
end, Jamal proposes a rethinking of the human in South Africa in the name of love, 
one means of which is a reinvigoration of the notion of queer. In this dissertation, I 
will consider the ways in which Barbara Adair articulates a queer present continuous 
be(com)ing in her two novels In Tangier We Killed the Blue Parrot and End, which 
enables me not only to explore the potentialities of realising and sustaining an 
indeterminate in-between space in which the self and the other are able to renounce 
the need to know in order to begin to come toward one another, but also to open a 
space for reimagining frameworks for understanding literary production in South 
Africa. 
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“Remember, we are not nouns but verbs, and are therefore caught in a wondrous and 
ceaseless process of becoming. Love is such a verb, such a process of becoming.”  
Ashraf Jamal (Interview n.p.) 
 
“Loving not knowing. Loving: not knowing.”  
Hélène Cixous (Cixous and Calle-Gruber 17) 
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INTRODUCTION, OR, HERE’S LOOKING AT YOU, BARBARA ADAIR 
Barbara Adair’s first novel In Tangier We Killed the Blue Parrot, published in 2004, 
draws on the American writers Paul and Jane Bowles’s time in Tangier, Morocco, and 
fictionalises their struggles to write as well as their efforts to love, not only each other 
but also their same-sex Moroccan lovers. Adair alternates a third-person narration 
focalised through Belquassim, Paul’s lover1, with italicised first-person monologic 
reflections from primarily Paul and Jane’s perspectives. Adair’s second novel End, 
published in 2007, is a similarly difficult book to summarise: as Beppi Chiuppani 
admits, “[i]t is a rather daunting task to describe End in an intelligible way” (160). 
Adair reworks various scenes from the 1942 film Casablanca in End as the narrator 
Freddie writes a novel in which an unnamed journalist – who is reporting from 
Maputo on the civil strife in Mozambique for a South African newspaper and who 
changes biological sex every alternate chapter – has an affair with X, a salesman from 
Johannesburg who is married to a drug addict, Y. These characters also frequently 
interact with Freddie to question her about their uncertain destinies. 
“I don’t do local,” declares Adair in an interview with Fred de Vries. “Everyone does 
local. Let’s get out of it, let’s do something different” (n.p.). Adair’s pronouncement 
here brings to the fore two of the central concerns of my dissertation which, broadly 
put, are the problems of “doing local” and “doing different”. As my descriptions of In 
Tangier We Killed the Blue Parrot and End suggest, Adair’s two novels are decidedly 
distinct works within the corpus of “South African” writing, especially to someone 
like me whose encounters with purportedly canonical works of “South African” 
literature have been overdetermined by ideas of race and the nation. Indeed, the 
discussions of “South African” literary works in the South African university classes I 
have attended have centred most often on rigid identity politics and involved reading 
representations of (post)apartheid racial relations as symptomatic commentaries on 
some supposedly coherent “South African” condition. As Sarah Nuttall points out, 
such practices of symptomatic interpretation, whose “genesis” is in “metaphor and 
allegory” (86) and whose aim often is to reveal the “true, deep undergirdings of 
apartheid” (85), has been the dominant mode of reading within South African literary 
                                                          
1 For the sake of clarity, I will refer in this dissertation to the literary figures in full as “Paul Bowles” 
and “Jane Bowles”, or by their surname “Bowles”, whereas I will refer to Adair’s representations of 
them as “Paul” and “Jane”. 
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criticism. 
What struck me upon reading Adair’s two novels for the first time is their obvious and 
playful intertextuality and metafictionality, features which are remarkably different 
from the literary social realism to which I had for the most part been exposed. 
Moreover, I was intrigued by the ways in which Adair toys with the indeterminacies 
of the (gendered) body and sex(uality) in both novels. It seems to me that In Tangier 
We Killed the Blue Parrot and End articulate a conception of queer which, as I 
elaborate in the following chapters, goes beyond the conventional understanding of 
the term as a category of identification against the (hetero)normative, beyond what 
David Halperin maintains in his influential formulation “is by definition whatever is 
at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in particular to 
which it necessarily refers. It is an identity without an essence” (62, emphases in 
original). This challenging strangeness of Adair’s two novels is perhaps best signalled 
in the omission, whether intentional or not, of In Tangier We Killed the Blue Parrot 
from the annual bibliography in the Journal of Commonwealth Literature which 
comprehensively documents publications of “South African” literature. End, on the 
other hand, is duly noted in the bibliography of 2007 publications, and Crystal Warren 
observes in her introduction to this bibliography that End is one of the “strong second 
novels” (183) produced that year and that Adair is one of the authors who “followed 
up the promise of their debuts” (183). 
While such bibliographies compiled under the rubric of the nation – whose parameters 
the Journal of Commonwealth Literature incidentally does not appear to define – may 
have their potential uses, I believe that they are symptomatic of the predicaments of 
cultural production and reception in South Africa that Ashraf Jamal has detailed in his 
work. For Jamal, whose views provide the impetus for this dissertation, the cultural 
imaginary in South Africa is still imprisoned within boundaries of difference 
established by the (colonial) past and still insists on rigid notions of the “national”. 
That is to say, Jamal claims that the South African cultural imaginary demands known 
and knowable categories of identification which foreclose the indeterminate 
heterogeneity of the human, and is thus unable to imaginatively engage with that 
which is unthinkable and unnameable. As such, Jamal suggests that we are unable to 
overcome the moral determinism that has burdened critical considerations of local 
cultural production. I outline Jamal’s position more fully in chapter one of this 
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dissertation, as this not only enables me to engage with the narrow critical reception 
of Adair’s two novels which takes the national as the necessary point of departure, but 
also allows me to be attentive to areas of inquiry that Jamal believes have been 
precluded by the inability to entertain the unthinkable and the indeterminate. 
One of the strategies that Jamal puts forward for thinking the unthinkable in South 
Africa, for adopting a position that avoids prescriptive and deterministic certainties, is 
a reinvigoration of the notion of queer, and this is a proposition that I take up most 
critically in my consideration of Adair’s two novels. In my view, “queer” in South 
African literary criticism continues to be co-opted into the teleological explanation of 
the nation that is South Africa, and Tim Trengove-Jones’s influential observation that 
“the status of gay South Africans has emerged as a litmus test for measuring how far 
South Africa has moved towards a culture of equality and non-discrimination” (117) 
is illustrative: what is clear here is that conceptions of queer remain grounded in 
sexual identity – that is, “gay” – and national progress. Indeed, Trengove-Jones 
further adds that “in a very specific permutation of the wider cultural process of 
bringing the hidden to light ([Albie] Sachs’s claim that ‘we are all coming out’), 
gayness has emerged from its occlusion by being aligned with our current governing 
narrative of human rights, pluralism, and constitutionalism” (117). I elaborate on this 
more fully in chapter one of my dissertation, and I also consider the problematic 
enunciations of queer in the critical reception of Adair’s two novels. 
In reading against such instrumentalisations of queer, I am able to think temporality, 
desire and relationality differently. The close reading of In Tangier We Killed the Blue 
Parrot and End that I offer in chapters two and three of this dissertation which 
(re)engage and reinvigorate queer thus enables me to advance what I am calling a 
queer present continuous be(com)ing. In this way, I am not only able to make sense of 
the overwhelming intertextuality of Adair’s two novels, but am also able to suggest a 
hermeneutics of desire which facilitates my engagement with Jamal’s urgent call to 
“rethink the human in South Africa and […], as a constitutive part of the process, 
restore the capacity for love” (Predicaments 20). As I argue, rethinking love as a 
“properly political concept”, to borrow Lauren Berlant’s formulation, means 
reconsidering the relationship between self and other in a more impersonal manner. 
What I ultimately contend is that thinking through my notion of the queer present 
continuous be(com)ing enables me to explore the potentialities, as enunciated in 
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Adair’s two novels, of realising and sustaining an indeterminate in-between space in 
which the self and the other are able to renounce the need to know in order to begin to 
come toward one another. 
Moreover, I am aware that such an indeterminate in-between space of be(com)ing is a 
necessarily textual one, and it is Hélène Cixous’s conception of writing – especially 
her articulation of écriture féminine – that allows me to engage with such issues of 
(meta)textuality in In Tangier We Killed the Blue Parrot and End. For Cixous, such 
acts of writing situated within a feminine libidinal economy are not only attentive to 
the unsettling, emancipatory potentialities of jouissance, but also “give rise to the 
other while respecting them” (“Literature” 26). My close reading in chapters two and 
three of this dissertation thus draw on Cixous’s notion of writing, which is in my view 
a textual expression of love as impersonal intimacy, to think through Adair’s two 
novels which, as my argument will demonstrate, are acts of writing situated within 
what Jamal calls “other logics of engagement and cultural practice” (“Bullet” 19). In 
this way, I am able to propose that Adair’s two novels may productively put the 
reader “en procès”, to use Julia Kristeva’s formulation. 
What remains for me to point out in this introduction is that Lauren Berlant’s 
proposition for thinking experimentally – that is, queerly – has guided me in the 
writing of this dissertation. According to Berlant, 
 
 
[t]his is what it means to live, and to theorize, experimentally: to make 
registers of attention and assessment that can change the world of their 
implication, but also to model the suspension of knowing in a way that 
dilates attention to a problem or scene. This involves the pain and pleasure 
of unlearning or “breaking down” what we thought our object was and 
who we are in relation to it; this involves moving with it without assurance 
of what we might become as we refuse to reproduce the lines of 
association, convergence, and force whose security defended us from the 
disturbance that, we say, we also want. (Berlant and Edelman 117) 
 
 
 
The queer present continuous be(com)ing that I articulate in my “experimental” 
reading, which departs radically from conventional modes of making sense of “South 
African” literature, envisions exactly this “suspension of knowing”. The question 
mark in the title of my dissertation, “Love in the Time of South Africa?”, thus holds 
open such a space of uncertainty and indeterminacy at the risk of abjection: that is to 
say, this question mark underpins the “pain and pleasure of unlearning or ‘breaking 
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down’ what we thought” we have understood about the notions of “love”, “time” and 
“South Africa”. It is also for this reason that I attempt to forego as many subheadings 
as possible in this dissertation, as I believe that subheadings signal the possibility of 
neat, discrete categorisations which will instrumentalise my consideration of Adair’s 
In Tangier We Killed the Blue Parrot and End in ways that I am precisely trying to 
avoid. 
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CHAPTER ONE: STILL DREAMING OF THE LOVE TO COME? ON FRAMING BARBARA 
ADAIR 
1.1 ASHRAF JAMAL AND THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Ashraf Jamal’s provocative analysis of cultural, and specifically literary, production 
in South Africa after apartheid in Predicaments of Culture in South Africa informs my 
evaluation of Adair’s situation within what has been taken to be the field of “South 
African literature”. For Jamal, cultural production and reception in South Africa is 
still trapped “within the ‘ghetto’ ([Albie] Sachs) or ‘gulag’ ([JM] Coetzee)” (19) and 
thus not yet free from the oppression of fatalist, positivist and relativist thinking that 
dogs the South African imaginary (xii). Central to Jamal’s concern, then, is a critical 
reflection on “how to bypass, overwhelm, and ignore oppression, and, in doing so, 
create an other space for thought and creativity” (xii). Put differently, Jamal believes 
that the South African cultural imaginary is stuck in rigid and inadequate categories of 
“nomination” (9) or identification, and he emphasises that it is urgently necessary to 
engage with the unthinkable indeterminacies of what it means to be human in 
contemporary South Africa. Freedom, Jamal suggests, is the transgression of both the 
closures of apartheid and the reactive nature of imaginative expression which persists 
today: what he argues for is “a sphere of expression that accepts the unthinkable: that 
which has not heretofore been thought; that which in its nature resists thought; that 
which challenges the prohibition of the unnameable” (7). In an interview with Russel 
Brownlee which usefully summaries his argument in Predicaments of Culture in 
South Africa, Jamal further points out that he “very rarely encountered the ability or 
the courage to grasp the unthinkable; to shift the axis away from the tedium of 
polarisation, as though our minds and imaginations were transfixed by the Manichean 
dialectic and precious little else”. For this reason, he proposes that what needs to be 
taken up by the South African cultural imaginary is a fluidity that “avoids prescription 
and determinist certainties” (n.p.). 
Jamal begins Predicaments of Culture in South Africa by considering Albie Sachs’s 
seminal essay “Preparing Ourselves for Freedom”, and follows Sachs in arguing that 
freedom is achieved in the moment that it “cede[s] its pathological attachment to the 
oppressive regime that shaped and constrained its deliverance” (3), as such 
attachments render culture merely reactive and resistant. Sachs’s most pertinent point 
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for Jamal is his suggestion that the South African cultural imaginary needs to 
innovatively engage with that which is unthinkable and unnameable in order to 
overcome the moral determinism that has burdened critical considerations of the 
country’s cultural production: according to Jamal, “over and above the democratic or 
pluralistic levelling of cultural differences there remains a cultural agency that 
surpasses boundaries, as well as their nominal erasure, that can potentially evoke a 
third space which, in the South African cultural economy has not quite been expressed, 
let alone sustained” (11). He further urges South African cultural practice to break 
through the “increased ennui and sense of fatality” (4) to “rethink or re-imagine the 
negative closures that continue to dog cultural expression” (15). That is to say, Jamal 
finds that cultural imaginary in South Africa is still unable to productively account for 
the vital heterogeneity of its society and still seems trapped within the divisive logic 
of cultural difference established by the past, and for this reason he wants to think 
through ways that “render fluid the fixity of cultural difference” (31). Though Jamal 
understands Sachs to be invoking the possibility that South Africa could “imagine 
itself otherwise, that [it] could, through the creative act, restore the ability to dream, 
think and taste the deferred promise of freedom” (17), Jamal suggests that this 
otherness to itself which the South African cultural imaginary needs is “as much a 
source of terror as it is a promise of happiness” (17) as its achievement demands 
alternative and unconventional modes of thinking. 
One of the problematic modes of thinking about South Africa is JM Coetzee’s 
articulation in his Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech that the country is as 
“irresistible as it is unlovable” (qtd in Jamal, Predicaments 23): Jamal proposes a 
countervision that “South Africa is as resistible as it is lovable” (23, emphasis in 
original), suggesting that it is only in this way that we can begin to engage differently 
with the country’s pathological obsession with overdetermined, binaristic articulations 
of difference which foreclose any positive engagement with the “heterogeneous 
complexity of life” (37) in South Africa. What Jamal implies is that this failure of the 
encounter between self and other is what seems to have come to define South Africa – 
he maintains that “the history of South Africa has been shaped by the very lack of 
love” (24) – and thus reconceiving South Africa as “resistible as it is loveable” will 
“effect a psychic and epistemic embrace that works against fear and denial and 
gestures towards love” (23). For Jamal, a realisation of the potential of love is 
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inextricably linked to the attainment of freedom, and he emphasises that “for the 
imagination to liberate itself, for freedom to become realisable, thought must resist 
closure in the name of love” (24, emphasis in original). In this way, the central 
challenges to the South African cultural imaginary for Jamal are “[h]ow to rethink the 
human in South Africa and how, as a constitutive part of the process, restore the 
capacity for love”, “[h]ow to divert the psychic and epistemic constraints that repress 
the unthinkable and unspeakable and how to make this – emergent – otherness the 
harbinger of an ethically revisionary project”, and how, despite the “disfigurement of 
the human” in a society that is “caught between national and global imaginaries”, to 
“inculcate a spirit of play” and to nurture a “radical alterity” (20). 
Jamal finds that Homi Bhabha’s thought, especially his notion of the “hybrid 
moment” (Predicaments 24), points productively to a way beyond South Africa’s 
“exchang[ing of] radical difference for sameness, blurred gradation for fixed and 
separable terms” (24), towards an acknowledgement of the “factors at work in the 
constitution of a given position other than the ideational and the received 
particularities of the social and historical” (30). For this reason, Jamal argues that one 
of the most pertinent alternative envisionings of South African culture, Njabulo 
Ndebele’s humanist call for a rediscovery of the ordinary, is, despite appearing to 
emerge “as a third or supplementary term of critical engagement and perception” (84), 
in fact not as much of a liberating breakthrough as it appears to be because it remains 
an either/or logic which needs to be replaced by a both/and one (96): Jamal claims 
that “Ndebele’s resistance to the spectacular blinds him to the extraordinariness of the 
everyday” (96), and that the “post-colonial subject is necessarily caught between the 
spectacular and the ordinary” (97, emphasis in original). To (re)locate this in-
betweenness, this hybrid moment within contemporary South Africa, Jamal proposes 
that we need to “affirmatively refigure South Africa as an indefinite category and as 
an experiential paradox” (25) that is able to account for the “changing present – the 
time of the now – that transmutes the dogma of the past and the fiction of the future” 
(90). That is to say, Jamal thinks with Bhabha to think through and beyond the ways 
that the South African cultural imaginary holds on to the injustices of the past and the 
discourse of the “rainbow nation” which repressively subsumes difference, to “an 
other embrace – the embrace not only of otherness, but the embrace of others” which 
he posits is “the surest means, within the ever-shifting present, through which to 
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recover a past and promote a future freed from the spectre of colonialism” (40, 
emphasis in original). 
Leon de Kock’s notion of the “seam” is for Jamal one conceptual attempt to articulate 
the hybrid moment, to account for “the layering and the stresses and strains inherent 
in a bonded and repressive conception of” South Africa (Predicaments 24). In “South 
Africa in the Global Imaginary”, De Kock proposes that the seam is “the site of a 
joining together that also bears the mark of the suture” (276), which means that any 
attempt at converging difference necessarily “bears the mark of its own crisis” (276). 
South African writing has, according to De Kock, been a kind of “seam” in that it is 
“the place where difference and sameness are hitched together – where they are 
brought to self-awareness, denied, or displaced into third terms” (277). The 
negotiation of identity within a literature conceived in this way as national for De 
Kock then signals the simultaneous recognition and sublimation of alterity, for the 
seam is “a place where neither oneness nor difference can be maintained without 
reference to the knowledge of its double, its constitutively cross-hitched character” 
(287). De Kock proposes an unpicking of this poetics of the seam in “Does South 
African Literature Still Exist?”, for if “the seam of compulsive identity formation 
under conditions of referential fracture has been undone, then the lines of affiliation, 
logically, are free to go where they like” (77) and this undoing may facilitate a 
moving beyond the “absolute contests and the grim polarities of the past” (77). Jamal 
articulates two strategies inherent in the paradoxes of the seam that foster this 
“cognitive slippage that enables the sustenance and the interrogation of a fraught 
‘seam’ that would, at every turn, undo the seeming integrity of South Africa” 
(Predicaments 25) and realise a “liminal position of belonging-yet-not-belonging” (57) 
which will allow South Africa to emerge as other to itself and attain cultural 
imaginaries free from oppression. 
One of the strategies that Jamal articulates is a “radical syncretism” (Predicaments 
69), rather than the “reactive syncretism” (62) which, “co-opted by nationalism and 
the market forces of late-modernity” (65), dominates the South African cultural 
imaginary and “merely constructs the illusion of a positive engagement or merger of 
difference” (66). Jamal argues that radical syncretism does not deny and erase the 
notoriety of the past but reveals and addresses its links to the present (70), and it is 
furthermore, like Bhabha’s hybrid moment, a “means through which to issue forth 
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something new and unrecognisable, a new era of negotiation of meaning and 
representation” (75, emphasis in original). For Jamal, radical syncretism 
“acknowledges no a priori truth, neither does it post its own truth as the answer” and 
thereby is able to “expose abnormality at the root of the seemingly normal” (80): 
radical syncretism is an “aesthetic and epistemological strategy that, in challenging 
authorised beliefs and practices, serves to further destabilise public doxa and received 
authority” (81), and it is this “radically syncretic construction of identity” (77) which 
may facilitate an othering of the self and allow for the emergence of love. 
Another strategy that Jamal enunciates which sustains the radical interstitial agency of 
the seam of the South African cultural imaginary is the notion of “queer”. Jamal 
makes clear that “it is not strictly within the domain of sexually defined identity 
formation that the term is relevant” for him (Predicaments 90), but that it is in fact, 
following Annamarie Jagose, its “more mediated relation to categories of 
identification” (90) that he finds useful: “queer” for Jamal is a kind of third space 
“which, in foregrounding and enacting a ‘mediated relation’ to the dominant 
imperatives of identification, ultimately works towards the deterritorialisation of these 
imperatives” (103). That is to say, in rethinking the constitutive contradictions in 
conceptions of culture in South Africa – such as in levelling the ordinary and the 
spectacular or extraordinary – queer does not reconcile the binary to produce a 
synthesis, but instead “reveals the ‘invisible visible’” (105), instituting “a radical 
plurality as the basis of any interstitial grasp of the changing present” (103). Most 
importantly for Jamal, queer 
 
 
comes to exemplify what Bhabha defines as the double life of the 
postcolonial subject, a life which constructively perverts existent polarities, 
which undoes closure and the discretion which founds the separation of 
terms of engagement, which deliberately over-dramatises the self as that 
which exists in extra-moral space, and, against a sage or pious wisdom, 
celebrates the constitutive perversity of the postcolonial condition as the 
source of revisionary agency and not the marginalised figuration of mere 
scandal. (103) 
 
 
 
In other words, queer becomes a productive term for Jamal’s consideration of the 
predicament of culture in South Africa as it offers, in its refusal to “be conscripted 
into a preconceived system of change” (105), a “way of living and thinking the 
psychic and epistemic impasse of the present moment” (105): queer facilitates a 
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thinking of the unthinkable and the unnameable, an acknowledgement of the 
inadequacies of signifying economies and of the closures instituted in categorical 
nominalisation, and also opens up creative spaces for reckoning with the unresolved 
violences of South Africa’s past which continue to compromise considerations of the 
“radicality or heterogeneity that subsists at the core of South Africa’s differential 
condition” (61). Queer, Jamal thus implies, precipitates South Africa’s becoming 
other to itself and questions its obsession with identity politics that reifies a state of 
lovelessness, which for Jamal is “the negation of thought, and hence of life itself” 
(interview with Brownlee). 
1.2 ON “QUEER” IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICAN LITERARY CRITICISM 
As I have pointed out, it seems that for Jamal, thinking and reinvigorating the notion 
of queer is one means of achieving a “cultivation of selfhood and nationhood – in and 
through representation – that is ceaselessly mobile and fluid” (Predicaments 154). 
Nonetheless, Jamal observes, drawing on the Mother City Queer Project’s creator 
Andrew Putter, that “queer, as an intellectual model and way of life, has fallen victim 
to ‘reification’” as a result of a “deficient critical reflexivity” (118). That is to say, 
queer seems to have become less a critical engagement with the incommensurable and 
mediated nature of all social relations than a fixation of reasonable categories of 
identification which have been co-opted into a new norm, a new code of received 
values. What I also understand Jamal to be foregrounding here is that queer has come 
to be co-opted into the teleological explanation of the nation that is South Africa, and 
this is in fact symptomatic of Jamal’s diagnosis of the predicament of South African 
literary production: according to Jamal, “South African literature in English has 
elected to sanctify and memorialize its intent, producing a literature informed by a 
messianic, liberatory, or reactive drive, hence a struggle literature (which precedes 
liberation from apartheid) and a post-apartheid literature (which establishes a 
democratic state of play)” (“Bullet” 11) and for this reason it “fail[s] to give 
satisfactory weight to the marvellous richness that comes from non-prescriptiveness 
and healthily perverse reconfigurations of community” (19). It indeed seems to me 
that South African literature read under the sign of queer has struggled to think queer 
beyond sexual identity and national progress, and this predicament is evident in two 
prominent works of contemporary South African “queer” literary criticism: Cheryl 
Stobie’s Somewhere in the Double Rainbow: Representations of Bisexuality in Post-
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apartheid Novels and Brenna Munro’s South Africa and the Dream of Love to Come: 
Queer Sexuality and the Struggle for Freedom. 
In Somewhere in the Double Rainbow, Stobie explores the increasing number of 
South African novels published after 1994 which “employ bisexuality as a metaphor” 
and which map this onto a consideration of the “reshaping of the nation in different 
terms from the oppressive binary ideologies of the past” (xi). Even though she 
acknowledges that “[i]nstead of the fixities of identity politics, queer theory posits 
fluid spaces of possibility” (16), Stobie’s use of bisexuality – which she intriguingly 
conflates with queer: she claims that she works through the “complex relationship 
between the concepts of queer and bisexuality in order to be able to oscillate between 
the two frameworks in [her] literary analysis” (16) – seems to prescriptively 
(re)position bisexuality within a spectrum of inhabitable sexual identities. For 
example, in her chapter titled “‘Biopia’ in Biography: A Cultural History of 
Bisexuality in South Africa”, Stobie examines a “short-sighted refusal to perceive, or 
a misrepresentation of, bisexuality” (69), especially within (auto)biographies of 
“subjects associated with the arts, and who have South African connections, spanning 
the twentieth century” (75). It is exactly Stobie’s need to recuperate and make visible 
a lived experience – however indeterminate or disputable – of bisexuality that ends up 
reifying it as a discrete category of identification, despite her insistence that her use of 
“bisexuality” should not be “understood as implying a concrete identity, but should be 
read provisionally and contingently” (20). 
In a comprehensive explication of her conceptualisation of bisexuality, Stobie seems 
to put bisexuality forward as a third term which offers a synthesis of the dialectic that 
results from any attempt to reckon with binaries. She maintains that 
 
 
[b]isexuality represents a challenge to identities which are less certain and 
stable than many would like to believe, and it represents a challenge to 
narratives which repress alternatives. It thus offers a means of viewing the 
heterosexual/homosexual system of which it is a complex part. Viewed 
from a sympathetic – some might say utopian – perspective, it represents a 
potential for change, a loosening of boundaries, a possibility of 
multiplicity, all of which signify a fruitful cultural and national pathway 
beyond rigid binaries of the past. (Somewhere 70) 
 
 
 
While I am not disputing the potential productivity inherent in bisexuality as a 
broader, strategically essentialist form of identity politics that Stobie seems to be 
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elaborating, what I am uncomfortable with is her conflation of such an articulation of 
the subject as relational with my – and I would also argue, Jamal’s – understanding of 
queer as processual. Put differently, the fluidity and boundary disruptions that 
Stobie’s thinking through bisexuality would like to enable is still nonetheless limited 
to an instrumentality, that of working through the rigidly divisive logic of cultural 
difference established by South Africa’s violent past, whereas queer, in Jamal’s 
articulation, “cannot be conscripted into a preconceived idea of change” 
(Predicaments 105). In Stobie’s reading, the engagement with bisexuality in South 
African writing necessarily says something about the change in the national imaginary 
that is also an indication of the progression of the nation out of its past, maintaining 
that “a preoccupation with the trope of bisexuality in novels at this stage of South 
Africa’s history is deeply significant within a national imaginary which is attempting 
to move beyond a strictly binarist viewpoint” (270). This symptomatic reading of 
bisexuality in its function as “queer” is in my view flawed, for even though it attempts 
to offer an engagement with what Jamal calls “the interstitial, ceaselessly 
compromised, and unresolvedly heterogeneous condition which continues to define 
South African culture” (Predicaments 148), bisexuality has nonetheless been 
insistently offered by Stobie as a kind of grand narrative of (sexual) identification that 
has, as Jamal would put it, “been rigged the better to explain the country’s received 
history and not the radical a priori heterogeneity, or wide range of irreducible swings, 
non-linearity, and temporal trajectories that make up that history” (“Bullet” 16). 
In her chapter on Adair’s In Tangier We Killed the Blue Parrot, which is one of the 
few critical considerations of the novel, Stobie is at pains to establish the sexuality of 
the characters in the novel, especially that of Paul and Jane Bowles, who Stobie notes 
have historically “(misleadingly) often not [been] flagged as bisexual” (Somewhere 
241), and further asserts that bisexuality is “textually perceived as the norm, rather 
than an aberration, although the author herself [ie Adair] identifies as a lesbian. Thus, 
usefully for my purposes, Adair is biopic in her representation of a number of 
personae” (236). Not only does Stobie not make clear the significance of why this 
failure to ascertain the bisexuality of Paul and Jane Bowles is “misleading”, she also 
seems to accuse Adair of some kind of privilege which arises from Adair’s subject 
position – which she makes a point of pointing out – within the hegemonic binary of 
hetero/homosexuality that necessarily elides the Bowles’ bisexuality in Adair’s 
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fictionalisation of these American writers, despite her acknowledgement that 
bisexuality is not an “aberration” – that is, that it has not been short-sightedly 
misrepresented – in the novel. This impulse to know and to accurately situate people 
and characters within nominal categories of sexual identification is troubling, 
especially for someone like Stobie whose project claims to hold open a space for the 
consideration of fluid indeterminacies. 
Moreover, Stobie maintains that In Tangier We Killed the Blue Parrot is an 
“anomalous text, difficult to classify, but comprehensible primarily within a South 
African context” (Somewhere 266, my emphasis) and that the novel, although set in 
Tangier, ultimately “allows for productive and progressive reflection on the 
contemporary South African social landscape, as well as on South Africa’s position 
within the continent of Africa” (267). I would argue that this reading of the novel 
which adamantly resituates it within a “South African” framework is exactly the kind 
of interpretative move that the “dull and prescriptive enterprise” (“Bullet” 15), as 
Jamal describes it, of literary criticism in South Africa would make: according to 
Jamal, a literary work for South African literary critics “becomes important because it 
explains a given concern, its provenance measured according to the relevance of that 
concern. The utility rather than the use, therefore, lies in the book’s telos and not – 
where it should count the more – in the aesthetic affect that limns and qualifies that 
telos” (“Bullet” 15, emphasis in original). In fact, Stobie’s entire project – which 
“aim[s] to chart the representation of bisexuality, in the context of a body of fiction 
that deals with variant sexualities, in order to consider the ways in which this 
sexuality contributes to debates about how ‘queer’ reflects and shapes notions of 
emerging South African national identity” (13-14, my emphasis) – is symptomatic of 
Jamal’s assessment of the current state of South African literary criticism: it is clear 
from Stobie’s conclusion – that the engagement with bisexuality necessarily signals a 
changing society that is “moving out of the rigid and oppressive racial, gender and 
sexual binaries of the past” (273) – that she has not been able to resist the reactive and 
overdetermined narratives about national progress and cultural expression. 
Munro acknowledges in a footnote in South Africa and the Dream of Love to Come 
that Stobie’s Somewhere in the Double Rainbow “is an important starting point in the 
critical conversation about sexuality and South African literature – indeed it is the 
only book-length study of the topic thus far” (246), and her appraisal of Stobie’s main 
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concern – that bisexuality’s “appearance in a wide range of postapartheid literary texts 
indicated both a crisis of representation and a desire to move beyond black/white, 
either/or thinking in the wake of apartheid” (246) – foregrounds what I have argued is 
problematic about Stobie’s project. Munro in fact takes up a similarly problematic 
ideological position in terms of sexual identity and the national imaginary, indicating 
that her project examines how “the deployment of the figure of the gay person as a 
symbol of South Africa’s democratic modernity is, of course, a radical departure from 
the traditional familial iconography of nationhood – and it emerges from a history in 
which homosexuality has long been a deeply contested idea, bound up with the re-
imagining of race, gender, and nation in the context of settler colonialism” (viii). 
What is neatly highlighted here is that, firstly, despite the gesture towards “queer 
sexuality” in the book’s subtitle, Munro’s focus is really on a particular reified 
category of identification, the homosexual, and more specifically the male 
homosexual; and secondly, Munro’s reading of sexuality is instrumentalised in that 
she understands the changing attitude, however ambiguous or contradictory, in the 
engagement with sexuality in the South African literary texts she examines as 
necessarily charting the emergence of a more nuanced and democratic discourse about 
gay rights in South Africa. For Munro, male homosexuality came to stand, during the 
era of anti-apartheid struggles, for “the perversity of apartheid – but also sometimes 
fashioned as sign of resistance to the mores of an authoritarian regime that attempted 
to regulate everyone’s sexuality in the name of racial purity” (viii), and she argues 
that “the gay, lesbian, or bisexual person then became a kind of stock minor character 
in the pageant of nationhood in the 1990s, embodying the arrival of a radically new 
social order and symbolically mediating conflicts over race and class” (ix). Indeed, 
Munro admits that her project “began as the search for a progress narrative from afar; 
I wanted to know how South Africans managed to forge a gay-friendly, radically 
plural democracy” (xxxiii), even though she does recognise the “varying modes of 
disillusionment and disappointment” (xxxiii) in the face of the nation’s failing 
transformation. It is Munro’s impulse to read sexuality symptomatically, to trace 
through the literary representation of minority sexual identities an overdetermined 
narrative about the precarious progress of a nation that is trying to democratically 
account for the multiplicity of “queer” lives, that, as I have pointed out, is limiting.  
Nevertheless, one recent work of South African literary criticism, Andrew van der 
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Vlies’s Present Imperfect: Contemporary South African Writing, does seem to present 
a more nuanced and productive engagement with notions of queer, especially within a 
South African context. Though “not expressly a study of queer politics or poetics” (9) 
but rather a “study of affect, temporality, and form in writing from postapartheid 
South Africa” (vii), Van der Vlies explains that “the reader will notice that queer 
characters are to be found in many of the texts discussed” (9) in Present Imperfect, 
and these gesture towards the usefulness of recent queer theories which are “interested 
in understanding bad feelings more generally” and which enable him to think “affect 
and temporality together – and for taking literary texts as archive and promise” (9). 
For Van der Vlies, “disappointment is a significant structure of feeling in 
contemporary South Africa” (viii) as many of the promises of post-1994 rainbowism 
remain unfulfilled, and he argues that recent South African literature reflects this 
sense of stasis and thus “might provide spaces in which imaginative openings out of 
the present uncertain aftermath of the end of apartheid are made visible” (ix). Chapter 
five of Van der Vlies’s study, “South Africa, Time or Place?”, is of particular interest 
to me, as it is in fact a reworked elaboration of a previously published article, “Zoë 
Wicomb’s Queer Cosmopolitanisms”. As the title of the original article makes clear, 
Van der Vlies is interested in the ways that “figures of queer disruption throughout 
Wicomb’s oeuvre” subversively engage “with transnational identities and affiliations 
and with the chimera of racial purity and national unity in post-apartheid South 
Africa” (425, emphasis in original), and it thus seems that Van der Vlies is attentive in 
this article to articulations of queer beyond (sexual) identity to think queer as the 
productive space of the proliferation of indeterminacies. That is to say, Van der Vlies 
foregrounds the hybrid and syncretic nature of Wicomb’s work which challenges the 
claims to affiliative authenticity – whether identificatory or textual – that is so 
prevalent in considerations of “a South African canon, and a national tradition” (439): 
he argues that not only does Wicomb unsettle racial and both hetero- and homosexual 
categories of identification, but her metafictional and intertextual novels also present a 
“broader project of cultural questioning and disruption” (440) which welcomes 
“multivalence and ambiguity” (440). 
Van der Vlies indeed elaborates on these productive queer potentialities in his book 
chapter “South Africa, Time or Place?”. He recognises that “Wicomb consistently 
seeks to hold open the possibility of exploring – and enabling – formal, political, and 
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affective uncertainty” (127) and further maintains that Wicomb’s work is attentive to 
the “subtleties of a culturally, racially, and linguistically heterogeneous country” 
(128). Moreover, Van der Vlies contends that the metafictionality and especially the 
intertextuality of Wicomb’s novels are a kind of “queer” strategy which 
 
 
constitutes a refusal to cede the revolutionary potential of the transition to 
monolithic constructions of nation or family (or national family), to a 
restrictive sense of what it is proper for a “South African” text to engage. 
Rather, Wicomb’s restless allusiveness suggests a textual equivalent to her 
characters’ displacements (and perhaps her own transnationalism): a 
refusal to cede ground to any resurgent nationalism. (128) 
 
 
 
Van der Vlies thus appears to offer a critical mode of engaging queer which attends to 
the predicaments Jamal raises about South African literary culture, for his discerning 
analysis of Wicomb’s work seems to bypass the received positions which valorise 
difference and which result in what Jamal calls the “reification of an unresolved and 
constitutive difference that defines South Africa’s cultural imaginary” (Predicaments 
147). Van der Vlies attempts instead to think the indeterminately heterogeneous and 
the radically syncretic that for Jamal is “constitutive of lived experience in South 
Africa” (Predicaments 63), and most significantly, his consideration of Wicomb’s 
work suggests that, contrary to Jamal, there is in fact “radical play” and 
“experimentation at the heart of South African literature in English” (“Bullet” 16).  
Nevertheless, Van der Vlies distinctly foregrounds the South African context of 
Wicomb’s work, reading her creative experimentation as a reaction or a refusal to 
accept the prescriptive South African identity politics that has persisted into 
postapartheid society. In the chapter’s concluding paragraph, Van der Vlies further 
proposes that 
 
 
Wicomb’s embrace of the metafictional and of intertextuality comprises a 
queer ethical response to the strange now-time of contemporary South 
African socialities and imaginaries. It is a textual, but also an ethical, 
strategy, one that is particularly suited to an oeuvre imbued with a 
frustration at the inevitability of the disappointment of utopian 
expectations, wise to the habit nations have of cycling back to the hearth, 
the heteronormative family, ideas of ethnic purity, abhorrence of the in-
between. Wicomb’s narrative ethics will have much to say to and about 
South Africa for some considerable time. (149, my emphases) 
 
 
 
Although this may be appropriate, for Van der Vlies is responding to Wicomb’s own 
18 
 
strident engagement with a particular national context after all, I believe that queer 
has nonetheless been limited to a teleological explanation of the nation that is South 
Africa – even if it is to account for its “radical a priori heterogeneity” (Jamal, “Bullet” 
16). In my reading of Adair’s two novels that follows, I want to consider how the 
kinds of productive queer potentialities that Van der Vlies enunciates may open a 
space to entirely “rethink the perceptual dislocation in South Africa within an ever-
shifting, restless and heterogeneous present” (Jamal, Predicaments 47) in literary 
works which do not explicitly call attention to such issues of nationhood and 
identification. 
I should note at this point that the various engagements with notions of queer in South 
African literary criticism that I have been tracing span a little over a decade, from the 
publication of Jamal’s Predicaments of Culture in South Africa in 2005 to Van der 
Vlies’s Present Imperfect in 2017. Even though Jamal’s critical concern is literary and 
cultural production of the period immediately following the official end of apartheid 
while Van der Vlies engages mainly with postapartheid – especially what has been 
termed “post-transitional” South African literature – what is noteworthy is that it has 
taken such a protracted period for the potentially transformative and liberating 
impulses of queer which Jamal enunciates to be taken up. Interestingly, it is also only 
recently that any commentator working in the field generally known as “South 
African literature” has addressed the significance of Jamal’s appraisal of the 
predicaments of cultural production in South Africa: De Kock maintains in Losing the 
Plot: Crime, Reality and Fiction in Postapartheid Writing, which was published in 
2016, that Jamal’s “key intervention” is in his “plea for a change of spirit, a decisive 
turn in the affective disposition in which all acts of culture, for him, are enveloped” 
(94, emphasis in original), and he further observes that 
 
 
Jamal’s emphatic statements – “to love is to think”, and “it is lovelessness 
that is the negation of thought, and hence of life itself” – bring him much 
closer to a movement in critical theory that was gaining ground at the time 
he was in conversation with Brownlee [see Jamal, interview], though it is 
one that Jamal does not explicitly invoke: the Affective Turn. (98) 
 
 
 
De Kock’s recognition that Jamal’s thinking is in line with the turn to a consideration 
of affect in critical theorisation is informative, for it highlights the enduring reluctance 
of readings of what has been called “South African literature” to move beyond 
symptomatic and teleologically national(ist) ones. Affect is, according to Vilashini 
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Cooppan, “in one sense deeply local, experienced at the level of the body and skin 
and abstracted from larger categories of shared social identification. In another sense 
affect is prototypically global, constituted by flows that run over and through 
individual subjects and singular sites of identification to comprise a larger network” 
(52). What this suggests is that thinking with and through affect facilitates a 
worlding – or, in Cooppan’s formulation, a “worldedness” (71) – of “South African 
literature”, a necessary reconsideration of the categories of identification through 
which we make sense of ourselves and of South Africa’s literary production, and this 
is indeed what I have argued Van der Vlies’s Present Imperfect, which has been 
marketed as the “first study of affect in South African literature”, belatedly attempts 
to do. 
1.3 ON THE CATEGORY OF “SOUTH AFRICAN LITERATURE” 
What has been implicit in my consideration of Jamal’s reinvigoration of the notion of 
queer thus far is a critique of the category of a coherent national “South African” 
literature itself, the delineation of which had been a constant preoccupation in the 
academy. In his seminal paper “South Africa in the Global Imaginary” from 2001, De 
Kock surveys the literary historiographies which attempt to establish a consolidated 
canon of South African literature and points to the problems of their endeavours to 
account for the country’s “cultural heterogeneity […which] remains to this day a 
scene of largely unresolved differences” (264, emphasis in original). He argues that 
“[p]erhaps to be a ‘South African’ writer in the full sense requires imaginative 
inhabitation of the seam as a deep symbolic structure” (284), referring to his poetics 
of the seam which I discussed earlier, and he further proposes that “‘South Africa’ 
itself remains a sign under erasure – the question who ‘speaks’ for South Africa is as 
vexed today as it ever was” (273). That is to say, De Kock groundbreakingly2 
recognises the simultaneous inadequacy yet necessity of employing the category 
“South African literature”. He indeed maintains in “Judging New ‘South African’ 
Fiction in the Transnational Moment” that “South African literature” as a category 
may still remain useful and perhaps “even necessary for a sense of history and 
                                                          
2 Van der Vlies points out that Lewis Nkosi had in fact already suggested at a conference at Oxford as 
early as 1991 that “‘South African literature’ did not exist” (South African Textual Cultures 174), 
although I would argue that it was not until De Kock’s reflections on the issue that it was significantly 
taken up by academics. 
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determination in what one might call a ‘national’ imaginary” (32), though a 
consideration of this “national” requires an examination of how it interacts with 
transnational issues, how this “national” is constituted through interactions with that 
which is beyond its borders: according to De Kock, “the space of the ‘national’ has 
irrevocably entered into the fluid waters of the ‘trans’, the transitive cusp of crossing 
and recrossing, of absorbing the fictional self into (now easier, more fluid) spaces of 
related elsewheres, and of absorbing the otherness of such elsewheres into the 
fictional self” (32-3).  
De Kock’s displacing of essentialist and essentialising conceptualisations of “South 
African literature”, his insistence on the fluid processes of travel and translation, has 
been widely taken up by academics working in the field, and this questioning of 
nomenclature and categorisation is perhaps most evident in the special issue of 
English Studies in Africa from 2010 dedicated to the consideration of the usefulness 
of the term “post-transitional” South African literature. Ronit Frenkel and Craig 
MacKenzie maintain in their introduction to the special edition, “Conceptualising 
‘Post-transitional’ South African Literature in English”, that the term “is, and is not, a 
temporal marker” because “[a]s a referent it cannot but highlight the passage of time 
that has passed since South Africa’s transition into a democracy, yet it also points to 
the period before and after this formal transition as an unbounded period and 
discourse” and “does not claim that the issues involved in the transition have been 
resolved” (4). Frenkel and MacKenzie suggest that this “new wave of writing” (2) is 
“[c]haracterized by a proliferation of genres” and “encompasses diasporic South 
African writings (often examining issues of dislocation), proletarian disclosures, 
lyrical existential ruminations, memoir, satire, miracle narratives, and crime stories, 
and addresses issues of return, the dynamics of illness, and questions of space and its 
contestation” (4). Most significantly, Frenkel and MacKenzie contend that the 
“politically incorrect humour and incisive satire” of these works often show how 
problematic “traditional markers like nationality, race or ethnicity” (2) are, and they 
also note that this “post-transitional” literature is more cosmopolitan in style, as it 
“exhibits a reduced obligation to the logics of political commitment” and it 
“purposely contests the national as its overriding context” (4), thereby indicating “a 
broadening of thought and form that is context-bound but global in orientation as it 
attempts to frame South Africa in the present, as well as in terms of the transnational 
21 
 
relations that connect it to the globe” (4). 
In this light, it is intriguing that neither Stobie nor Munro offers any reflection on the 
constitution of the field of South African literature they take as their object of analysis. 
As Van der Vlies maintains in his earlier work South African Textual Cultures, “[a]ny 
study using the designation ‘South African literature’ as shorthand necessarily 
engages […] with a field riven with definitional problems” (174). Despite 
acknowledging that bisexuality presents a “category crisis” (22), Stobie seems to be 
blind to the “crisis” in the other category that her work takes as a guiding rubric – 
“post-apartheid” South African novels. In fact, Stobie reads Nadine Gordimer’s The 
House Gun as “offer[ing] the most scope for the analysis of bisexuality as a prime 
embodiment of De Kock’s ‘seam’ in the climate of social change in contemporary 
South Africa” (175): this not only indicates that she problematically takes South 
African literature as a cohesive field, but also demonstrates that she misses the radical 
categorical slippages that De Kock’s poetics of the seam suggests. For Van der Vlies, 
who is attentive to these concerns, “[t]o ask, then, what South African literature might 
be, requires asking not only what makes a work ‘South African’ (what makes it 
tentatively the work of a national category), but also what criteria, institutions and 
protocols of reading have effected its reception and construction, both as South 
African – or problematically “South African” – and as literature” (174, emphasis in 
original). Setting aside the question of what makes a work “literature”, the intrinsic 
worldiness of literature that Van der Vlies emphasises speaks to the productive 
impulses of queer which open up different, interstitial spaces for reckoning with 
South Africa’s radical heterogeneity. What also needs to be taken into account in Van 
der Vlies’s view is the pervasive influence of modernity, whose contradictions 
“continue to challenge the South African polity, and to provoke an ever-growing body 
of creative writing in the country – which continues to be published both there and 
abroad, and to invite and resist description in national terms” (175). Jamal similarly 
remarks that 
 
 
when I speak of “South Africa”, it must be remembered that other than as 
an indefinitely pronominal descriptor with its own – limited – rhetorical 
efficacy, the country is not conceived as a historically and geographically 
bounded and determined site. Rather, “South Africa” serves as a drifting 
signifier […] through and in which I hope to assess the epistemological 
basis for the conceptualisation of traces of an emergent – though 
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beleaguered and repressed – consciousness. In other words: how and why 
do we think of who and what “we” are? To what end does the claim to 
nationhood validate the contiguous and fraught nature of modernity as it is 
played out at the southernmost point of Africa? How do we think of 
cultural change both inside and outside the boundaries of the nation? 
(Predicaments 89) 
 
 
 
 
1.4 ON THE CRITICAL RECEPTION OF IN TANGIER WE KILLED THE BLUE PARROT  
AND END 
Adair’s two novels have elicited relatively little critical consideration other than book 
reviews in local newspapers3. Stobie has worked extensively on In Tangier We Killed 
the Blue Parrot4: she has presented a conference paper titled “Somatics, Space, 
Surprise: Creative Dissonance in Barbara Adair’s In Tangier We Killed the Blue 
Parrot”, published a journal article “Writing in the Interzone: A Queer Postcolonial 
Reading of Barbara Adair’s In Tangier We Killed the Blue Parrot” which was then 
elaborated into the chapter in her book Somewhere in the Double Rainbow, mentioned 
it along with End in another article “Postcolonial Pomosexuality: Queer/Alternative 
Fiction after Disgrace”, and she also supervised Jean Rossmann’s master’s thesis on 
the novel. End has been examined academically only in a chapter in Beppi 
Chiuppani’s PhD dissertation, “Beyond Political Engagement? Redefining the 
Literary in Post-dictatorship Brazil and Post-apartheid South Africa”. In this section I 
want to think through the problematically symptomatic readings – which I have 
already argued Stobie’s chapter on In Tangier exemplifies – that the newspaper 
reviews and, to some extent, academic considerations of Adair’s two novels have 
presented. 
The reviews of In Tangier focus mostly on Adair’s engagement with the lives of Paul 
and Jane Bowles, paying more attention to elucidating the Bowles’ biography than to 
the significance of Adair’s rewriting of their lives in her novel. Martha Stone’s brief 
review, for instance, does not engage with In Tangier on its own terms but rather 
reads its significance in terms of its relation to the life and works of Paul and Jane 
Bowles: Stone proposes that In Tangier “is worth hunting down by anyone interested 
                                                          
3 I would like to acknowledge the help of the National English Literary Museum in Grahamstown in 
sourcing some of these newspaper reviews. 
4 Hereafter abbreviated as In Tangier. 
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in the lives of the Bowleses and their circle. Better still, it may encourage some 
readers to explore or re-explore the writings of its main characters” (45). Stobie also 
picks up on this problem in Adam Levin’s review, which I will elaborate on in the 
next chapter, stating that Levin’s “line of investigation strikes [her] as inappropriate, 
as it privileges biography, treating it as sacrosanct, although a biography itself is no 
more than a subjective interpretation of a life” (“Somatics” 42). Moreover, Stephen 
Randall faults Adair for not adequately accounting for the Bowles’ lives, remarking in 
his review – pointedly titled “Interesting Foray into Literary Figures” – that he is “not 
convinced that, lengthwise, the novel is a sufficiently substantial vehicle for 
delineating two such powerful literary personalities” (4). In a similarly baffling and 
unsubstantiated manner, he claims that it “is good to see” (4) in 2004 a South African 
writer “using this period and these writer as their first foray into fictional writing” (4). 
The impulse to make sense of In Tangier through its author’s South African context 
that Randall hints at is most evident in Chris Dunton’s review as well as the academic 
considerations of the novel by Stobie and Rossmann. As I pointed out earlier, Stobie 
emphasises the situatedness of In Tangier within a post-apartheid South African 
landscape, arguing that it is “comprehensible primarily within a South African 
context” (266). For Stobie, Adair’s preface is important as it not only “situates the 
author as part of her own South African milieu” (235), but it also “provides a clear 
optic through which to read the ensuing fictionalised account” (236) of the Bowles’ 
time in Tangier and “directs the reader to respond to the text as a meditation on the 
significance of the dissolution of some systemic boundaries” (237). Stobie thus 
implies, in my view, that In Tangier can be usefully read as an allegory of post-
apartheid South Africa because it draws parallels between the contestations and 
reconfigurations of “intimate connections” and “ideologies and creative forms” (246), 
such as the issues concerning “sexuality in a changing society with a racially 
overdetermined history” (266), that take place in contemporary post-apartheid South 
Africa and the interzone of mid 20th-century Tangier. Dunton similarly concludes his 
review, which is perhaps the most thoughtful of all the newspaper reviews, by 
declaring that “in the end I’m not quite sure what it [In Tangier] intends to achieve. 
One possible way beyond that uncertainty is to read it in the context of South African 
fiction, post-Disgrace: to see it, in other words, as an exploration of notions of choice, 
distancing and home that reflects, very obliquely, on patterns of social consciousness 
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in the author’s own environment” (18). 
Rossmann examines the significance of Dunton’s situation of In Tangier in relation to 
JM Coetzee’s Disgrace (25), and she also at first emphasises that the novel compels a 
reading as a commentary on post-apartheid South Africa: Rossmann maintains that 
“the choices of different modes of personal attachments, sexualities and sexual 
pleasure, complicated by race and gender, are not only central concerns in Adair's text, 
but also major socio-political issues in current South African public (and private) 
debate” (26). By distancing readers from the socio-political landscape with which 
they are familiar, Rossmann believes that Adair is able to encourage readers to 
question more productively their own environment (27) and to “rethink the 
supposedly resolved issues of [South Africa’s] transitional democracy and the 
promises of [its] new Constitution” (32). It is noteworthy that Rossmann does 
nevertheless reflect on her claim that “the significance of Adair's text lies in its status 
as a South African novel and in the questions arising out of its place in the landscape 
of South African literatures” (25). She contends that 
 
 
[i]n terms of a poststructuralist critique of the text, centrality should not be 
afforded to the author or her position as a South African, “displaced” in 
Tangier as a tourist/traveller comparable with the expatriate Bowleses. […] 
However, I would argue it is also interesting critically in terms of the 
broader underlying questions it asks about how texts function as vehicles 
for exploring the construction of identity and gendered subjectivities. How 
do texts act as useful sites for exploring the ways intimacy is staged during 
periods of social and political transition? How are “given” subjectivities 
internalised, subverted or re-invented in different geopolitical and 
historical contexts? (36) 
 
 
 
This gesture towards a consideration of the novel beyond its South African condition 
is however co-opted back into the teleological explanation of the nation that is South 
Africa, for Rossmann concludes that In Tangier “creates a space for dialogue between 
the present South African social text and the past text of the Bowleses’ lives and 
fictions” (141). She argues, for instance, that “[i]t would seem that Adair’s text 
mirrors a South African social reality; that is, the gap between constitutional 
guarantees and the actual experiences of women in contemporary South Africa” (144). 
In Rossmann’s view then, In Tangier, which “fails to offer equal textual, psychic or 
imaginative space to the position of women” (100), is symptomatic of the dominance 
of patriarchal relations in South African society. 
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In examining how End “stages some of the concepts on which [Njabulo] Ndebele 
constructed his aesthetics [ie a rediscovery of the ordinary], while at the same time 
bringing them to their limit and divesting them of any progressive political import” 
(153), Chiuppani similarly situates the novel within the South African context and 
argues that “some of its main characteristics are comprehensible only by taking into 
account a set of very particular issues which were raised in the course of the South 
African critical debate around political commitment during the final years of the 
apartheid regime” (153). Chiuppani points out that this is contrary to Adair’s own 
intentions, which she made clear in her interview with Fred de Vries, of eschewing 
the “local” (154). For Chiuppani, End ultimately articulates a “post-engagement” in 
response to Ndebele’s concerns with the limitations of engaged realism. Nevertheless, 
Chiuppani proposes that Adair’s post-engagement leads to the rediscovery of a “new 
non-ideological politics” focused on the body and gender, and “the struggle for 
societal power appears to turn into the search of a novel relationship with the self” 
(192). Chiuppani thus maintains that Adair tries to reconceive what may constitute a 
sense of identity, thereby letting “detailed descriptions of the sexualized body […] 
completely overshadow race”, a “bodily dimension” that was extremely prominent in 
engaged, anti-apartheid South African literature (195). For these reasons, Chiuppani 
concludes that “[d]espite its wider appeal, it [End] can only be understood as a 
specific reaction to” issues rooted in the South African socio-cultural context (197). 
What becomes evident then in the critical reception of Adair’s two novels is the 
persistence of the dilemma which Jamal identifies in literary and cultural production 
in South Africa and, I would also argue, in the reception thereof. Jamal indicates in 
the interview with Brownlee that he has “very rarely encountered the ability or the 
courage to grasp the unthinkable; to shift the axis away from the tedium of 
polarisation, as though our minds and imaginations were transfixed by the Manichean 
dialectic and precious little else” (n.p.). Ann Ussher’s comment – that In Tangier is 
“an up-market work, often graphic, and would not appeal to the narrow-minded or the 
homophobic” (10) – is perhaps indicative of this in its anticipation of what Jamal calls 
“the latent conservatism of South Africa’s cultural perceptual field” (“Hipper 
Redacted” 476), the (over)sensitive South African readers who are mostly still 
contained within clear categories of difference. I thus take up in the next two chapters 
Jamal’s call to think more carefully through “indeterminacy as the condition for the 
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representation of culture in South Africa” (Predicaments 144) and to engage queerly 
with the “ceaseless enactment and reinvention of desire” (117), which is also a 
rethinking of the human in the name of love, that I believe Adair’s In Tangier and 
End enunciate. Such a radical departure from the established and constraining ways in 
which South African literature has been read is in my view productive in that it not 
only allows me to take seriously Adair’s departures from the national imaginary and 
resist a symptomatic, allegorical reading, but it also enables me to be attentive to areas 
of inquiry that have been overlooked, which, in the case of Adair, is the queer present 
continuous be(com)ing. 
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CHAPTER TWO: QUEER FUTURITY • QUEER PRESENT CONTINUOUS 
2.1 QUEER THEORY AND FUTURITY 
Since its inception, queer studies has been concerned with questions of futurity: 
Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner capture this sense of a still-to-come when they 
note in 1995 that “almost everything that can be called queer theory has been radically 
anticipatory, trying to bring a world into being” (“What Does Queer Theory” 344). 
Michael O’Rouke has recently noted that, despite various claims of the “death” of 
queer theory and the “anti-social” turn in recent queer studies which fiercely rejects 
any notion of a future, there is still a body of queer work “on the side of affirmation, 
utopianism and socio-political hope, very much on the side of life” (108) and he 
further maintains that current work in the field suggests that not only is there “a future 
for queer thinking, but that, Queer Theory is the future, a theory of the future, one 
which still has much to teach us about the urgent cultural and political questions of 
today” (107). The renewed sense of productive utopian optimism in reaction to the 
anti-social turn – which Jack-Judith Halberstam suggests is perhaps exemplified by 
Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive in its polemic 
“rejection of futurity as the meaning of queer critique and link[ing of] queer theory to 
the death drive in order to propose a relentless form of negativity” (“Anti-Social 
Turn” 141) –  is, I would argue, most evident in José Esteban Muñoz’s Cruising 
Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity. Muñoz believes that even though 
queerness only exists as “an ideality that can be distilled from the past and used to 
imagine a future” (1), it is in this desire for a better “then and there”, an alternative 
way of being which “resists mandates to accept that which is not enough” (96), that he 
finds transformative potentiality.  
It thus seems to me that the recent anti-social turn has brought to the fore a more 
nuanced iteration of futurity in queer studies, in that negativity is taken up as a 
productive potential instead of as a nihilistic hopelessness. For Edelman, queer 
signifies the limit of the logic of “reproductive futurism” which perpetuates the 
“absolute privilege of heteronormativity” (No Future 2). That is to say, because queer 
is non-reproduction, it threatens the (hetero)normative social order that is figured by 
the child: queer is “the negativity opposed to every form of social viability” (Edelman, 
No Future 9) and “comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the 
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resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form” (3). Critics such as 
Halberstam (“Anti-Social Turn” 141-142) have found this sense of apolitical, anti-
utopian queer negativity to be problematically unavailing, even though Edelman 
himself observes in a footnote that some may misread his project as “an ‘apolitical’ 
formalism, an insufficiently ‘historicized’ intervention in the materiality of politics as 
we know it” (No Future 157). In fact, Edelman argues that “the embrace of queer 
negativity, then, can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some 
positive social value; its value, instead, resides in its challenge to value as defined by 
the social, and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social itself” (No 
Future 6). This formulation suggests that queer’s invaluable potentiality is in its very 
resistance of and opposition to accepted heteronormative norms and values. Edelman 
also emphasises that “the efficacy of queerness, its real strategic value, lies in its 
resistance to a Symbolic reality that only ever invests us as subjects insofar as we 
invest ourselves in it, clinging to its governing fictions, its persistent sublimations, as 
reality itself” (No Future 18). He thus seems to imply that queer will only have a 
future if it is able to manage the perhaps impossible task of conceptualising an 
alternative psychoanalytical structure to the Symbolic. 
Halberstam’s articulation of queer negativity in their current work appears to be more 
politically compelling than Edelman’s. They assert that “[n]egativity might well 
constitute an anti-politics but it should not register as apolitical” (“Anti-Social Turn” 
148), thereby suggesting that in place of an apathetic ennui, queer negativity should 
prompt an earnest and impatient political engagement. The “negative potential of the 
queer” is also of particular interest to them because it allows for an exploration of the 
unpredictable implications of the loss of established meanings and patterns of desire 
(“Anti-Social Turn” 152) as well as a “rethinking [of] the meaning of the political 
through queerness precisely by embracing the incoherent, the lonely, the defeated, the 
traitorous and the disloyal and the formulations of selfhood that these negative modes 
set in motion” (“Queer Betrayals” 178). For this reason, Halberstam proposes that  
queer “names the other possibilities, the other potential outcomes, the non-linear and 
non-inevitable trajectories that fan out from any given event and lead to unpredictable 
futures” (“Anti-Social Turn” 153). Nonetheless, they are especially wary of the 
sanguine celebration of queer desires and urge a consideration of the ways in which 
homosexuality may also be “a site of complicity, complicity in everything that is 
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rotten about love, life, and politics as much as we want it to be complicity in the good, 
the true, and the righteous” (“Queer Betrayals” 185).  
Heather Love’s exploration of the potentiality of queer negativity resonates with 
Halberstam’s work, and informs my understanding of Barbara Adair’s complex 
enunciations of queer futurity in her two novels, In Tangier and End. In Feeling 
Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History, Love argues that queer critics have 
tended to either idealise accounts of the past and the progress of queer politics or 
focus too exclusively on redressing the negative “bad feelings” (160) and suffering 
which gays and lesbians throughout the years have experienced, and thus overlook 
“the wounds, the switchbacks, and the false starts” (32), the nuances of the difficulties 
and ambivalences that have marked queer experiences. For this reason, Love 
emphasises “backward feelings” such as “nostalgia, regret, shame, despair, 
ressentiment, passivity, escapism, self-hatred, withdrawal, bitterness, defeatism, and 
loneliness” (4) – seemingly apolitical feelings as a result of their “lack of vehemence 
and lack of dynamism” (162) but which she nonetheless believes are “tied to the 
experience of social exclusion and to the historical ‘impossibility’ of same-sex desire” 
(4) – in her consideration of the psychic and historical legacy of homophobia, that 
“historical injury” (1), that “history of loss” (29). Through this “feeling backward” to 
a “tradition of queer experience and representation” (4), Love attempts to “teas[e] out 
how this approach to the past might constitute an alternative form of politics in the 
present” (26). This alternative queer politics needs to, Love argues, “incorporat[e] the 
damage that we hope to repair” (151), thus implying that it is impossible to envisage 
any kind of queer transformative politics without an awareness of what needs to be 
transformed. Love is thus committed to a sense of queer well-being and futurity, for in 
asserting that “the question that faces us is how to make a future backward enough 
that even the most reluctant among us might want to live there” (163), she suggests 
that it is only through a constant engagement with the injurious past in the present that 
a promising future can be sustained. 
2.2 IN TANGIER WE KILLED THE BLUE PARROT AND THE QUEER PRESENT 
CONTINUOUS 
As I pointed out in my introduction, In Tangier is Adair’s fictionalised account of the 
American writers Paul and Jane Bowles’s time in Tangier, Morocco: in the novel, 
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Adair carefully draws out the Bowles’ struggles to write as well as their struggles to 
love, not only each other but also their same-sex Moroccan lovers. It is well known 
that Paul and Jane Bowles had an unconventional, and what may perhaps be called 
queer, relationship: even though they were married, they had sexual relationships with 
people of their own sex (Meyers n.p.). Millicent Dillon also mentions in her 
biography of Jane Bowles, A Little Original Sin, that the Bowles often discussed their 
affairs and “their ideal of a marriage, and agreed that no marriage was any good 
unless the partners were free” (43). This is movingly elaborated in In Tangier when 
Paul explains that his and Jane’s relationship “is a great relationship because it is 
based on our common understanding, or maybe misunderstanding, of the world. We 
have an implicit trust which, despite distance and sexual infidelity, will always be 
there. For Jane I am her harbour, for me, Jane is my harbour. Everyone else is just one 
of the small ports that we call into along the way” (46). Paul’s male Moroccan lover 
Belquassim, through whom a significant portion of the novel is focalised, is based on 
the minor character of the same name in Paul Bowles’s novel The Sheltering Sky, 
whereas Cherifa, Jane’s female Moroccan lover, is drawn from Jane Bowles’s lover of 
the same name, whom Jeffrey Meyers describes, perhaps too prejudiciously, as “[a]n 
illiterate savage who spoke only the local Moghrebi dialect and laughed uproariously 
at her own jokes, […and] was notorious for her black magic and insatiable greed, her 
love of alcohol and wild rages” (n.p.).  
In Tangier, which coincidentally was published in the same year as Edelman’s No 
Future, seems to suggest that there is in fact “no future” for queer. Throughout the 
novel, the impotence and destructiveness of queer desire is clear. Jane, for example, 
expresses in exasperation to Belquassim that 
 
 
I try all the time to live by standards that I have set myself, values that I 
have created for myself. But not many people can understand this. They 
think that if your values are not theirs, then you must be crazy, or lonely, 
or sad. And then when they tell me that I must be crazy, lonely or sad, for 
a minute I think that I am, and then I really do go to pieces. And it’s a 
never-ending circle. (64-65) 
 
 
 
As the narrative of In Tangier progresses, it becomes evident that it is not only Jane’s 
gradual estrangement from Paul that causes her to break down, but also her sense of 
alienation resulting from her rejection of what Edelman terms the logic of 
reproductive futurism. She laments that “I know that I sleep in the arms of so many 
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women, but it’s not the same. Or is it the same? These questions, such a cliché, the 
questions that everyone asks once in a while. Maybe I must just value what I have 
with Paul, but even that I have lost. I have done terrible and irreparable damage” 
(135). This “damage” is, I would argue, the psychological anguish and despair Jane 
has inflicted on herself as she continuously attempts – and fails – to find her place in 
either the arms of Cherifa or Paul.  
Even though In Tangier highlights the problematic racial dynamics between Paul and 
Jane and their respective Moroccan lovers and suggests that part of Belquassim’s 
defeatism is a result of his dependency on the white Europeans, I want to argue that 
the sense of forlorn hope that seems to pervade the novel is also indicative of the 
inevitable failure of anti-social queer in the face of hegemonic heteronormativity. The 
closing scene of In Tangier – in which Belquassim finishes his drink in a bar as he 
thinks of Paul’s telegram from Spain informing him of Jane’s death, while a young 
boy who turns out to be Belquassim’s son arrives to summon him home for supper 
(163-164) – can be read in light of Edelman’s thesis: the child leading the father home 
is a reminder that the queer figure has no choice but to comply with the logic of 
reproductive futurism. Indeed, Belquassim demonstrates that he too has come to this 
realisation, for in his contemplation that “when I sold myself, what did I receive in 
payment? Only a dream, and I have already spent my dream” (164) is the suggestion 
of the inaccessibility of queer utopia. Paul’s earlier ruminations on hope – when he 
says “‘Hope in what, humanity? It is such a false emotion, hope. Hope is more false 
than love, for hope allows a person to believe that he will ultimately attain something 
better. But he never will, and they never do’” (141) – also captures this despondency 
about the (un)sustainability of queer futures. In the opening chapter, Belquassim in 
fact reflects that Paul and Jane “had freed themselves from the slow decay of social 
bondage. Freed themselves from prejudice, tyranny and despair. And yet where are 
they now?” (6). Death seems to be the only other option for queer.  
Nevertheless, I want to argue that an appropriate response to Belquassim’s rhetorical 
question is that Paul and Jane are in Adair’s In Tangier. The lives of Paul and Jane 
Bowles (and those of various other queer historical figures who have a significant 
presence in the novel, such as William Burroughs, Gertrude Stein, and the lesbian 
writer and salonist Natalie Barney) become intertexts to which Adair “feels 
backward”, to borrow Love’s formulation. That is to say, in drawing intertextually on 
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the lives of Paul and Jane Bowles as well as on their milieu and literary oeuvre, In 
Tangier urges our attending in the present moment of reading to the Bowles’ 
emotional legacy and to Adair’s elaboration of the latent potential of “backward 
feelings”, or what Halberstam would call queer negativity. In Tangier can thus be 
understood as a textual articulation of affective feelings backward and, in this way, it 
opens up a potentially productive vision of queer futurity. Indeed, Linda Hutcheon 
argues that such “[p]ostmodern intertextuality is a formal manifestation of both a 
desire to close the gap between past and present of the reader and a desire to rewrite 
the past in a new context” (Poetics 118, my emphasis). 
In In Tangier, Jane’s volatile emotions seem to stem from her sense of (un)belonging, 
her reluctance to subscribe to the logic of reproductive futurism. She is exceedingly 
insecure about her own intellectual ability and is also highly aware of other people’s 
opinions of her. For example, she grumbles to Belquassim about how, despite her 
novel being fairly well received by the New York literary circle, they still nonetheless 
“never really think of me as a real person. They may think that I am daring, but they 
never take my autonomy from their normal dull world seriously. I am never a part of 
them. And sometimes, when it gets to me, when I feel insecure, then I think that I 
have made the wrong choices” (65). Even though she feels that she has liberated 
herself from the “normal dull world” of conventionality, she is still deeply troubled by 
this marginalised position society has assigned her, and she also bemoans how 
hegemonic heteronormativity forecloses her “queer” identity when she reflects: “Why 
am I not a wife and mother like all those ladies that I grew up with? It would make 
things so much easier. I would at least be a person, someone whom the world can 
recognise” (65). Belquassim however observes that Jane in fact “tried to define 
herself in pleasure” in order to cope with this despair and self-doubt because it was 
“the way that she kept herself safe from those she loved most. How she kept safe from 
an outside world that she believed sought to judge her” (7). Nonetheless, this pleasure 
never seems to be sustainable. The gentle violence of the sensuality between Jane and 
Natalie5, who arrives in Tangier with Gertrude (Stein) and Alice (B Toklas), captures 
this sense of the unsustinability of pleasure and the inevitable pain concomitant 
therewith: despite the intimacy of their sexual encounter, Jane gets “twisted” by 
                                                          
5 It is worth noting that there is no mention of a meeting between Jane Bowles and Natalie Barney in 
Dillon’s biography of Bowles, A Little Original Sin. 
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Natalie “in a hard brutal way” that she ends up “gasp[ing] as if she were a frangipani 
bud that had been torn from the bud” (114). 
However, Paul suggests that it is exactly Jane’s need for emotional plenitude, her 
“desperate need to fill herself up with life’s emotional content” (22), that attracts him 
to her and keeps him going, for it is in this way that he can “experience life” and 
“[i]t’s the only way I really know what feelings are all about” (21). Jane’s negative, 
“backward” feelings thus become the impetus of sorts for Paul’s creative prolificacy. 
Throughout In Tangier, Paul displays a sense of apathetic, and almost nihilistic, 
detachment. In his most comprehensive elaboration thereof – he claims that “I do not 
care about anything; that is my value. I never speak about feelings; I do not 
experience that inner turmoil that most people seem to experience. I do not have 
feelings. I am able to stand outside the circle, never moving inside. In this way I can 
capture the feelings of others. I survive by words” (20) – he suggests that it is this 
self-imposed indifference, this almost dispassionate subjectivity, that is constructive 
because it paradoxically enables him to write productively about the “feelings” of 
others. Indeed, Jane comments that Paul “has already moved away from me into that 
world of nothingness where he is able to create. He needs to watch someone die, 
implacable and without feeling, and then he writes about it, and he writes about it 
beautifully” (135). It therefore becomes evident that queer negativity can sustain a 
sense of vitality and futurity, as Paul implies that his “survival” depends on this 
nihilistically impassive working-through of others’ feelings in his literary works, 
spurred on by Jane’s emotional fervour. Nonetheless, despite this seeming 
affectlessness, Paul continuously strives throughout In Tangier to understand the 
concept of love, just as Jane and Belquassim do in their different ways, and I will 
explore this more fully in the next chapter. 
What is also noteworthy, however, is Paul’s remark that “[s]entiment and memory 
cannot affect me. I put those feelings somewhere else, otherwise I cannot work” (144, 
my emphasis), suggesting that for him to be productive, he has to let go of both the 
sentimental and the past, which for him also belongs to the affective. Love similarly 
locates the past in the affective, yet it is precisely through a “feeling backward”, a 
reaching for past structures of queer feeling, that one can forge a “backward future” 
(147) in which the past is reconsidered and revalorised to capacitate a queer “then and 
there”, to borrow Muñoz’s formulation, where this historical loss is embraced and 
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abjection risked (30). Jane can be understood as speaking to this when she says to 
Belquassim that “[n]o one can tell a story that is his own […]. We all have a common 
story, it’s the same story, an old story, but I want you to tell me anyway. I want you to 
tell me because you have a new face and therefore you will tell the story differently” 
(14): she is interested in how Belquassim will enunciate his own “story” and implies 
that in repeatedly encountering the affective narratives of others, which for her are 
always already variations on a prior, established theme, she will be better able to 
make sense of her own “story” and a discursive space may be opened up to re-
evaluate and perhaps even to transform the legacy of those deep-rooted affective 
themes of loss and abjection. 
Indeed, In Tangier is framed as Belquassim’s recollections of his past with Paul and 
Jane, as is indicated in the opening passage where Belquassim explains that 
“[m]emories are remembered so that the adventure can be told. The telling of a 
memory makes the story, the story that is more exotic than the experience. What 
happened itself is not the real, only the story is real.” (1). What is suggested here is 
that, in recounting his involvement in the lives of Jane and Paul, Belquassim is trying 
to work through – and perhaps even rework – and re-evaluate his sense of 
displacement and despair resulting from his position as both a colonised and a queer 
subject. For Muñoz, “our remembrances and their ritualized telling – through film, 
video, performance, writing, and visual culture” have “world-making potentialities” 
(35). This transformative potential is evident when Belquassim realises that the 
“immediacy of my own suffering, maybe, helps me to see the world more clearly. If I 
know about pain then at least I can know the pain of others. Maybe it will allow me to 
forgive more easily as I will know that everyone else suffers in much the same way as 
I do” (11). In a similar manner to Jane, Belquassim believes that an acute awareness 
of his own suffering may foster a letting go of resentment and a sensitive 
reconsideration of the consequences of queer negativity. 
As I have been suggesting, In Tangier’s enunciation of queer futurity only becomes 
distinctly apparent when it is considered inter- and metatextually. The way in which 
the novel is framed thus also becomes significant. In the preface, Adair notes that a 
young boy points out to her that “the old man with the white hair” who is writing in 
the café is presumably Paul Bowles and as she leaves, “he lifts up his head and looks 
out across the sea” (n.p.). In the last chapter of the novel, Belquassim looks out of the 
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bar to see Spain in the distance across the ocean (163) and his son also leads him 
home through the “front door that leads down to the ocean” (164). Jane Bowles muses 
in a notebook that “[t]here comes a moment when there is no possibility of escape, as 
if the spirit were a box hitting at the walls of the head. Looking at the ocean is the 
only relief” (qtd in M Dillon, A Little Original Sin 238). These two scenes of “looking 
at the ocean” which open and close the novel thus index the “possibility of escape” 
from the nullifying logic of reproductive futurism and the potential recourse to an 
affirming, solacing queer negativity. 
The notable South African writer Marlene van Niekerk’s appraisal of In Tangier is 
published, somewhat oddly, as the last page of the book and thus can be read as a sort 
of afterword. She concludes that In Tangier “leaves the reader with an overbearing 
sense of melancholy and sadness about the unavoidable traps of desire and exorcism 
that any western writer confronting any ‘other’ will encounter” (n.p.). The “other” 
here can not only be understood conventionally as the colonial other, but perhaps also 
as the queer other, and in this way, Van Niekerk points to the burden of the affective 
legacy of queer ostracism. However, she also observes that “it is a reading experience 
that lingers in the mind” and that there is “a self-reflexive depth to all the voices that 
Adair so skilfully evokes for her purpose” (n.p., my emphases). Van Niekerk’s 
comments thus suggest that Adair’s “feeling backward” to the legacy of Paul and Jane 
Bowles articulates and simultaneously attempts to disrupt the supposedly hopeless 
paralysis of queer negativity, for the unsettling persistence of the “backward feelings” 
in the novel – which she identifies as “[w]riterly narcissism, betrayal, moral confusion, 
love, lust and loss” (n.p.) – necessitates the attentive readers’ introspection on their 
own relation thereto. In this way, In Tangier performs what I want to call a “queer 
present continuous”. Whereas a “feeling backward” privileges the past, a queer 
present continuous – just as the present continuous tense describes something that is 
happening now but implies that it began sometime before the moment of enunciation 
and probably continued after it (Thomson and Martinet 154-155) – foregrounds the 
continuity of the past in the present and its implications for the future. In Tangier as 
an iteration of the queer present continuous thus opens a discursive space for the 
consideration of alternative modes of be(com)ing and encountering, of whether some 
sense of queer ideality and transformative politics can be distilled from an 
invalidating past to imagine a hopeful future. 
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In fact, I think that Van Niekerk’s passing remarks about the “writer” become quite 
significant when considered more specifically in the Barthesian sense and elucidates 
the fundamental point I am trying to advance in this section, which is that In Tangier 
is a “writerly” text and it is in this way that a productive queer futurity can be 
enunciated. Throughout his work on textuality, Roland Barthes distinguishes between 
a “readerly” and “writerly” text. In S/Z, his earliest elaboration on these terms, 
Barthes maintains that the reader of the readerly text is “plunged into a kind of 
idleness” (4) and “instead of functioning himself, instead of gaining access to the 
magic of the signifier, to the pleasure of writing, he is left with no more than the poor 
freedom either to accept or reject the text” (4). Barthes adds that the readerly text is 
“controlled by the principle of non-contradiction, but by multiplying solidarities, by 
stressing at every opportunity the compatible nature of circumstances, by attaching 
narrated events together with a kind of logical ‘paste,’ the discourse carries this 
principle to the point of obsession” (156). That is to say, a readerly text is not only 
one in which the reader is a passive consumer of the literary work’s meaning but is 
also one that is presented in a linear and traditional manner which forecloses the 
possibility for a plurality of meaning. In contrast, a writerly text is, according to 
Barthes, “ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world as 
function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system 
(Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of 
networks, the infinity of languages” (S/Z 5, emphasis in original). This suggests that a 
writerly text is one which resists the reader’s passive consumption of the literary work 
because it is interwoven with a multiplicity of narrative, cultural and social discourse 
and ideologies which challenge his or her expectations. In making sense of this 
plurality of meaning, the reader effectively becomes “a producer of the text” (4). 
Barthes’s essay “From Work to Text”, which was originally published a year after S/Z, 
nuances this distinction between readerly and writerly texts. Here Barthes seems to 
equate the writerly text with his notion of “Text”, for the Text not only “accomplishes 
the very plural of meaning” (159) and thus “asks of the reader a practical 
collaboration” (163) in the reading-writing thereof, but also disrupts the conventional, 
the status quo, because it is “subversive” (157) and is “always paradoxical” (158, 
emphasis in original). What is significant in this essay is Barthes’s distinct elaboration 
of intertextuality. He argues that what makes up the plurality of the Text’s meaning is 
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that it is 
 
 
woven entirely with citations, references, echoes, cultural languages (what 
language is not?), antecedent or contemporary, which cut across it through 
and through in a vast stereophony. The intertextual in which every text is 
held, it itself being the text-between of another text, is not to be confused 
with some origin of the text: to try to find the “sources”, the “influences” 
of a work, is to fall in with the myth of filiation; the citations which go to 
make up a text are anonymous, untraceable, and yet already read: they are 
quotations without inverted commas. (160) 
 
 
 
 
That is to say, every Text is heteroglossic by nature because it is never self-enclosed 
but always already contains within it various social and cultural discourses as well as 
vestiges of other texts, whether literary or not, which threaten any stable, unitary 
conception of meaning. Barthes also seems to suggest here that the point is not to 
trace and identify a literary work’s intertexts, but rather to understand the relational 
nature of all texts and to make meaning of the networks of affiliation. 
Barthes carefully articulates this understanding of intertextuality in a later treatise on 
textuality, The Pleasure of the Text. For Barthes, 
 
 
Text means Tissue; but whereas hitherto we have always taken this tissue 
as a product, a ready-made veil, behind which lies, more or less hidden, 
meaning (truth), we are now emphasizing, in the tissue, the generative idea 
that the text is made, is worked out in a perpetual interweaving; lost in this 
tissue–this texture–the subject unmakes himself, like a spider dissolving in 
the constructive secretions of its web. (64, emphases in original) 
 
 
 
 
This again emphasises that all texts are intertextual and what in turn makes a text 
“readerly” or “writerly” is the way in which the text itself foregrounds this 
intertextual nature. The reader of a writerly text gets entangled and “unmakes” him- 
or herself in this web of (inter)texts and experiences a jouissance or bliss as a result of 
this loss of the stability of selfhood in language. The writerly text of bliss, Barthes 
argues, “discomforts (perhaps to the point of a certain boredom), unsettles the reader’s 
historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, 
memories, brings to a crisis his relation with language” (Pleasure 14). It is thus in 
these texts’ subversion of what Barthes calls doxa – the conventional, the accepted – 
that the reader, disintegrating into the realm of textuality and unravelling his or her 
settled sense of identity, experiences a moment of orgasmic bliss. On the other hand, 
though the distinction is not as differentially unambiguous, texts of pleasure – that is, 
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readerly texts – are texts which are pleasurable because they conform to the 
ideologies of the dominant class and plug the reader into its social values: according 
to Barthes, the text of pleasure is one that “contents, fills, grants euphoria; the text that 
comes from culture and does not break with it, is linked to a comfortable practice of 
reading” (14, emphasis in original). 
In Tangier’s complex writerly intertextuality has clearly baffled some reviewers. 
According to Martha Stone, whose review appears to be the only one from outside 
South Africa, In Tangier is “a hybrid consisting of excerpts from six works of fiction 
and poetry by Paul Bowles and two works of fiction by his wife, Jane Auer Bowles, 
all held together by Barbara Adair’s novel. At no point does Adair give the reader any 
indication of which work is being quoted” (45). For Stone, then, In Tangier is part 
fiction and part a collection of unattributed excerpts. Adam Levin, whose review 
“Paul, Jane and Barbara” appears in a local newspaper, similarly finds Adair’s 
apparent “borrowing” (to use his term) of passages from Paul and Jane Bowles’s work 
problematic. He points out that “[i]n the course of 164 pages, a total of 33 pages of 
either Paul or Jane’s work is simply lifted in page-long chunks” (n.p.). It is unclear, 
however, which pages Levin is referring to here, for the italicised first-person stream-
of-conscious meditations which intersperse the novel total 37 pages and, though 
presented as if they are excerpts from the journals of the Bowleses6, are in fact 
fictional because they frequently mention Belquassim, whom the Bowleses would 
never have been able to interact with because he is a character drawn from Paul 
Bowles’s The Sheltering Sky. Perhaps naively, Levin asserts that “[w]hile some might 
pass this off as a post-modern literary technique, for me it verges on plagiarism” (n.p.) 
and he further insists that “the story, if not the details, [must remain] true to the spirit 
and motivation of the subject” (n.p.). The issues raised by these reviewers relating to 
originality, the extent to which writers may use other writers’ published work and the 
fictionalising of biographical “fact” are in fact addressed by Adair herself, not only 
indirectly through the metafictionality of In Tangier, but also directly in her 
acknowledgements as well as in her later article “Speaking through the Mask of 
Culture”, which responds to the highly publicised dispute between Antjie Krog and 
                                                          
6 Shirley Kossick also incorrectly identifies these sections in her description of In Tangier: “Using the 
recollections of Belquassim as well as journal entries of both Paul and Jane, Adair pieces together a 
compelling portrayal of their lives in Tangier” (n.p., my emphasis). 
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Stephen Watson regarding their poetical reworkings of the Bleek-Lloyd archives of 
indigenous Khoisan narratives and Watson’s accusation that Krog plagiarised his 
adaptations thereof7. I thus think that it is necessary to consider carefully what Levin 
rejects as the “post-modern literary technique[s]” (n.p.) of In Tangier and the 
implications thereof.  
In “Speaking through the Mask of Culture”, Adair self-knowingly weaves, without 
citation, the words of not only Barthes but also Julia Kristeva into her own: she claims 
that in postmodernity, “we have texts as a mosaic of quotations8. Intertextuality, an 
unconscious imitation; the citations that go to make up the text are anonymous, 
untraceable and yet already read, they are quotations without inverted commas, a 
tissue of quotations drawn from innumerable centres of culture9” (n.p.). In this way, 
Adair positions herself resolutely within the tradition of postmodernist notions of 
textuality and authorship. Jean Rossmann explores this through the metatextuality of 
the novel and comments on how Adair uses Paul (Bowles) – who was known as a 
translator and promoter of Moroccan artist-writers such as his “protégé” (M Dillon, 
You Are Not I xiv) Mohammed Mrabet and Ahmed Yacoubi, with whom he had a 
“creative relationship” (ibid. 224) – to reflect on the nature of her own creative-
writing process (34-36). For example, Rossmann discusses how Adair articulates her 
own playful practices of appropriation and reworking when she lets Paul reflect that 
“[i]t is a new thing for me to record the story of another. Yes, I do make some 
changes, but the story and the language are not my own. Now I am playing with the 
words of another. They are not my words. I do not own them. Yet I feel that they are 
mine because I write them down” (In Tangier 124; qtd in Rossmann 35). 
Nonetheless, Adair’s postmodern “playing” with others’ words seems to be curiously 
problematised in her suggestion in “Speaking through the Mask of Culture” that 
because “there are only a limited number of so-called unique combinations” of 
originality, what is left for the individual is the “imitation of the styles and words of 
                                                          
7 See chapter one part one of Kathryn Barbara Highman’s PhD dissertation, “Forging a New South 
Africa: Plagiarism and the National Imaginary”, for a detailed analysis of the case. 
8 In her essay “Word, Dialogue and Novel” which presents the ideas of the Russian literary theorist 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Kristeva writes that for Bakhtin, “any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; 
any text is the absorption and transformation of another” (37). 
9 In his well-known essay “The Death of the Author”, Barthes suggests that “[t]he text is a tissue of 
quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture” (146). 
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others” and thus “[w]riters necessarily speak through a mask, the mask of culture” 
(n.p.). These claims point to Arthur Schopenhauer’s essay “On Authorship and Style”, 
in which he actually censures such lazy imitation. For Schopenhauer, “[t]o imitate 
another’s style is equivalent to wearing a mask. However fine this may be, it soon 
becomes insipid and insufferable because it is lifeless, so that even the ugliest living 
face is better. […] We should discover faults of style in the writings of others in order 
to avoid them in our own” (515-516). Adair, however, astutely qualifies this mask as 
being that of “culture”, because for her, as for Barthes, all literary works are 
necessarily situated within a network of socio-cultural discourses. In thus resituating 
the lives and works of Paul and Jane Bowles in In Tangier as what Hutcheon would 
call “historiographic metafiction”, Adair calls attention to such “faults” or oversights 
as not recognising that “[t]he interaction of the historiographic and the metafictional 
foregrounds the rejection of the claims of both ‘authentic’ representation and 
‘inauthentic’ copy alike, and the very meaning of artistic originality is as forcefully 
challenged as is the transparency of historical referentiality” (Hutcheon, Poetics 110). 
That is to say, the past needs to be reconceptualised as being no longer reliably 
teleological because it is also only accessible through textualisations, and thus In 
Tangier’s re-examining of the discursive contexts of the Bowleses opens this past up 
to potential revisions with transformative implications for the present and the future. 
Barthes’s enunciation of the intertext as “simply a circular memory” (Pleasure 36, 
emphasis in original) is thus also instructive in its analogy of complicating of linear 
temporality and textuality. 
Indeed, what I think is significant for my consideration of queer futurity is not 
whether Adair unquestioningly accepts the postmodern notion of (inter)textuality, but 
rather how her taking up thereof opens up a space for a queer present continuous of 
alternatives. In the acknowledgements which appear just after the title page of In 
Tangier, Adair claims that readers “will know these words or sentences or paragraphs 
or poetry. They will know who wrote them. They will know where the words come 
from. They will also know why they are placed where they are in my text” (n.p., my 
emphasis). Adair thus self-consciously hints at her practice of feeling backward to the 
(literary) archive of queer negative affect and further recognises the attentive reader’s 
writerly awareness of its legacies. Stone’s review picks up on this, albeit reductively, 
when she maintains that In Tangier “is worth hunting down by anyone interested in 
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the lives of the Bowleses and their circle. Better still, it may encourage some readers 
to explore or re-explore the writings of its main characters” (45). In the novel, Adair 
has Paul reflect more discriminately on the impact of his work when he contemplates 
that “when I die my books will remain, and if they are still read people will remember 
me. Or maybe they will not. Maybe they will just remember the people who are made 
by the words. They will not be my words. They will just be words. People’s words. 
[…] Nothing lasts, but does it pass on?” (125). Though Paul’s words literally “pass 
on” through Adair’s novel, what is more significant is how Adair enunciates a queer 
present continuous: she suggests that Paul’s words become part of the (textualised) 
history of queer negativity which, when remembered, may end up changing people’s 
consciousness, which in turn may potentially bring about a change in social 
circumstances where queerness can re-member itself into a more progressive society. 
One of the queer figures that Adair feels backward to in In Tangier is Kit, the female 
protagonist of Paul Bowles’s The Sheltering Sky. Belquassim offers a reading of the 
last section of The Sheltering Sky, in which Kit gets picked up by a caravan of 
Bedouin traders after Port’s death and becomes attached to one of the camel drivers, 
Belquassim (P Bowles 285ff.). Adair’s Belquassim believes that 
 
 
Kit, after the death of her husband, then left more than just his body, she 
left her senses behind. She left her America and became part of a caravan 
that was moving its silver across the desert. She left behind her civilisation, 
her body-wrapped right-mindedness, to appropriate another civilisation, 
one that inflicted a suffering that she could never previously have known, 
but one that allowed her to revel with an almost sensuous pleasure in her 
own suffering and to understand that it is only death that can claim 
ownership. (28) 
 
 
 
It is evident here that Belquassim’s point of view focuses tenderly on Kit’s giving up 
of what Barthes would call doxa to embrace an alternative “civilisation”, an 
alternative mode of being in which pain becomes an impetus to be in touch with – and 
perhaps even transcend – the bodily self. This contrasts the way Dillon frames her 
analysis in A Little Original Sin of the same section. For Dillon, Kit in this final 
section of The Sheltering Sky “goes deeper and deeper into a savage landscape where 
she is subjected to a series of rapes and brutalities. She even comes to love her 
degradation in a world that is sex and death and violence and nothing else. She finally 
falls into madness” (175), and thus what is foregrounded is a sense not only of 
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victimhood but also of a demise and ruination of the self. 
Furthermore, Adair feels backward to the two puzzling female protagonists of Jane 
Bowles’s Two Serious Ladies, Miss Goering and Mrs Copperfield, who according to 
Dillon “seem in a perpetual traction of the emotions” (Little Original Sin 101). In the 
extract from the closing pages of Jane Bowles’s novel that Jane reads to Belquassim, 
Mrs Copperfield, who has just returned from a trip to Panama where she met the 
prostitute Pacifica, meets up with Miss Goering in a restaurant and reflects that 
 
 
“I can’t live without her [Pacifica], not for a minute. I’d go completely to 
pieces.” To which one of her serious friends [ie Miss Goering] replies: 
“But you have gone to pieces, or do I misjudge you dreadfully?” “True 
enough,” says Mrs Copperfield, “I have gone to pieces, which is a thing I 
have wanted to do for years … but I have my happiness, which I guard like 
a wolf, and I have authority now and a certain amount of daring, which, if 
you remember correctly, I never had before.” (In Tangier 64) 
 
 
 
This suggests that Mrs Copperfield has finally triumphed in her refusal to live 
according to the dictates of the logic of reproductive futurism, and in fact feels that 
she gains a sense of respect and a certain liberation in her “going to pieces”, in her 
audacious breaking (up) of doxa. What is further noteworthy is Adair’s omission of 
the clause “I know I am as guilty as I can be”, which appears in Jane Bowles’s 
original (197) where Adair has ellipses, and this suggests a sanguine elision of 
negative culpability in order to foreground the affirmative and productive sense of 
queer futurity. Though Jane asserts to Belquassim that she wants to feel exactly as 
Mrs Copperfield – whose “sole object in life was to be happy” (J Bowles 40) – does, 
she also realises that she does not yet “have that certain amount of daring” (In Tangier 
64) to challenge the (hetero)normalising structures she is confronted with. Adair is 
thus not naively unaware of the emotional struggles concomitant with the desire to 
belong in unbelonging: just as Jane Bowles in writing Two Serious Ladies “was not 
simply creating character as she wrote; she was also creating herself and her life to 
come” (M Dillon, Little Original Sin 107), so Adair in In Tangier questions and 
works through the world-making potentiality, as Muñoz would have it, of a queer 
present continuous. 
It is in this way that I understand Adair’s In Tangier to open up a discursive third 
space for a consideration of the productivity of alternative, queer be(com)ings. In an 
interview with Jonathan Rutherford, Homi Bhabha explains that this notion of the 
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third space “displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of 
authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through 
received wisdom” (211). Though it does not dismiss and lose sight of archives of 
antisocial queer negativity that it feels backward to, In Tangier in its iteration of a 
queer present continuous unsettles the way in which these relationalities have been 
conventionally received. For example, in feeling backward to Jane Bowles and her 
work – which in Dillon’s reading is about “what is common to us all: of that place 
within ourselves where we are at one and the same time masculine and feminine, 
childlike and powerful, aged and just beginning, of that place where we go to death 
and we hold on to life” (Little Original Sin 423) – Adair continues to negotiate the 
either/or-ness of the logic of reproductive futurism to advance an and-ness of queer 
antisocial sociality and present continuous. 
Furthermore, this kind of hybrid third space, according to Bhabha, “gives rise to 
something different, something new and unrecognisable, a new area of negotiation of 
meaning and representation” (211). As problematic as Levin’s reading of In Tangier 
may be, his review signals that the novel does indeed open up this discursive third 
space. When Levin elaborates that he is “suspicious” as to whether In Tangier “stays 
true to the spirit of the Bowleses” and claims that “[o]nce the writer has lost the 
reader’s trust in this way, it is difficult to re-establish it. Was Cherifa so evil? I 
wonder. Was Jane so angry?” (n.p.), he highlights how the novel unsettles readers’ 
cultural and textual assumptions and conventional approach to meaning-making. 
Indeed, Dillon maintains that both Paul and Jane Bowles “[i]n their originality […] 
shared an antagonism to imposed systems of thought, to academia, to intellectual and 
literary snobs” (Little Original Sin 43). Paul and Jane Bowles thus serve to elaborate 
an affective heteroglossia in In Tangier, in which the attentive reader is compelled to 
pragmatically reconsider and revise notions of queer negativity to ground future 
possibilities. That is to say, Adair does not categorically attempt to make reparations, 
but rather signals (inter)textually the possibility for a rethinking of the productive 
potentiality of queer antisocial affectivity. For Barthes, intertextuality suggests “the 
impossibility of living outside the infinite text – […] the book creates the meaning, 
the meaning creates life” (Pleasure 36). Paul’s comment to Belquassim that 
“[s]ometimes I think we should all live as if we were in a novel, then it would not hurt 
so much” (82) addresses, however dispassionately, the “world-making potentialities” 
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(Muñoz 35) of such intertextual remembering and retelling. 
2.3 END AND THE QUEER PRESENT CONTINUOUS 
Adair’s second novel End, as I suggested in the introduction, draws on and reworks 
the 1942 film Casablanca in complex ways. As Fred de Vries further points out, 
“[t]here’s also the cruel writer Freddie, a kind of superimposed character, who talks to 
her protagonists, called X and Y, and treats them like puppets on a string. Oh, and one 
of them changes gender, whenever it suits the manipulative Freddie” (n.p.). In this 
section, I will consider how End enunciates, similarly to In Tangier, a potentially 
productive vision of queer antisocial sociality. Although the novel’s title suggests a 
sense of finality, of no beyond, no future, what End rather seems to delineate is the 
limits of the logic of reproductive futurism. Furthermore, End seems committed to a 
queer present continuous where the futurity and world-making potentialities of (queer) 
textuality lie in the sujet en procès who, according to Kristeva, “remodel[s] the 
historically accepted and defined chora of signifiance, through the proposition of the 
representation of a different relation to natural objects, to social apparatuses, and to 
the body itself” (“Subject in Process” 142). This fluid motility of the unnamed 
journalist’s be(com)ing is dramatised through End’s metafictional nature, and the 
unnamed journalist comes to occupy the position of what Edelman terms the 
“sinthomosexual”, or rather, what I will call a sinthomosexual en procès.  
Beppi Chiuppani, whose PhD chapter is the only academic consideration of End, 
argues that the plots of End and the film Casablanca are both “constructed around the 
political and the sentimental” and thus the novel’s setting up of the film as an intertext 
“elicits in the reader the expectation of an interaction between these two dimensions” 
(163). Chiuppani further maintains that “[r]ight from the prologue, we realize that if 
Casablanca was commenting on the dilemma of engagement in the struggle for 
European freedom, End will be thinking about a similar problematic in relation to 
recent African history” (162). What I think End does more pertinently is to situate and 
question the dilemma of interaction between the political and the affective in relation 
to the logic of reproductive futurism. Indeed, De Vries points out in his interview with 
Adair that the “story of Casablanca is essentially the choice between love and virtue, 
between staying with the woman you love and doing the right thing” (n.p.), and Adair 
indicates in that interview that Casablanca “is all about true love ladida” and that she 
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had hoped to turn the conventional love story “on its head” and “[m]ake the clichés 
the opposite” (n.p.). 
The film Casablanca focuses on a love triangle in which Rick Blaine, an American 
café owner who holds two letters of transit, has to choose between his enduring love 
for Ilsa Lund, a woman who was his former lover, and helping her husband Victor 
Laszlo, who is involved in the resistance movement, escape Vichy-controlled 
Casablanca to continue his fight against the Nazis. Rick eventually lets Ilsa and her 
husband have the letters of transit to leave Casablanca, thereby allowing the legally 
married couple to remain together. Rick remarks to Ilsa in his newfound sense of 
political commitment that they both know she belongs with Victor as she is “part of 
his work. The thing that keeps him going”. In this way, Rick suggests that 
conventional, heteronormative forms of kinship are necessary for political activism, 
for a future free of oppression. In End, Adair focuses on queer’s forward-looking 
constraintlessness when Freddie takes the queer unnamed journalist with her on the 
plane out of South Africa, leaving the married couple X and Y behind to face the 
law – Y is arrested “on a charge of being an accessory to the murder of a civilian in 
Berea and dealing in cocaine, mandrax and cannabis” (152). The unnamed journalist 
further points out to X that “You are part of her [Y]. You are the thing that keeps her 
going” (153). The implication here is that X and Y are ontologically constitutive – the 
man is the woman – and hence that the heteronormative demarcations of sex and 
patterns of intimacy are inevitably arrested in unproductive impotency, in a no-future. 
Furthermore, in Casablanca, a Bulgarian woman approaches Rick to find out whether 
Captain Renault is “trustworthy”,  as she is prepared to offer herself to him for sex in 
exchange for exit visas. Not wanting her to ruin her new marriage, Rick arranges for 
her husband to win at the roulette table so that they will have enough money to buy 
the visas themselves. This suggests that heroic patriarchy is always in support of 
maintaining heteronormative forms of kinship. Adair, however, reworks this scene 
from the film to comment on the inhibiting nature of the logic of reproductive 
futurism and the (symbolic) law. In End, a woman of “about twenty” years old walks 
up to a policeman to enquire “what kind of man” the police captain is, as he has 
promised her husband a job in the police force if she sleeps with him. The woman and 
her husband are from the Eastern Cape and are trying to survive in Johannesburg. The 
policeman urges them to leave the city and arranges for her husband to win at the 
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roulette table so that they will have enough money to return to the Eastern Cape (127-
129). What is thus emphasised is that it is indeed the patriarchal, symbolic law – as 
figured in the policeman, the enforcer of the law – that holds such stultifying, 
heteronormative organisations of communal relations in place. 
Adair’s hesitancy to accept the logic of reproductive futurism becomes clearly evident 
when Y muses that 
 
 
[e]veryone seems to have children, and if they don’t then they have a cat. I 
suppose it is a biological imperative that all women need to bear children 
so that the race will continue. Biology disguised as good sex. Or maybe 
disguised as selfless sharing. No one else will need you to share your life 
with them. Or is it just plain fear that makes people reproduce, the fear of 
death, the need for immorality, immorality through your own genes? The 
need not to be alone. Maybe it is just ego, the need to be so desperately 
needed. I wonder. (108) 
 
 
 
That is to say, the claim that reproduction is a necessary “biological imperative” is 
merely an excuse to disguise a fundamental fear and empty narcissism. The peculiar 
last chapter of End, which Chiuppani glosses as “a surreal epilogue to the story” (165), 
thus fits into Adair’s problematising of the logic of reproductive futurism. Princess 
Diana is imagined to visit a refugee camp in the north of Mozambique. After having 
engaged with the people, Diana is assassinated on her way back to the plane. More 
than just a critique of the colonisers’ superficial, self-serving attempts to make 
reparations, the scene also highlights, in my view, the absurdity and futility of 
patrilineage – or of what Halberstam calls reproductive time, the heteronormative 
“temporal frames of bourgeois reproduction and family, longevity, risk/safety, and 
inheritance” (In a Queer Time and Place 6) – as embodied in the notion of monarchy 
and exemplified in Diana, who is described as “the future Queen of England” (157). 
Diana is a “vacant princess” who is “as vacant as their [the refugees’] world” (158) 
because she is trapped in an inescapable, hopeless existence, just like the refugees, 
and thus her assassination highlights this vulnerability and ineffectuality of 
reproductive futurism. When the unnamed journalist states in face of this that “I am 
tired of all of this now. It all seems so desperate. I want something else” (159), he10 
                                                          
10 Gender pronouns used to refer to the unnamed journalist will follow the sexual designation in the 
End chapter under discussion. 
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seems to be yearning for nonnormative logics of engaging with and be(com)ing in the 
world. 
End seems to suggest that drug use is one way to embody an alternative, queer 
temporality. Y is a drug addict and dealer, and her habits are often a point of 
contention between her and her husband, X. X complains to Y that “I hate that white 
powder that you put up your nose or put into a pipe to smoke. […] Don’t you 
sometimes wonder if it is worth all of this? I mean, what are you doing it for?” (63) 
and accuses her of trying to break free from herself and her responsibilities when he 
reflects that “I wonder if you know you are trying to escape from yourself” (64). For 
Halberstam, queer temporality is about “the potentiality of a life unscripted by the 
conventions of family, inheritance, and child rearing” (In a Queer Time and Place 2), 
and Y embraces this counterhegemonic productivity of drugs. Y recognises the 
stagnancy of rigid conventionality and affirms drugs’ ability to open up a queer 
present continuous when she asks X whether she should “remain here hiding out with 
you then? […] Or shall I carry on the best I can in these circumstances? If I stop the 
powder it will be as if I have stopped breathing. I shall die. If we were all like you the 
world would die” (63). Indeed, X does acknowledge that Y’s drug addiction is more 
than just a shirking from responsibilities when he remarks that she “needs to be free 
and she is fighting for freedom. Freedom is the only thing that she knows about” 
(141-142). That is to say, drugs become a different kind of letter of transit, one which 
allows a breaking free from the confining logic of reproductive futurism. This is 
emphasised in End when the drug dealer Y meets is constantly identified as the 
“weasel” (84-85, 133-134), a reference to Casablanca’s Ugarte, who is suggested at 
the beginning of the film to have murdered German couriers to obtain the letters of 
transit, which he planned to sell to Victor Laszlo. There are further parallels between 
the drugs in End and the letters of transit in Casablanca: for example, the weasel-like 
drug dealer slips the drugs he is trying to hide in the piano in a Johannesburg hotel bar 
(94) , just as the letters of transit were hidden under the hinged lid of the piano in 
Rick’s Café in the film. 
The potential for liberation in drugs thus seems to be situated in the provisionally 
sustaining unbelonging and disconnection from the logic of reproductive futurism. Y 
argues that “[c]hildren fasten people into the pointlessness of existence. Drugs offer a 
way out of living because then you can live in a world that is false and untrue. You 
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create it, you die in it, and you can pretend” (108). Freddie, however, is apprehensive 
of the egocentric self-absorption of this apparent unshackling, even though she had 
earlier pointed to the agency of those who choose “[t]he drug world – at least one 
changes consciousness by choice” (61). She maintains that 
 
 
[i]f you think that drugs point to a way out, even though the rest of the 
world frowns on the way out because they only feel secure in the world if 
they believe everyone is really there in it with them, everyone is as grey 
and sober as themselves. You think they give you a way out as they 
change the world for you. They alter the way that you see things. They 
expand your mind. Would they do the same for X? I sort of think that they 
wouldn’t. (109) 
 
 
 
Freddie ultimately suggests that drugs do not bring the subject to embody a tenably 
radical queer temporality, for the temporality that drugs allow one to embody tries to 
disrupt the hegemonic “repro-time” (Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place 5) and 
thus is circumscribed and will never be sanctioned by it. Indeed, Y has not been able 
to let go of her heteronormative marriage and the couple is left to face the (symbolic) 
law. 
Furthermore, the unnamed journalist – “the I, the he, the she, the changeable-at-a-
whim character” (9) – indicates to X that “[w]here I am going you can’t follow. What 
I have to do you cannot be any part of” (153). This is indicative of Adair’s critique of 
the logic of reproductive futurism: reproductive heteronormativity is unable to figure 
the undoing of the symbolic, which an embodiment of radical queer temporality 
seems to demand, and is thus left behind. In the prologue to End, it is said that “many 
eyes in imprisoned Africa turned hopefully, or desperately, towards the freedom of 
America, the freedom to live and the freedom not to die” (n.p.). Freddie’s flying out 
of Johannesburg with the unnamed journalist, the queer “sometimes-different-gender 
protagonist” (87), thus suggests an attempt to enunciate an emancipating queer 
present continuous in which queerness has “the freedom to live and the freedom not to 
die”. This seems to point to the Deleuzoguattarian lines of flight that David Ruffolo 
articulates in his Post-Queer Politics. For Ruffolo, the politics of “queer” is stagnant 
because 
 
 
bodies can only be conceptualized through the representations and 
significations of identity norms that inscribe bodies. The emphasis on 
being here maintains an unproductive commitment to meaning. Post-
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queer’s interest in the creative and rhizomatic functioning of becoming is 
not in opposition to being, meaning, representations, and significations but 
asks different questions around what bodies can do as they are dialogically 
negotiated through creative relations that do not refer back to the 
inscriptive limitations of subjectivity. (15, emphasis in original) 
 
 
 
 
In other words then, drugs merely reposition the subject in the endless, unproductive 
cycle of significations and representations. Through the unnamed journalist, Adair 
seems to enunciate a “post-queer” body politics of becoming that is not limited to the 
“discursive reproductions of identity norms” (Ruffolo 24): in the constant changing of 
biological sex, the unnamed journalist straddles the queer/heteronormative binary and 
thus seems to transcend the “inscriptive limitations of subjectivity” to produce 
creative flows of desire. 
Nevertheless, I think that End suggests that this ontology of becoming necessarily 
happens within symbolic textuality, hence my use of “be(com)ing”. Freddie 
recognises the symbolic nature of writing, for she points out to the unnamed journalist 
that “a future means you have to keep on living. And you have no future beyond these 
pages” (112), and thus proposes to her that “maybe I can write another story with you 
as the main character in it” (154). What is implicit here is the acknowledgement that 
even such radical queerness as the unnamed journalist seems to embody is dependent 
on significations and representations. Freddie in fact suggests that all engagement 
with the world is necessarily mediated through the symbolic when she muses that she 
herself “would only be here for the length of this novel. Once it ended, she and this 
created world would no longer exist. Only the readers would continue to exist in their 
own worlds, worlds that they created in which to pass their own time” (8). That is to 
say, people make sense of their world through significations and representations, just 
as the writer constructs a novel through language. The world-making potentiality of 
texts is also indirectly signalled here. Freddie clarifies that “[w]ords don’t die. They 
just have to be read. It’s only the readers who die” (3). What End precipitates is the 
“death” of the reader in heteronormative repro-time, and in this manner potentially 
opens access to a “mode of being” – or rather, a mode of queer be(com)ing – “in the 
world that is also inventing the world” (Muñoz 121). End’s feeling backward to 
Casablanca further emphasises this world-making potentiality of the queer present 
continuous. For Muñoz, this kind of “[q]ueer restaging of the past helps us imagine 
new temporalities that interrupt straight time” (171). Indeed, the unnamed journalist’s 
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comment to Freddie – that “[t]hanks Freddie, for reminding me of the movie […]. It 
has made things so much more complicated; now I will have to think about love and 
romance… love and loss” (2) – suggests that Adair’s intertextual reworking of 
Casablanca necessitates a more “complicated” and more fluid conceptualisation of 
desire: what is lost in this process is our commitment to the logic of reproductive 
futurism. It is the unnamed journalist in End who embodies such a radical queer 
temporality and who advances a rhetorical space for a queer antisocial sociality and 
be(com)ing. The unnamed journalist thus comes to occupy what I am calling, drawing 
on both Edelman and Kristeva, the figure of the sinthomosexual en procès who is 
disruptive of the symbolic logic of reproductive futurism.  
According to Edelman, the “defining mark of futurism” is that it “inscribes the faith 
that temporal duration will result in the realization of meaning by way of a ‘final 
signifier’ that will make meaning whole at last” (No Future 37). This suggests that the 
logic of reproductive futurism accedes to a meaningful, symbolic telos despite its 
constant deferral. To contrast this, Edelman, informed by the Lacanian sinthome11,  
develops the notion of “sinthomosexuality” which “scorns such belief in a final 
signifier, reducing every signifier to the status of the letter and insisting on access to 
jouissance in place of access to sense, on identification with one’s sinthome instead of 
belief in its meaning” (37, emphasis in original). That is to say, the sinthomosexual is 
not preoccupied so much with intelligibility but rather with the drives of jouissance 
which disrupt all attempts at meaning-making. Indeed, Edelman clarifies that 
“[d]esignating a locus of enjoyment beyond the logic of interpretation, and thus 
beyond the correlative logic of the symptom and its cure, the sinthome refers to the 
mode of jouissance constitutive of the subject, which defines it no longer as subject of 
desire, but rather as subject of the drive” (113). Even though this drive for Edelman is 
the death drive – he claims that “jouissance evokes the death drive that always insists 
as the void in and of the subject, beyond its fantasy of self-realization, beyond the 
                                                          
11 Edelman explains that “[t]he sinthome – a term, as Lacan explains in Seminar 23, that he takes from 
an ‘old way of writing what was written later as “symptom”’ – speaks to the singularity of the subject’s 
existence, to the particular way each subject manages to knot together the orders of the Symbolic, the 
Imaginary, and the Real. […] Though it functions as the necessary condition for the subject's 
engagement of Symbolic reality, the sinthome refuses the Symbolic logic that determines the exchange 
of signifiers; it admits no translation of its singularity and therefore carries nothing of meaning, 
recalling in this the letter as the site at which meaning comes undone” (35). 
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pleasure principle ” (25) – and thus queer means a figural embodiment of the death 
drive, Edelman nonetheless attributes a contingent political agency to queer. He 
maintains that even though no one can exist “outside the Symbolic”, we can still 
“make the choice to accede to our cultural production as figures – within the dominant 
logic of narrative, within Symbolic reality – for the dismantling of such a logic and 
thus for the death drive it harbors within” (22, emphases in original). 
This “subject of the drive” who works within the symbolic to unsettle it points to 
Kristeva’s notion of the sujet en procès, who is attuned to the “process of signifiance, 
that is, [to the] pre-verbal drives and semiotic operations logically if not 
chronologically anterior to the phenomenon of language. In this process, the unitary 
subject discovered by psychoanalysis is only one moment, a time of arrest, a stasis, 
exceeded and threatened by this movement” (“Subject in Process” 134). For Kristeva 
then, the sujet en procès is constantly motile and this access to the semiotic12, 
affective drives threatens to undo symbolic stabilities and structures. In her 
groundbreaking work Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva emphasises how the 
semiotic and the symbolic modalities together constitute the signifying process (24), 
which she calls signifiance, and she highlights the subversive nature of the semiotic, 
as it is the “return of instinctual functioning within the symbolic, as a negativity 
introduced into the symbolic order, and as the transgression of that order” (69). 
Kristeva argues that it is in “poetic language” that the semiotic manifests most 
distinctly, and Kelly Oliver makes Kristeva’s position clear that “within poetic 
language, the semiotic element disrupts the unity of the Symbolic and thereby disrupts 
the unity of the subject of/in language”: in other words, poetic language “calls the 
subject into crisis, puts the subject on trial” (13) and the subject is thus always one of 
fluid be(com)ing.  
Whereas Edelman’s recuperative politics is less obvious, Kristeva’s project is clearly 
a political one. Edelman recognises that the sinthomosexual in fact “conjures a 
politicality unrecognizable as such by virtue of its resistance to futurism’s 
                                                          
12 Noëlle McAfee clarifies that for Kristeva, the semiotic “is the extra-verbal way in which bodily 
energy and affects make their way into language. The semiotic includes both the subject’s drives and 
articulations. While the semiotic may be expressed verbally, it is not subject to regular rules of syntax” 
(17), whereas the symbolic is “a way of signifying that depends on language as a sign system complete 
with its grammar and syntax” (17). 
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constraining definition of the political field” (“Ever After” 472), while Oliver notes 
that “[f]or Kristeva, to recognize the subject-in-process is to recognize the death drive 
and eros. It is to recognize drive force that transgresses the Law. […] To recognize 
the subject-in-process expands our conception of the social. The social becomes both 
Law and transgression, both Meaning and nonmeaning. It becomes a social-in-
process/on trial” (184). What I am thus foregrounding in reading Edelman through 
Kristeva is the agency and present continuity inherent in Edelman’s figure of the 
sinthomosexual. Sinthomosexuality, Edelman argues, 
 
 
affirms a constant, eruptive jouissance that responds to the inarticulable 
Real, to the impossibility of sexual rapport or of ever being able to signify 
the relation between the sexes. […] Sinthomosexuality, then, like the death 
drive, engages, by refusing, the normative stasis, the immobility, of 
sexuation to which we are delivered by Symbolic law and the promise of 
sexual relation. (No Future 74) 
 
 
 
Both Edelman and Kristeva are thus attentive to the uncontainably transgressive and 
transformative jouissance of the drives and the nuanced ways which it may unsettle 
symbolic structures of meaning. In this manner, my figure of the sinthomosexual en 
procès recuperates Edelman’s queer antisociality for a queer antisocial sociality 
grounded not in the negotiation of empathetic intersubjective recognition but in the 
connective potentialities of jouissance. That is to say, rather than completely 
disavowing relationality and identity-based notions of community, the sinthomosexual 
en procès insists on the emancipatory potentialities of jouissance and the creative, 
unossified forms of selfhood and belonging which attend to these pre-symbolic drives 
in the symbolic. Queer is thus not just a mere “structural position” (Edelman, No 
Future 24) negating futurism, but becomes a present continuous be(com)ing. 
The unnamed journalist reflects at the beginning of End that “[r]oles must be played 
in life” (17), and Freddie later adds that “[r]oles can always be changed, like the 
clothes that you wear” (120). In an interview about Gender Trouble, the work in 
which she first formulated the notion of the performativity of gender, Judith Butler 
maintains that 
 
 
[t]he bad reading goes something like this: I can get up in the morning, 
look in my closet, and decide which gender I want to be today. I can take 
out a piece of clothing and change my gender, stylize it, and then that 
evening I can change it again and be something radically other, so that 
what you get is something like the commodification of gender, and the 
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understanding of taking on a gender as a kind of consumerism. […] [M]y 
whole point was that the very formation of subjects, the very formation of 
persons, presupposes gender in a certain way – that gender is not to be 
chosen and that “performativity” is not radical choice and it’s not 
voluntarism. […] Performativity has to do with repetition, very often the 
repetition of oppressive and painful gender norms to force them to 
resignify. (83-84, emphasis in original) 
 
 
 
In pointing to what Butler claims is a “bad reading” of her notion of performativity, 
End in fact parodies the seemingly volitional resituation in and re-identification with 
gendered subject positions and the reductivity of identity-based politics. This is most 
evident in the various scenes where X has sexual intercourse with the unnamed 
journalist whose biological sex alternates seemingly whimsically between male and 
female in different chapters of the novel, thereby necessitating readers to interpret the 
acts as variously homosexual and heterosexual. It is exactly this kind of “circulation 
of identity norms” (20) that Ruffolo finds problematic: he argues that “resignification 
as a form of discursive power actually limits bodies to the possibilities within the 
strict realm of subjectivity” (22) and he believes that Butler’s notion of performativity 
has been central in this “solidification of queer, subjectivity, and discourse” (25). As I 
have been suggesting, End articulates an alternative: the sinthomosexual en procès 
who embodies a queer present continuous be(com)ing that does not inhibit the free 
play of jouissance. 
In Xai Xai, the unnamed journalist meets up with X, whom he first comes into contact 
with at a pub in Maputo, and they have an erotic encounter: 
 
 
He couldn’t see X, but he knew that he was in the room. He could smell 
him – that faint smell of urine that all men seemed to have hovering 
around them. Then he saw the shadow reflected in the brown-spotted 
mirror of the open cupboard door. The reflection beckoned him inwards. 
Like a corpse, the body moved slightly as the breeze from outside blew the 
cupboard door. It swung inwards, the blank holes that were closed eyes 
gaped upwards. X’s mouth was slightly open, his bare, smooth chest rose 
and fell with his breathing. His nipples were wine stained, darker than the 
rest of his skin, bullet scars, and his hands were flung behind his head as if 
he had just fallen backwards. He walked into the room and moved up to 
the body. Slowly he leant over it and took one of the nipples between his 
lips. X moaned, as if in a dream. Then the cupboard door swung shut and 
he could no longer see the image, nor feel the nipple in his mouth. 
“Hello,” he said and walked over to the bed. He leaned over to kiss X. Lips 
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lightly on a cheek. (50)  
 
 
 
In this first sex scene, the physical body is sexuated only through the male pronouns 
and it is thus symbolic signification that inscribes the body in gender. For Edelman, 
sinthomosexuality “finds something other in the words of the law, enforcing an 
awareness of something else, something that remains unaccounted for in the accounts 
we give of ourselves, by figuring an encounter with a force that loosens our hold on 
the meanings we cling to” (86). What the unnamed journalist as sinthomosexual en 
procès foregrounds is the sexual, corporeal drives which attempt to unbind the hold 
on regularising meaning to embrace the inarticulacy of be(com)ing. Furthermore, in 
comparing the eroticised body to a “corpse”, Adair indirectly connects the (figure of 
the) death drive and jouissance, thereby signalling the subject of the drive beyond the 
logic of meaning, the logic of reproductive futurism. This is also evident in the 
unnamed journalist’s thoughts in a taxi that is stopped by soldiers while she is 
travelling from Mozambique to South Africa – a soldier smashes the glass of the 
window and she muses, as a shard of glass cuts her, that “[t]he blood felt like X’s 
semen, a stain on her face. It dripped downwards. Semen, the texture of blood. Semen 
that made her bleed” (75). The unnamed journalist here unsettles normative 
associations of the body to intimate the painful death drive underlying jouissance, and 
the response presented by the text is intriguing: “He [the soldier] slowly licked the 
blood from a finger that was surrounded by a silver wedding band and smiled. Bright 
red, red, like the sky at night, red like the ruby the Indian nurse wore in her nose, red, 
red... Red for the unborn child soldier” (76, emphasis in original). The italicised 
section functions as a sort of refrain throughout the novel when blood is involved. 
This refrain first appears when the unnamed journalist is experiencing her menstrual 
cycle in Maputo. She comments that “[a] bright red splash ran down her leg, 
nourishment for an unborn child. […] It had looked so good that blood, she was afraid 
to hide it. Maybe it would go away when she wasn’t looking. Red, like the sky at night, 
red like the ruby the Indian nurse wore in her nose, red, red...” (13). The same basic 
refrain also concludes the bloody scenes where the unnamed journalist cuts his cheek 
while he is shaving and thinking of a random girl (26), and where the police raid 
Rick’s Café and shoot the drug-dealing “weasel”. In this latter scene, the text notes 
that “tonight a white man was shot, not a black man. The blood stained the carpet red. 
It was the same colour as the blood that ran the streets in Alexandra township. Red, 
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like the sky at night, red like the ruby the Indian nurse wore in her nose, red, red...” 
(136). Furthermore, when the unnamed journalist encounters one of the child refugees 
whose legs had been amputated and whose loose bandages were “trailing like a bridal 
veil on the ground”, she observes that “[t]he blood was now running fresh; one drop 
and then another fell into the sand. Bright red, red, like the sky at night, red like the 
ruby the Indian nurse wore in her nose, red, red... Red for the unborn child, the child 
in uterus, but he had already been born” (15). When the unnamed journalist kisses X 
in a hotel room, “[h]er red lipstick left a bloodstain where their lips met” (103) and 
the refrain – “Bright red, red, like the sky at night, red like the ruby the Indian nurse 
wore in her nose, red, red... Red for the dead child, the child in death, but he had 
already been born” (104) – appears. In the last instance, Princes Diana is imagined to 
be assassinated during her visit to a refugee camp in the north of Mozambique. The 
bleeding bullet hole is described as a “bloody star that shone brightly” (160), and the 
text responds with the refrain “Bright red, red, like the sky at night, red like the ruby 
the Indian nurse wore in her nose, red, red... Red for the dead child, the child princess, 
red, red…” (161). The refrain thus plays up the contradictions inherent in blood as a 
symbol for both life and death, pointing to the animating death drive within the 
antisocial sociality of the queer present continuous.  
Another refrain that End incorporates is the song “As Time Goes By”, which is 
performed in Casablanca by Rick’s Café’s in-house pianist Sam. The lyrics of the 
song suggest that “no matter what the future brings”, what is most important – that is, 
the “fundamental thing of life” – is to persist in “the fight for love and glory” (Adair, 
End 16), which in the context of the film is the struggle for patriotic and 
heteroreproductive forms of identification and kinship. This investment in the logic of 
reproductive futurism is questioned when the unnamed journalist reflects that “[t]he 
words of the song rang in her head, but they seemed to be all wrong. That was not 
how Sam had sung it, or had he? Sam did not sing the song the way Amil [the child 
refugee whose legs had been amputated] and the scratchy dog had sung it” (16): in 
other words, reproductive time can be unproductive and illogical for some. Freddie 
further remarks that “[w]asn’t the movie [Casablanca] made to inspire the Americans 
to fight for nothing at all?” (16), signalling the disenchantment with the logic of 
reproductive futurism, as Freddie suggests that the fight for “love and glory” is 
ultimately for “nothing at all”. Edelman maintains that “the politics of reproductive 
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futurism, the only politics we’re permitted to know, organizes and administers an 
apparently self-regulating economy of sentimentality in which futurity comes to 
signify access to the realization of meaning both promised and prohibited by the fact 
of our formation as subjects of the signifier” (No Future 134). As I have been arguing, 
End exposes the fallacy of this logic and challenges this accession to symbolic 
meaning in the articulation of a radical queer temporality and be(com)ing through the 
semiotic drives. Indeed, Freddie urges the unnamed journalist to “[s]top thinking 
about time”, to “[s]top being influenced by what is only an arbitrary division in a day. 
It is a pernicious and bourgeois instrument; don’t keep imposing it upon yourself” (46, 
emphasis in original). That is to say, reproductive time is merely an apparatus 
supplementing the hegemonic logic of futurism and Freddie encourages instead a 
queer life that is unscripted by such stultifying and “pernicious” conventions. 
In drawing intertextually on the sexually transgressive cult musical-film The Rocky 
Horror Picture Show in another refrain, End furthers its enunciation of a queer 
be(com)ing. After Freddie reflects metafictionally at the beginning of the novel that 
only she could love the unnamed journalist and after a later scene in which Freddie 
watches X and Y in Rick’s Café, the text declares: “Tick, tock, tick, tock… Time is 
fleeting, madness takes its toll. How does the rest of the song go? And soon this story 
will end… Tick, tock, tick, tock… Time goes by… After time comes time…” (6, 134; 
my emphasis). The italicised portion of the refrain comes from the song “Time 
Warp” , which Dr Frank N Furter’s servant Riff Raff sings in Rocky Horror. For 
Amittai Aviram, this song implies that “we [the audience], with Mr. and soon-to-be 
Mrs. Normal [Brad and Janet, the newly engaged couple], have just stepped into a 
weird realm […] where time does not progress, where both space and time are 
‘warped’ from their ordinary linearity” (185). End thus indicates right from the 
beginning through this refrain that it will disrupt hegemonic, linear understandings of 
being and temporality. Furthermore, in feeling backward to this important 
contribution to the queer archive, End also emphasises the inconsistencies within the 
logic of reproductive futurism. Indeed, Aviram argues that in Rocky Horror, 
 
 
[t]he institution of heterosexual reproduction has been effectively 
subverted, and, according to the neckless narrator [the frame narrator who 
tells Brad and Janet’s story], the characters […] remain “lost in time, lost 
in space,—and meaning”. To be “lost…in meaning” is to find oneself in 
the play of meanings and allusions, in a position that is both frightening 
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and exhilaratingly free. (190) 
 
 
 
That is to say, Rocky Horror and End both demonstrate the unsettling and liberating 
potentialities of the antisocial semiotic drives, and it is these interruptions of the 
symbolic order that embrace the articulation of queer be(com)ing. 
Nonetheless, both Rocky Horror and End seem to be keenly aware that there cannot 
be a total dismantling of the symbolic. Dr Frank N Furter, who embodies the 
transgressive semiotic drives in Rocky Horror, is eventually killed by Riff Raff and 
his sister Magenta, who Aviram argues “somewhat (but not entirely) represen[t] a 
heterosexual couple” (189), and this suggests that the symbolic order always manages 
to subsume differences and reassert itself. Indeed, Oliver notes that “[f]or Kristeva, to 
abolish the Symbolic is to abolish society. Without the Symbolic order, we live with 
delirium or psychosis. More than this, how could we have any discourse, 
emancipatory or otherwise, without the Symbolic?” (9, emphasis in original). End 
recognises the dynamic productivity of persistently pushing against the symbolic even 
though there can be no complete receding from its logic. Edelman contends that “[t]he 
formal insistence of the drive, in fact, has the effect of deforming meaning insofar as 
it shows how the absolute privilege accorded the ‘semantic function’ serves as the 
privileged mechanism for maintaining the collective ‘illusion of a life’” (No Future 
135-136). In this way, End’s “formal insistence of the drive” confronts the impasses 
and “illusions” of sociality foisted by the logic of reproductive futurism to open up a 
space for a queer antisocial sociality. This is dramatised in the novel’s 
metafictionality, and the sinthomosexual en procès puts the reading subject in process 
and on trial, bringing about “a modification of the relation of the subject to the 
outside” (Kristeva, “Subject in Process” 142). 
The front cover of End quotes the first two lines of the novel – “Can Freddie tell you a 
story, a fiction; words that mean nothing or everything depending upon how you want 
to perceive them? And will it have a wow finish?” – and in doing so headlines its 
metafictionality. Throughout the novel, questions about the nature of fictional writing 
and textuality are raised and the text’s implication in (queer) world-making is also 
explored. Freddie, the writer who is working on a novel in End, reflects right at the 
beginning that “[r]eaders like a man with personal integrity, morality, intelligence. 
They want to be able to identify with the hero, they want an identity, they want to be 
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saved from the obscurity of having a choice” (5). This makes clear the relation 
between readers and texts, as what is suggested is that readers enjoy being able to 
identify with and perhaps even model their identities on conventional characters. The 
world-making potentialities of texts is thus also implied, for texts seem to have a 
tangible impact on reality. Indeed, Patricia Waugh in her seminal work on metafiction 
argues that “for metafictional writers the most fundamental assumption is that 
composing a novel is basically no different from composing or constructing one’s 
‘reality’” (24) and she further indicates that metafiction “sense[s] that reality or 
history are provisional: no longer a world of eternal verities but a series of 
constructions, artifices, impermanent structures” (7). Through its metafictionality and 
its figure of the sinthomosexual en procès, End exposes the ideological 
constructedness of existing power and meaning-making structures – especially the 
hegemonic logic of reproductive futurism – and compels the unsettling thereof. 
It is clear that this metafictionality complements the figure of the sinthomosexual en 
procès to establish a third space through which the queer antisocial sociality and 
be(com)ing is enunciated. The unnamed journalist’s comment on the Médecins Sans 
Frontières doctors in Maputo – that “[t]hey were real people. They had a real purpose. 
They had all crossed borders, the border of the ‘I’ that Freddie had created for her. 
They knew that they were ‘I’. They had manufactured a meaning for themselves” 
(11) – is indicative of this. It is exactly this unwavering insistence on stable and 
meaningful identities which these doctors epitomise that End problematises, for it 
forecloses the revolutionary productivity of modes of becoming with are attuned to 
the free-flowing semiotic drives. In other words, even though the “border of the ‘I’” 
of the unnamed journalist seems to be within the textual, this figure of the 
sinthomosexual en procès has further material implications, for it opens the space for 
a discourse of radical queerness which necessarily challenges the kind of purpose-
driven and self-assured subjectivity in which these doctors have invested. Edelman 
maintains that “the efficacy of queerness, its real strategic value, lies in its resistance 
to a symbolic reality that only ever invests us as subjects insofar as we invest 
ourselves in it, clinging to its governing fictions, its persistent sublimations, as reality 
itself” (18). Indeed, Freddie intimates that the unnamed journalist, the hero-
protagonist of the novel, attempts to find a way out of the “governing fictions” of the 
reproductive futurism when she explains that “[a]ll a hero wants is to find a way out 
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of the world. That is why they die so well and so dramatically” (63). This is further 
signalled in the dramatic “wow finish” of End, in which the imagined Princess Diana 
is assassinated. William Spurlin argues that Diana can be read as a queer icon 
particularly after her death in that she “resisted inhabiting subject positions that 
inhibited the expression of her desires” (169-170), and in doing so she 
 
 
enabled not only the redeployment of gender norms insofar as she 
unapologetically enjoyed sexuality outside the confines of marriage and 
procreation, both of which are legibly inscribed in her position as princess, 
but also showed the world the ways in which it is possible to realign one’s 
affectional and familial bonds in meaningful ways beyond those dictated 
by convention, by biology, or by marriage. (168) 
 
 
 
In this way, Spurlin and Adair both seem to recognise that this kind of “death” in the 
symbolic logic of reproductive futurism facilitates the potentiality of the queer present 
continuous be(com)ing. 
It seems to me, however, that at certain points in End, doubts are raised about the 
efficacy of this figure of the sinthomosexual en procès. In a scene informed 
intertextually by Victor Laszlo’s comment to Rick in Casablanca – “Welcome back 
to the fight. This time I know our side will win” – which indexes Laszlo’s assurance 
of political liberation as well as the triumph of those on the side of the logic of 
reproductive futurism, Freddie delivers this exact statement to X but adds in a murmur 
that she is “not sure which side is which, but what does it matter? When did it ever 
matter?” (154). Freddie suggests here that it is often difficult to distinguish between 
those who subscribe to the logic of reproductive futurism and those who challenge it, 
thus seeming to express an apolitical nonchalance and to lose faith in the potential 
achievements of the figure of the sinthomosexual en procès. Indeed, the unnamed 
journalist also seems to believe that she is a purely textual figure with no reach 
beyond the novel when she remarks to Freddie that she is “trapped in the world that is 
your world” (12), and Freddie seems to corroborate this when she tells him that “a 
future means you have to keep on living. And you have no future beyond these pages” 
(112). Nonetheless, Freddie reaffirms the necessity for this figure when she indicates 
to the unnamed journalist that “maybe I can write another story with you as the main 
character in it” (154) and when she reassures him that “we all know where it will end, 
so I must make you take the side that will win. You are, after all, the protagonist of 
this story” (92). Most significantly, it is the unnamed journalist that Freddie takes 
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with her on the plane out of Johannesburg in the end, leaving the heterosexual couple 
X and Y behind. This is symbolic, as I discussed earlier, of End’s enunciation of an 
emancipating queer present continuous. 
It is thus evident that End situates the consideration of queer futurity in its articulation 
of the queer present continuous, in which the figure of the sinthomosexual en procès 
metafictionally advances a queer antisocial sociality and be(com)ing that contests the 
hegemony of the logic of reproductive futurism. It is through this figure and the 
metafictionality of the novel that the reader is similarly put in process and on trial, and 
consequently, the “unsettled reader is forced to scrutinize his concepts of art as well 
as his life values. Often he must revise his understanding of what he reads so 
frequently that he comes to question the very possibility of understanding. In doing so 
he might be freed from enslavement not only to the empirical, but also to his own set 
patterns of thought and imagination” (Hutcheon, Narcissistic Narrative 139). What 
End necessitates is a more fluid conceptualisation of semiotic desires which 
continuously push against and threaten to undo symbolic structures of meaning-
making. For Kristeva, the kind of project in revolutionary poetic language in which 
End partakes is necessarily political, for “[t]he text is a practice that could be 
compared to political revolution: the one brings about in the subject what the other 
introduces into society” (Revolution 17). In other words, what I am arguing is that in 
this revolution in representation, Adair opens a productive third space in which 
stultifyingly rigid discourses, such as the logic of reproductive futurism, can be 
transformed. It is therefore appropriate that when X asks the unnamed journalist 
“[w]ho are you, and what did you do before, what do you do now, and what do you 
really think? Why are you here?” (52), the latter responds with “[w]e said no 
questions” (52). Such questions are unanswerable as we are always be(com)ing, and 
to attempt to respond to them would be a settling into fixed and symbolic subject 
positions. Finally, it is significantly indicative that the journalist who functions as the 
figure of the sinthomosexual en procès in End remains unnamed, for names are 
merely the “illusion of words” (33) that can never fully articulate the complexity of 
queer be(com)ing. 
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CHAPTER THREE: LOVE • IMPERSONAL INTIMACY 
3.1 AN EQUALLY POLITICAL CONCEPT OF LOVE 
According to Leo Bersani, love is “an exemplary concept in all philosophical 
speculation about the possibility of connectedness between the subject and the world” 
(Bersani and Phillips 75). To think through what love signifies is thus to carefully 
examine the relationship between the self and the other, the encounter with difference.  
Lauren Berlant also affirms the centrality of love in considerations of relationality and 
intimacy when she maintains that “love has been established as the core feeling of 
being and life, a primary feeling of sociality” (“Love, a Queer Feeling” 436). Berlant 
points out that what is conventionally thought of as love has been “central to the 
normalisation of heterosexuality and femininity in consumer culture” (440) – in other 
words, it scripts heteronormative desires for marriage and procreation (438) – but she 
nonetheless believes that thinking queerly about love opens it productively to become 
“a scene of optimism for change, for a transformational environment” (448). Berlant 
thus recognises love’s ultimate potential for actualising “forms of nonviolent intimacy 
that will structure reliably what a life is, what fulfilment feels like, and what a text 
about people’s lives will say” (439-440), though this can only be achieved if we 
accept love’s incoherence and acknowledge that love problematises all settled 
conventions and institutions which presume it to establish principles for living (443). 
For this reason, love needs to be thought of as an explicitly political concept and 
Berlant elaborates in “A Properly Political Concept of Love” that whatever else love 
may be, its politicality lies in its “desire to induce change without trauma, to become 
revolutionized and open and yet more oneself” (685). This implies that love has 
world-making potentialities which do not aggressively appropriate or subsume 
difference but rather empower our attempts to negotiate difference, which in turn 
allows us to understand ourselves differently. Indeed, Berlant proposes that 
 
 
[a] properly transformational political concept [of love] would provide the 
courage to take the leap into a project of better relationality that would 
give us patience with the “without guarantees” part of love’s various 
temporalities; a properly transformational political concept would open 
spaces for really dealing with the discomfort of the radical contingency 
that a genuine democracy – like any attachment – would demand; a 
properly transformational political concept would release courage and 
creativity about how to make resources for living available to all objects in 
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their thatness. (690) 
 
 
 
What is thus suggested is that love accomplishes a sort of affective support in that we 
become able to work empathetically and productively with the unintelligibility of 
otherness and the new forms of relationality these endeavours at intersubjectivity may 
induce. 
Bersani’s notion of “impersonal intimacy”, which he also terms “impersonal 
narcissism”, is in my view one formulation of love as a properly political concept – 
despite Berlant’s critique thereof as “wishful and willful” (“Neither Monstrous” 269). 
In his collaboration with Adam Phillips in Intimacies, Bersani argues that what is 
necessary is “a profound shift in registers of intimacy: from our heterosexual culture’s 
reserving the highest relational value for the couple to a communal model of 
impersonal intimacy” (42). Informed by Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalytic discourses, 
Bersani maintains that love is fundamentally a narcissistic love for the self and that a 
“reinvent[ion of] the relational possibilities of narcissism itself” (76) is needed for the 
conventional belief that “in love the human subject is exceptionally open to 
otherness” (75) to be true. Bersani draws on the Phaedrus to develop this new 
relational model: love in the Platonic text is firstly about a “contemplation of pure 
Forms” (80), and in the pederastic relationships common to ancient Greek life, the 
older lover recognises in the younger beloved something of these ideal Forms which 
are linked to the gods, and thus he also perceives something of his own soul (81-82). 
What Bersani proposes is that we emulate this model of relationality in which “each 
partner demands of the other […] that he reflect the lover’s type of being, his 
universal singularity (and not his psychological particularities, his personal 
difference), by recognizing and cultivating that singularity as his own most pervasive, 
most pressing potentiality” (86). Intimacy is thus not concerned with individual egos 
and the differences that underlie our personalities, but becomes about the reciprocal 
love of the selfsame in the other, the mutual recognition of the “singularities” and 
virtual potentialities that people share and can cultivate together. Bersani seems to 
realise that this universalising attempt to erase boundaries may be problematic, but he 
emphasises nonetheless that 
 
 
[i]f we were able to relate to others according to this model of impersonal 
narcissism, what is different about others (their psychological individuality) 
could be thought of as merely the envelope of the more profound (if less 
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fully realized, or completed) part of themselves which is our sameness. 
Naturally, each subject’s type of being is not reflected in everyone else. 
But the experience of belonging to a family of singularity without national, 
ethnic, racial, or gendered borders might make us sensitive to the 
ontological status of difference itself as what I called the nonthreatening 
supplement of sameness. (86) 
 
 
 
That is to say, what is ultimately politically transformational and productive about 
impersonal intimacy is that it is a kind of relationality not based on mastery or 
absolute knowledge of the other, but on a non-domineering reckoning with difference. 
However idealistic impersonal intimacy may seem, its significance lies in its 
optimistic reformulation of the relationship between the self and the other which does 
not interpret difference as hostile and threatening: it offers instead a paradigm for 
working with our inherent unsettling nonsovereignty, and the possibility of interacting 
empathetically with the other and being, as Phillips puts it, “attuned […] to what each 
is becoming in the presence of the other” (113). 
Hélène Cixous’s notion of écriture féminine seems to be a textual expression of 
impersonal intimacy as her articulation of acts of writing that are situated within a 
feminine libidinal economy offers a space for the self to investigate its relationship 
with the other in a non-commandeering manner. As Ian Blyth and Susan Sellers 
explain, what is central to écriture féminine is “the desire to set up a non-acquisitional 
space – a space where the self can explore and experience the non-self (the ‘other’) in 
mutual respect, harmony and love. A ‘feminine’ approach to the other is generous and 
giving, it avoids the (‘masculine’) impulse to appropriate or annihilate the other’s 
difference, allowing the other to remain as ‘other’” (15). For Cixous, this fundamental 
difference throughout history has been sexual difference. In her seminal piece “Sorties: 
Out and Out: Attacks/Ways Out/Forays”, Cixous argues that Western thought is 
constructed upon binaristic, hierarchical oppositions (63) and this has entrenched the 
“[s]ubordination of the feminine to the masculine order” (65). The feminine13, with its 
                                                          
13 It must be noted that Cixous does not lapse into sexual essentialisms, for she emphasises that she 
“make[s] a point of using the qualifiers of sexual difference here to avoid the confusion man/masculine, 
woman/feminine: for there are some men who do not repress their femininity, some women who, more 
or less strongly, inscribe their masculinity” (“Sorties” 81, emphasis in original). That is to say, Cixous 
does not believe that écriture féminine is the sole domain of women, though she does admit that “it is 
undeniable that there are psychic consequences of the difference between the sexes” (82) as 
specifically female experiences such as pregnancy may contribute to the practice of writing in the 
feminine. 
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drives and desires, has thus been repressed in order to ensure the functioning of the 
phallogocentric system (67) and it is this problematic relationship with the masculine 
and the symbolic that Cixous wishes to unsettle: she believes that it is time for a new 
model of relationality, for “[h]istory has never produced or recorded anything else 
which does not mean that this form is destinal or natural. Phallocentrism is the enemy. 
Of everyone. […] And it is time to change. To invent the other history” (83). 
In the alternative relationship that Cixous anticipates, “there would have to be a 
recognition of each other” and “each would take the risk of other, of difference, 
without feeling threatened by the existence of an otherness, rather, delighting to 
increase through the unknown that is there to discover, to respect, to favor, to cherish” 
(“Sorties” 78, emphasis in original). Cixous believes that this “other history”, this 
“acceptance of the presence of the other” (Blyth and Sellers 32), is achievable through 
a new feminine practice of writing. In this écriture féminine, women would not 
repress their “instinctual drives”, or “what-comes-before-language” (88), but let them 
come through in writing. Furthermore, women would be in touch with their bodies 
because the woman really “makes what she thinks materialize carnally, she conveys 
meaning with her body” (92). In this way, women will “blow up the [phallogocentric] 
Law” (95) and “‘realise’ the un-censored relationship of woman to her sexuality, to 
her woman-being giving her back access to her own forces; that will return her goods, 
her pleasures, her organs, her vast bodily territories kept under seal; that will tear her 
out of the superegoed, over-Mosesed structure where the same position of guilt is 
always reserved for her” (97). 
Écriture féminine thus centres corporeality and the semiotic, and most importantly for 
Cixous, “there is a link between the economy of femininity – the open, extravagant 
subjectivity, that relationship to the other in which the gift doesn’t calculate its 
influence – and the possibility of love; and a link between this ‘libido of the other’ 
and writing” (91-92). In other words, écriture féminine opens a space “in which a type 
of exchange would be produced that would be different, a kind of desire that wouldn’t 
be in collusion with the old story of death. This desire would invent Love” (78): it is 
through this revolutionised and revolutionary mode of writing in the feminine that one 
can begin to understand and arrive at love as impersonal intimacy, that is, as a 
“renunciation of the demands of a self that wants to exert power over the other, a 
renunciation that would accept, without giving in, so good-heartedly, to deliver itself, 
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to open up, to give rise to the other while respecting them” (Cixous, “Literature” 26). 
Cixous’s articulation of écriture féminine, which draws attention to the properly 
political value of textuality and writing as “the passageway, the entrance, the exit, the 
dwelling place of the other in me” (“Sorties” 85-86), thus offers a useful framework 
for exploring the articulations of queer present-continuous be(com)ing in Adair’s two 
novels. 
3.2 “FREEDOM THROUGH THIS STRANGE KIND OF LOVE”: IN TANGIER WE 
KILLED A BLUE PARROT AND IMPERSONAL INTIMACY 
In her master’s dissertation on In Tangier, Jean Rossmann closely examines 
representations of intimacy and relationality in the novel. She argues that “the 
relationship between self and Other as represented by Adair reveals a quest for the 
impossible annihilation of difference or alterity” (49) and further maintains that In 
Tangier offers, especially through Paul, “a utopian vision, challenging the limits and 
boundaries of love/intimacy and suggesting new possibilities beyond the limits of the 
known” (49). Even though Paul’s relationship with Belquassim appears to be one 
between the Western coloniser and the native colonised, Rossmann claims that “the 
encounter with the Other, as represented in Adair's text, is so riddled with the 
complexities and existential possibilities of alternative intimate relationships that it 
exceeds a purely racist and imperialistic critique” (73). She focuses instead on what 
she terms “counterpleasures” (57), that is, the transgressive sadomasochistic eroticism 
that iterates new corporealities which give rise to different imaginings of relationality. 
Nonetheless, Rossmann argues that Adair reinscribes the dominance of patriarchal 
relations in her representation of women and that she “pathologises the women in her 
novel as wild, wicked and wanton” (114). In fact, Rossmann seems to find it puzzling 
that Adair, being a female writer, does not engage in some kind of écriture feminine 
(139-140, 145-146): not only does Rossmann maintain that “Adair fails to offer equal 
textual, psychic or imaginative space to the position of women” (100) and that female 
experience “remains irrevocably ‘outside knowledge’” (120), she also “wonders how 
Adair as a woman writer fails to balance the intensely personal nature of the male sex 
scenes with an equal attention to the intimacy of ‘lesbian’ lovemaking” (129). 
Even though Rossmann does attempt to elaborate on the writerly nature of In Tangier, 
arguing that “Adair's text is a palimpsest that allows, through its postmodern 
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technique, a space for the expression of new modes of intimacies” (4), Rossmann 
ultimately believes that “[w]hilst raising contemporary issues surrounding sexual 
freedom, the ethics and aesthetics of sadomasochistic counterpleasures, and creating 
space for alternative patterns of intimacy, Adair’s vision […] is limited” (147). My 
sense is that Rossmann’s account of intimacy and relationality in In Tangier does not 
sufficiently account for Adair’s careful, reserved vision which recognises the dangers 
of the desire to “annihilate” difference but is also sceptical of the possibility of 
bringing the self and the other into a relation of equality. What Adair seems to be 
attentive to in her novels is the nuanced spaces that sex and physical touch as well as 
radical acts of writing in the feminine libidinal economy may open for a consideration 
of difference, especially sexual and racial difference, and the potential for an 
impersonal intimacy. 
Throughout In Tangier, the nature of love is a constant preoccupation for the three 
central characters, Paul, Jane and Belquassim, and they try in their own ways to make 
sense of the burden of negotiating some sense of self which does not violently 
subsume the difference of the other. Jane’s reflection on her relationship with Paul is 
pivotal in this regard. She says that 
 
 
I love Paul. I will love him forever. But he says he has never loved anyone. 
How can I love someone who does not love me back? He always says 
“You are not I. So you love and I will not.” He has colonised me, or have I 
allowed this colonisation, as some say of the Moroccans? They allowed it 
to happen, as they knew that they would gain much from the French. They 
wanted it. They were lesser than their masters were. Am I lesser than Paul? 
Is he my master? (25) 
 
 
 
Confronted with Paul’s seemingly aloof resistance to intersubjectivity, Jane wonders 
whether any interaction between people, whether it be between people of different 
genders or of different races, necessarily sets up a conditional and hierarchical 
relationship of oppression. What Jane thus calls into question is whether love is 
always a force of subjugation, whether the self always ends up trying to obliterate 
difference in its interactions with the other. Nonetheless, Jane also expresses some 
unease at the realisation that people in fact seem to be complicit in their desire to 
maintain categories of difference, and her yoking of gender and colonial injustices is 
indicative of an implicit acknowledgement of as well as an attempt to mitigate her 
own involvement in the categorical “colonisation” of others. 
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This paradoxical entanglement with difference is reiterated in Paul’s response to Jane, 
“You are not I. So you love and I will not”. Here, Adair has Paul reference the title of 
Paul Bowles’s puzzling short story “You Are Not I”, collected in The Delicate Prey 
and Other Stories, in which a young woman who escapes a mental institution ends up 
at her sister’s house only for her to be forcefully taken back to the institution. As the 
young woman is manhandled back into her room at the institution, she observes that 
“no one realized that she was not I” (218), that she has somehow swapped places 
(mentally?) with her sister and it is the latter who is now confined in the institution. 
Millicent Dillon maintains in You Are Not I, her biography of Paul Bowles, that “You 
Are Not I” is “crucial, central” (239) to Bowles’s oeuvre and argues that “the essence 
of the story” is the “idea of the interpenetration of beings to the point of exchange of 
identity, the idea of the dissolution of borders between beings” (241). I think, rather, 
that Bowles’s short story demonstrates that the encounter with difference is always a 
conflictual one, for even though the young woman “ke[pt] insisting inside [her]self” 
and “willed” (214) a disintegration of the boundaries between herself and her sister, 
the curious use of subject pronouns in the title asserts that such intersubjective 
relations are impossible. Indeed, “You Are Not I” suggests that interactions between 
people are always a violent negotiation of scripted categories of identification – such 
as between those inside and those outside (the mental institution), between those who 
abide by social expectations and those who live by their personal convictions – and 
that a total identification with the other, which is a complete erasure of difference, 
threatens the subject itself with annihilation. What Jane’s reflection on love thus 
indicates is her commitment to intimate, intersubjective encounters with other people 
despite the burden of sustaining an identity which admits otherness without 
eradicating difference. 
Paul’s refusal of this burden, on the other hand, is reasserted when he declares that “I 
never want a place or a person to appropriate me. I will never take sides again, I do 
not have this right” (99). For him, interacting with others entails choosing identitarian 
modes of being and he does not wish to do this as it means forcibly appropriating and 
being appropriated by difference, which inevitably involves a loss of selfhood. He 
thus cautions that “once you reveal everything to another you fall under his power. If I 
ever told you one important thing this is it – don’t reveal yourself completely to 
another” (147). Paul seems to propose feelingless loneliness as the ethical alternative. 
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He remarks that “[b]lack solitariness is in my head. And to love…do I even know 
what it means?” (22) and further argues that 
 
 
I am not sure that I want to agree with what he [Jean-Paul Sartre] said later 
in his writings. He tried to say that our salvation is with each other as this 
is the only way we are free to experience and so to be. I am not sure that 
we cannot save ourselves alone, that is if we think that we need to be saved. 
I am not sure that the solidarity of others is a perspective I concur with. […] 
I think that human beings are confined to a life of solitariness, which is 
why I like it in this city [Tangier]. Here I have no illusions about my 
solitariness, I am outside the social milieu, I am outside of that which is 
familiar. So my solitariness is reinforced. (59) 
 
 
 
Paul suggests here that loneliness entails a moving away from everything that one is 
accustomed to, and significantly, what is also intimated is that in doing so, one  
shifts from a static being toward a mobile becoming. 
Indeed, Paul endorses the social isolation that Tangier affords him as he finds it 
productive. He claims that 
 
 
I love the silence out here. It teaches me something about solitude, about 
reintegration. […] Sometimes it is difficult not to try to keep hold of the 
man that I know, the American in me, but I think I have let it take its 
course. I do not remain who I am. It is not loneliness that I feel […]. I hear 
nothing but my own breathing, and I feel nothing but the blood moving 
through my veins and up into my brain allowing me to think. After this 
feeling I can only feel me. Just me, the inside of me. The inside of silence. 
The inside of nothing. (41) 
 
 
 
It is paradoxically this distancing from others that allows Paul to feel a “reintegration”, 
a sense of subjective and social coherence, which opens up the productive potential 
inherent in his seemingly nihilistic negativity. He asserts that “I do not have feelings. I 
am able to stand outside the circle, never moving inside. In this way I can capture the 
feelings of others. I survive by words” (20). That is to say, this reintegrating 
loneliness is what allows Paul to open up a space for writing, a space in which he can 
try to both empathetically engage with and “survive” – that is, not be destroyed by – 
difference. In this regard, he maintains that “[his] writing is based on nothing – that 
nothingness that creates existence” (20), as it is in and through writing that he feels he 
is able to arrive nonviolently and constructively at the other. Indeed, Belquassim 
remarks that Paul loves the stories that he told him and from these stories Paul “would 
fashion his own tales, tales of intrigue and passion. One world enjoined with another” 
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(7, my emphasis). 
Nonetheless, Paul also points to the limits of writing as a space for an unconditional 
interaction with the other, as he observes that 
 
 
[i]n writing, unlike music, I have to think of the people in the story, I have 
to think of where my characters are and how they will respond to what 
they are doing. I control them. I don’t judge them. What have I got to do 
with my characters? Nothing, they decide what to do although I write 
about it. But I leave myself out of their lives, I do not impose myself on 
their lives. I therefore cannot judge them. But I do control them. (53) 
 
 
 
This authority over the other Paul feels he has in writing suggests that for him, writing 
does not quite exemplify a space for impersonal intimacy as he is unable to 
completely suspend the need to fully know or control the other. Paul thus brings to the 
fore what Berlant finds “wishful and willful” (“Neither Monstrous” 269) about the 
notion of impersonal intimacy. Berlant maintains that “we have all been affected by 
ideas and by people, but attachments multiply affects without forcing detachment 
from prior positionings, especially if we see attachments mainly as aggressive and 
tightly binding” (“Neither Monstrous” 269), and this implies that it is not as easy as 
Bersani suggests for the ego to let go of the narcissistic need to subsume the 
threatening difference of the other in order to recognise the other’s singularity and 
similar potentiality for becoming. I would argue that Adair recognises this difficulty 
and tries in In Tangier to think through the implications of not being able to relate to 
the other along the model of impersonal intimacy.  
For Adair, this failure precipitates colonisation, and Bersani indeed remarks that “the 
imperialist project of invading and appropriating foreign territories” is “an ego-project, 
a defensive move (or a pre-emptively offensive move) against the world’s threatening 
difference from the self” (66). Regarding “the division of the country [Morocco] 
between the French and the Spanish, and the creation of the International Zone [in 
Tangier]” (83), Paul observes that “because we think that we are god we have divided 
the land too” (83), pointing to the ego-narcissism that is the European imperial project. 
Furthermore, on witnessing firsthand a Moroccan rebel rioting against and being shot 
by a French guard, Paul says to Belquassim: 
 
 
No, I want to hear these sounds. This is the sound of people who want to 
be free, free from the French who won’t let them walk on their stinking 
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bourgeois boulevards without being sneered at. And they think that if they 
are free of the French, if the Boulevard Pasteur is called the Avenue 
Mohammed V, they will be free from hunger and from nihilism. They 
won’t you know, but it doesn’t matter, what matters is their movement, 
their need to destroy those that they perceive are the cause of this wanton 
poverty and squalor. We are all its cause. We all want to destroy. (96) 
 
 
 
As I suggested earlier and as Paul reiterates here, colonisation seems to fundamentally 
be about an overcommitment to sustaining particular categories of identity that it 
becomes impossible to admit otherness without violently eradicating difference. What 
Paul proposes though, is that everyone is implicated in this antagonistic politics of 
subjective identification, and he thus also implies that what is necessary is a 
rethinking of relationality without aggression. The incident in which Belquassim is 
attacked with a knife by a Moroccan man for being a “sell-out whore” (80) – that is, 
for his perceived obsequiousness to Paul – also speaks to this hostility towards the 
other that results from ego identities. The native assailant reflects that 
 
 
[t]hey take our country. They take our culture. They take our women. And 
now they take our boys. They take what it is to be a man from this country 
and they leave only sickly women behind. The cutting. I did it because 
violence makes me a man. I cannot drive them out but I can be a man. A 
man who can make blood flow. A man who is not a woman. They cannot 
take me. They cannot make me a woman. I must stay a man, stay a man 
because then I can do violence. (89) 
 
 
 
This unwavering zeal for known and knowable categories of identification compels 
the destruction of the other, foreclosing any openness to difference. Cherifa’s 
comment on the disappearance of Paul’s “beautiful blue parrot” (57), which Paul and 
Belquassim believe she had killed with magic, is significant in this regard. In her 
saying that “I do not know what happened to the bird, […] but that bird was not a 
Moroccan bird. You brought it from somewhere else. It did not belong here in this 
Moroccan house” (58), she enforces scripted categories of (non)belonging. 
For Jane, this colonisation of the other, this brutal imposition of identificatory 
categories in one’s attempts to know and to relate to the other, is inadvertent. She 
remarks that “[n]o one who thinks, I believe, can ever rationalise colonialism in any 
form. It is only the faceless patriot who believes in the right of conquest and 
subjugation. […] Perhaps we all do it without recognising what it is. Am I colonising 
Cherifa, or is she colonising me?” (24). As indicated here in her uncertainty, what 
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Jane is preoccupied with throughout In Tangier is the “nonsovereignty” of the self – 
which Berlant and Lee Edelman clarify in Sex, or the Unbearable is “the 
psychoanalytic notion of the subject’s constitutive division that keeps us, as subjects, 
from fully knowing or being in control of ourselves and that prompts our 
misrecognition of our own motives and desires” (viii) – and the implications of this 
nonsovereignty for one’s endeavours to relate to others. For Berlant and Edelman, sex 
is a site which “holds out the prospect of discovering new ways of being and of being 
in the world[, b]ut it also raises the possibility of confronting our limit in ourselves or 
in another, of being inundated psychically or emotionally” (vii). It seems to me that 
Adair explores in In Tangier the kinds of spaces that physical touch and sexual 
intercourse offer for thinking anew about relationality and intimacy, for the self to 
suspend its fixation with frameworks of knowing to begin moving towards the other. 
Jane observes in her reflection on her relationship with Paul that, even though she 
cannot logically explain her desire to relate to Paul, she feels a strong affective 
connection when they touch each other. “I gave it [her soul] to him, and even if he 
remains an enigma, love is not rational. […] When we touch each other, it is passion 
mixed with my emotions and his lack of emotion that I love most of all. It is the way 
he touches me, touches my skin. Skin on skin. And we don’t have sex any more” (25), 
remarks Jane, intimating the intense association that is a radical encounter with the 
other beyond categories of difference. In this way, Jane’s comment on the 
ineffectuality of words and her desire to “feel” – that “what are words anyway? To me 
they mean nothing as long as I have my feelings, both the good and the bad ones. I do 
not need to describe them. I just want to feel” (26) – can perhaps be interpreted 
literally: to “feel”, that is, to touch, realises forms of continuous exchange which is 
also an openness to the other.  
Nonetheless, Jane’s relationship with Cherifa foregrounds the destabilising emotional 
“inundations”, the overwhelming anxieties and frustrations, that also accompany sex 
and physical touch’s unsettling resistance to the fixity of identificatory categories. 
Jane observes that “lust is harsh. It knows no boundaries or rationality. Cherifa 
impales me. […] When she touches me it is as if she is putting a knife through my 
body, I can’t move. […] Those long fingers over my nipples, squeezing them, 
fondling them. Watching my pleasure. Obsession, obsessive. It’s a feeling that so 
attracts me, but at the same time it repulses me” (50). This jouissance, this painful 
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pleasure that results from erotic touch, undoes the subject by making clear the limits 
of knowability – by “break[ing] down the fantasy of sovereignty” (Berlant and 
Edelman 71), as Edelman puts it – in the self’s struggles to relate empathetically to 
the other. Indeed, Jane further comments that 
 
 
[w]hen she [Cherifa] touches me, and whispers to me, my body seems to 
have a life of its own. It just moves and responds and it refuses to be 
influenced by what I say in my head. […] There are no rules in this game 
of passion. And Paul, when Paul touches me, and when I touch him, my 
head and my hands move together. But when I touch Cherifa my hands 
move on their own, they have no guide. It’s a kind of love I feel for her. 
But what is love really? I can’t compare what I feel for her to what I feel 
for Paul, but can’t they both be called love? Or, is love something that is 
reserved only for others? Something that I can never know? (51) 
 
 
 
This persistent apprehension that Jane expresses about the nature of the encounters 
with difference signals the committed yet also perturbing openness to thinking 
transformatively about relationality that sex and physical touch offers. As Berlant and 
Edelman argue, “[r]eimagining forms of relation entails imagining new genres of 
experience” (ix), and Jane’s uncertainty about “love” demonstrates her attempts to 
experiment with new, impersonal modes of intimacy, despite what Berlant and 
Edelman would call the unbearable negativity of sex. 
Paul, on the other hand, seems to imply that sex in fact cannot, as Berlant puts it, 
“induce a loosening of the subject that puts fear, pleasure, awkwardness, and above all 
experimentality in a scene that forces its participants to disturb what it has meant to be 
a person and to ‘have’ a world” (Berlant and Edelman 117). Paul claims that “I don’t 
much care for sex, which is why I do not often get involved with it” (23), and when he 
does engage in sexual intercourse, sex seems to be an act of appropriation. For 
instance, after one particular sexual encounter with Belquassim, “Paul leaned across 
him [Belquassim] and with his forefinger traced his own name with Belquassim’s 
semen across the flat brown stomach. Belquassim could feel the letters ‘P-A-U-L’” 
(29): this is clearly a symbolic act of claiming sovereignty, demonstrating Paul’s 
unwillingness to be unsettled and move beyond himself. Indeed, Dillon notes that 
“[i]n Paul [Bowles]’s own fiction, whenever the sexual act appears, it is almost 
invariably played out as a drama of one person overcoming another, of one person 
dominating and the other submitting” (You are Not I 218). 
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Nonetheless, Paul asserts that he “want[s] to make a case for love” (133). “I believe 
that if you are in love there is never any guarantee that you will ever be loved back,” 
he declares, “Love is only valuable if it is instinctive, rather than rational […] I don’t 
need to be loved back by anyone. I love her more than I have loved anyone. But my 
love is selfless, because, in a sense, if I am in love with my own reflection, it’s a 
reflection that I see in her. And in this I stand alone. It’s possible then that I am the 
cruel one” (133). This is perhaps the clearest articulation in In Tangier of Bersani’s 
notion of impersonal intimacy, the mode of relationality in which “the self the subject 
sees reflected in the other is not the unique personality central to modern notions of 
individualism” (85). For Bersani then, it is imperative that the self collapses the 
differentiating, and thus violent, categories of identification which not only structure 
the ego’s desire for assurance of its own existence but also one’s interactions with 
others, and he clarifies that the “fundamental premise of impersonal narcissism is that 
to love the other’s potential self is a form of self-love, a recognition that the partners 
in this intimacy already share a certain type of being (a sharing acknowledged by 
love)” (124). Paul’s recognition that encounters with the other are only constructive if 
they are “instinctual”, and more significantly, “selfless” thus speaks to this. This 
impersonal intimacy that Paul and Jane share is also not only acknowledged by 
Belquassim – he fathoms while watching Jane and Paul together in the hospital when 
Jane fell ill that “[h]e leaned against the wall and watched them in their intimacy. He 
had never been so close to something like this before and he felt awed. Whatever it 
was, he felt its intensity rush over him, clouding his thoughts as he battled to 
comprehend it. Why her, he thought, why her?” (158) – but is also reiterated by Jane, 
who claims that “[t]hat incomprehensible closeness that we have, it is not a logical 
closeness, but it is one that I do not question. That is how I love him [Paul]” (89, my 
emphasis). 
As I have indicated, Adair seems to propose throughout In Tangier that physical touch 
and sexual intercourse as well as the act of writing may open up spaces which realise 
the “incomprehensible closeness” that is an expression of impersonal intimacy, 
though she is evidently also hesitant about the potential of the self to hold off the 
colonisation of the other; that is, she is sceptical of whether the self can suspend the 
need to know the other in order to begin moving towards the in-between where 
otherness is admitted without the erasure of difference. Paul reiterates this view when 
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he observes: “How can we redeem ourselves? Through a community with other men 
as some have already put forward? Maybe we can even be lucid about this 
indifference. There is no prophylaxis, no solution. All I can do is write what I see and 
let other people be the judge of it” (98). Paul cynically implies that people have never 
quite been able to relate to one another without violence as we have not been able to 
treat difference indifferently and impersonally, and even though he acknowledges that 
he does not have a “solution” to this, he suggests that writing is the only way he can 
make sense of social encounters. Indeed, Belquassim mentions that “Paul needed his 
words. His stories were like pictures created by hashish, they painted him into an 
unknown world of raw emotion that he had never recognised or known existed. Only 
his characters knew of this emotion, but even they were unable to recognise it” (10). It 
is significant that it is Belquassim, a character from Paul Bowles’s novel The 
Sheltering Sky, who asserts that there is a “[f]reedom through this strange kind of 
love” (68): writing liberates people from conventional modes of being and knowing 
and offers a space for what Berlant calls an “experimentality in worlding” (Berlant 
and Edelman 100),  a dynamic space where intimacy and relationality can be thought 
differently. 
Ultimately then, Adair seems to suggest through In Tangier that the location of love is 
in the space of the in-between, that space where two people begin to move beyond the 
self towards – but not arrive at, as that would entail an erasure of difference – the 
other and it is in this space that I also locate the queer present continuous be(com)ing: 
what I draw attention to in my formulation is the relationship fostered by the textual 
between a coming towards the other and a sexual coming. Sarah Dillon astutely 
observes that what holds the “disparate examples” Bersani uses in Intimacies together 
to develop his notion of impersonal intimacy is the literary (60). Following Dillon, I 
would argue that Adair regards writing and literature as also “not just necessary to 
impersonal intimacy: literature is the medium of impersonal intimacy” (S Dillon 60, 
emphasis in original). That is to say, in challenging rigidly conventional 
understandings of corporeality, identity and relationality, and in, as Berlant would put 
it, “displacing sex from its normative function as the mechanism of emotional 
cohesion that sustains aggressive heteronormativity” (Berlant and Edelman 13), Adair 
situates In Tangier in what Cixous would call écriture féminine, a writing in the 
feminine libidinal economy which recuperates the unsettling, emancipatory 
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potentialities of jouissance and which “give[s] passage to this further-than-myself in 
myself” (Cixous and Calle-Gruber 56). Even though Adair suggests through In 
Tangier that the self and the other cannot quite relate equally and non-oppressively, it 
is exactly this movement beyond the self towards equality – that is, the movement 
towards what Phillips understands in Intimacies as “the longed for and feared 
experience of exchange, of intimacy, of desire indifferent to personal identity” (113) – 
that opens up the space for the equally political concept of impersonal intimacy. 
Reading Adair’s writerly text In Tangier, then, becomes, in a reformulation of 
Edelman’s observation (Berlant and Edelman 108), a kind of unbearable encounter 
that breaks down the structuring fantasy of reading subjects as they are compelled by 
the text to reconsider their relation to others and their concept of who they are. Indeed, 
Dillon maintains that “[l]iterature enables an impersonal intimacy between reader and 
characters, between reader and author and, perhaps most importantly, between co-
readers” (S Dillon 60), and it is in this way that we can make sense of the title of the 
novel, In Tangier We Killed the Blue Parrot: the first-person plural “we” recognises 
that even though everyone is implicated in this project of colonisation, this desire to 
work through the incoherences that trouble the fixity of identity and to 
comprehensively know the other, we can all become more aware of each other’s 
potential becoming after reading the novel and effect an impersonal mode of 
relationality which, to use Cixous’s eloquent exposition again, is “a renunciation of 
the demands of a self that wants to exert power over the other, a renunciation that 
would accept, without giving in, so good-heartedly, to deliver itself, to open up, to 
give rise to the other while respecting them” (“Literature” 26). 
3.3 “LOVE, THAT HUMAN CONSTRUCT”: END AND IMPERSONAL INTIMACY 
As I pointed out in the previous chapter, Adair claims in her interview with De Vries 
that End aims to unsettle the heteronormative “true love ladida” story of the film 
Casablanca and to “[m]ake the clichés the opposite”. Berlant and Warner similarly 
take issue with the hegemony of heteronormativity and urge an exploration of “the 
changed possibilities of identity, intelligibility, publics, culture, and sex that appear 
when the heterosexual couple is no longer the referent or the privileged example of 
sexual culture” (“Sex” 548). For them, “[m]aking a queer world has required the 
development of kinds of intimacy that bear no necessary relation to domestic space, to 
kinship, to the couple form, to property, or to the nation” (558). End’s decentring of 
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the heteronormative logic of reproductive futurism and the world-making potential of 
its queer present continuous be(com)ing thus necessitate a reconsideration of the 
notions of love – understood as the encounter between the self and the other – and 
intimacy. As in In Tangier, End situates love in the space of the in-between and 
explores more meticulously the ways that the textual may mediate the relationship 
between a sexual coming and a coming towards the other. 
Beppi Chiuppani centres his analysis of End on questions of political commitment. He 
argues that “[i]n the process of rethinking the nature and limits of engagement”, End 
manages to “focus on some of the spaces that were silenced by the repressive 
environment of apartheid, which in this specific case include a number of gender 
dynamics that can be considered queer” (153). In this regard, Chiuppani observes that 
Adair’s distinct “commitment to gender politics” (153) lies in her shifting the focus in 
End away from “social politics” to a reconceptualisation of the body, thereby 
“fashion[ing] a peculiar kind of gender/bodily engagement” (170). What End 
ultimately presents, according to Chiuppani, is “an unsettled and unsettling politics of 
the body, a dimension in which the power of the individual seems concentrated on 
rethinking the sexualized features of one’s bodily existence. These politics, precisely 
because of their inherent indefinition, become possible only through the written word 
of fiction” (196). Chiuppani thus suggests that the subversive politics of End lies in 
Adair’s “reinterpret[ion of] gender as a textual category” (168). The implications of 
this textualisation of the body informs my consideration of the novel’s articulation of 
intimacy and relationality: what I will argue is that the “unsettled and unsettling 
politics” of the body, mediated through the (s)(t)exual, precipitates an “unsettled and 
unsettling politics” of identity, and it is this destabilisation of the coherence of the self 
that necessitates a reconsideration of the nature of the encounter between the self and 
the other. 
Throughout End, Adair makes clear that sex has, as Edelman puts it, “something to do 
with experiencing corporeally, and in the orbit of the libidinal, the shock of 
discontinuity and the encounter with nonknowledge” (Berlant and Edelman 4). That is 
to say, the representations of the sexual in End bring the corporeal to its limits, and it 
is this that the figure of the sinthomosexual en procès, which I have been reading 
through the unnamed journalist, facilitates. This is signalled in part by the sense of 
restive perturbedness conveyed in the seemingly insignificant remarks which 
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emphasise the uncertainty of the unnamed journalist’s gender. For instance, while 
having sex with the unnamed journalist in chapter seven, who is referred to by 
feminine pronouns, X says that “[h]e pulled at the zip of his pretty khaki trousers and 
thought about her small hard breasts as they pressed against his thighs. They could 
have been a boy’s breasts they were so small. He thought about her face; looking 
down, all he could see was the dark cropped hair and a moving head that stirred his 
cock” (65, my emphasis). In the next chapter, in which the unnamed journalist is 
referred to by masculine pronouns, X notes upon waking up from a sexually 
stimulating dream that he “wiped his face and touched his cock. It was hard. Strange, 
the boy had the face of a girl, and then the face of a boy again. The face that hovered 
above his stomach, the hands that touched him in places that had not been touched 
before were a boy’s hands” (68, my emphasis). X’s arousal from this experience of 
the “nonknowledge” of corporeal indeterminacy calls attention to the body, especially 
the gendered body, as a construct that coheres identity, and it further reframes our 
thinking about identity along modes of desire and the libidinal – that is, along what 
Tim Dean, drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, calls a “hermeneutics of desire” 
(“Sameness” 26) – rather than identificatory categories. 
Adair nonetheless also seems to suggest that this unsettling defamiliarisation of the 
body within the hermeneutics of desire takes place not only during the sexual act, but 
happens when one stops resisting the persistence of one’s libidinal and semiotic drives. 
This is evident, for instance, when X passes a “very old” woman arguing with a 
cashier in a supermarket in Johannesburg about being overcharged for tampons (57). 
Freddie wonders whether the woman is “too old to menstruate […] but these days, 
who knows? Maybe hormones in a pill have genetically engineered her to keep on 
menstruating. Maybe she just wants to stay young, and what better way than to be 
reminded of your youth once a month?” (57). This insistence on the menstrual not 
only necessitates a reconceptualisation of the corporeal, but also troubles the 
experience of abjection that Julia Kristeva formulates and the way it has been 
conceived to mediate the self’s desire to be autonomous, to be distinct from the other. 
As Kelly Oliver explains, the abject is in Kristeva’s account “something repulsive that 
both attracts and repels. It holds you there despite your disgust. It fascinates” (55), 
and thus it signals a response to “what is on the border, what doesn’t respect borders”, 
a reaction to a kind of in-betweenness that disturbs the distinction between self and 
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other, that threatens identity (56). Furthermore, Oliver maintains that for Kristeva, the 
abject “threaten[s] the social, the Symbolic order. The Symbolic can maintain itself 
only by maintaining its borders; the abject points to the fragility of those borders” (56). 
The way the unnamed journalist in End describes her menstruation thus calls for 
consideration: she remarks while sitting on the toilet that 
 
 
[a] bright red splash ran down her leg, nourishment for an unborn child. 
Oh great, she thought, and with a wet washrag that she took from beside 
the basin she wiped it away. Bright red blood, it was a beautiful sunset 
colour. Sighing, she placed the white Kotex pad on her panties, pulled up 
her jeans and got up. It had looked so good, that blood, she was afraid to 
hide it. (13) 
 
 
 
The menstrual blood is tellingly not met with frightful repugnance, but rather is 
confronted with an appreciative pleasure, as if the unnamed journalist is not 
disconcerted by the potential collapse of meaning that abjection induces. That is to 
say, this alternative experience of the abject indicates Adair’s willingness to entertain 
the possibility of a mode of relationality in which – contrary to Kristeva’s assertion 
that “I abject myself within the same motion through which ‘I’ claim to establish 
myself” (Powers 3, emphasis in original) – the self remains incoherent, in which there 
remains an indistinct, unbound(ari)edness between the self and the other. 
This indifference to difference, this nondiscrimination between self and other which 
unsettles meaning, gestures towards the impersonal – which Bersani construes in one 
formulation as “a connectedness based on unlimited bodily intimacies” (Bersani and 
Phillips 37). What I am thus arguing is that in End, Adair attempts to stage the 
implications of such a connectedness in which the self – whose identity is established 
on a sense of the corporeal, however indeterminate and unsettled, rather than on 
identificatory categories – relates impersonally to the other. This is articulated in the 
novel when X, who relates categorically to Y as husband and wife, asserts: “all X 
thought was that maybe one day, one day Y would know what was best for her. She 
would want him. He was best for her. But now he wanted the boy’s body. He wanted 
to push his finger deep into that bracken sweet-smelling salubrious arse. He wanted to 
see his semen run down thighs and catch itself in the faded hairs that trapped it” (70, 
my emphasis). X intriguingly points here to a deferred potential relationality based on 
identification, but also expresses his immediate need for sex and a body specifically 
rather than a person(ality). Sex, as I noted in the previous section, blurs the 
79 
 
boundaries between self and other, and Dean elaborates that this is because “sex 
confuses the separateness and hence the distinguishability of bodies, thereby 
shattering (or threatening to shatter) our sense of corporeal integrity” (Unlimited 22). 
That is to say, sex calls attention to  our inherent nonsovereignty by unsettling our 
sense of the corporeal and hence it demands that the self suspend its fixation with 
identificatory categories to begin moving nonviolently towards the other. 
Following Dean’s observation that “erotic encounters represent not just an instance of 
but also, perhaps more significantly, a metaphor for contact with otherness” 
(Unlimited 181), I understand X’s need for another’s body in a sexual encounter as 
signalling Adair’s appeal for thinking anew about intimacy and relationality, about 
realising forms of contact with otherness that do not subsume the other. “Do you need 
to know someone to have sex with them? Probably not” (65) – the question that X 
asks and his tentative response to it when he thinks back to his first sexual encounter 
with the unnamed journalist in Mozambique – is thus a poignant one as it addresses 
Adair’s concern for impersonal intimacy. What it points to is that sex, rather than the 
ability to situate oneself and the other into known and knowable categories of 
identification, facilitates an intimate encounter with the other where the focus is not 
on difference. A later sex scene in which the unnamed journalist and X have oral sex 
complicates Adair’s consideration of relational possibilities: 
 
 
He [the unnamed journalist] knelt down on the floor as X sat there. Giving 
head is often described as something where the recipient of the pleasure is 
dominant, he thought as he took X’s cock in his mouth. Someone is always 
in a subservient position. I suppose that is what it looks like. Kneeling in 
front of a man. He sucked on the cock and it grew larger. But I am a man. 
And when I kneel I am kneeling because I have the power to give or not to 
give. […] He lifted his head from where it was deep in X’s groin. 
“I will do the thinking here,” he said to X. “I will think and you will just 
respond. And then when I am done we can consider this love thing that 
you speak about.” He bent his head again, and then he stopped and smiled. 
He leaned over and Freddie passed him a book that was lying on the table 
next to the bed. We can do things that we would never have thought of. 
We can do things that are only described in a book. (142-143) 
 
 
 
The unnamed journalist asserts that they will be able to “consider this love thing” 
once they have finished having sex, corroborating the idea that sex holds out the 
prospect for new understandings of intimacy and relationality. Nonetheless, the 
unnamed journalist also seems to indicate that despite the world-making potentialities 
of sex, one cannot relate outside of categories of identification but can only try to 
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resignify such categories. In this instance, it appears that sex enables the reclamation 
of the apparently “subservient position” of the giver of oral sex, even if it is to a more 
ambiguously domineering position. Furthermore, Adair mentions that books allow 
one to do certain things, pointing to the role of textualisation and textuality in 
bringing the corporeal to its limits and opening up the space for a renegotiation of 
intimacy. 
It indeed appears that for Adair, impersonal intimacy can only be realised through 
text(uality) and this is reiterated when she points out that even though the unnamed 
journalist “believed that he learned a lot about X” after their first rendezvous in 
Mozambique, “Freddie knew that he had learnt nothing. The only truth that he learnt 
was the feel of X’s body, and even that was no more real than celluloid. What he 
learnt was a lie, a fabrication, a physical presence” (54). What Freddie intimates here 
is the limits of the corporeal, suggesting that the body is in fact no more real than 
“celluloid”, a filmic text: the body, despite its materiality or “physical presence”, is a 
mere “fabrication”, a construct that professes to cohere the self and attempts to make 
possible an empathetic relationality based on a nonviolent reckoning with difference. 
Indeed, Freddie asserts that “the lie was always in the kiss, a betrayal” (6). In 
addressing the song “As Time Goes By” used in the film Casablanca – whose lyrics 
claim that “a kiss is just a kiss”, one of those “fundamental things of life” (Adair, End 
16) – Adair expresses reservations about whether mere bodily intimacy is able to 
facilitate impersonal intimacy, suggesting that a coming towards the other which does 
not subsume difference is not as simple as two bodies coming together. 
In her essay “When Our Two Lips Speak Together”, Luce Irigaray emphasises the 
world-making potential of the kiss when she proclaims that “[t]wo lips kiss two lips, 
and openness is ours again. Our ‘world’” (73). Even though Irigaray’s comments in 
this essay relate to sexual difference and the feminine, the figure of the lips she 
articulates is conceptually useful for my purposes as it expresses a singular plurality, a 
two-that-is-one, that troubles the distinction between self and other: in these kissing 
lips that is an erotic commingling, the boundaries between the touching and the 
touched, subject and object, disappear, thereby opening up the potential for a kind of 
relational encounter in which sameness or difference do not matter. Irigaray 
nonetheless further elaborates, somewhat enigmatically, that language intervenes in 
and disconcerts this intimacy: she states that “open or closed, for one never excludes 
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the other, our lips say that both love each other. Together. To articulate one precise 
word, our lips would have to separate and be distant from each other. Between them, 
one word” (72, emphasis in original). Freddie’s remark, read through Irigaray, then 
not only confronts the “lie” of corporeal determinacy which coheres identity, but also 
“betrays” the easy idealism as formulated in Casablanca’s “kiss is just a kiss”: the 
kiss is a kiss mediated through the language of the novel, language which intervenes 
in the two-that-is-onenness that exemplifies impersonal intimacy. 
End further teases out the nuances in the part that language and text(uality) take in the 
negotiation of an intimate, impersonal mode of relationality, and this occurs through 
the novel’s postulation of identity – or rather, identification – as the inhabiting of a 
series of constructed – that is, textual – “clichés”. In a Johannesburg hotel bar that is 
reminiscent of Rick’s Café in Casablanca, for example, Freddie observes that 
 
 
[a]t a table nearby sat seven people. Freddie looked at them and wondered 
what the best words would be to describe them. I can’t say fascist, for what 
does a fascist look like? Hitler was swarthy and he had a thin black 
moustache just above his top lip, a cockroach sitting on his mouth. […] 
The Spanish fascists did not look as modern and spotless as Ronald Regan 
did […]. And none of them looked like Margaret Thatcher or held a 
handbag. Well, I suppose, once again, it is a particularly South African 
stereotype; fascist clothing, khaki pants and khaki shirts, apartheid 
clothing in a bar. You know what I mean. It is the way they comb their 
hair. It is slicked down with oil. And I suppose it is their size. They are fat. 
Why is it that the description of a fascist is always of an overweight fascist? 
I mean, Thatcher was thin, so was PW Botha. Oh fuck, I can’t seem to 
write anything that is not a cliché, Freddie mused. (85-86) 
 
 
 
Freddie indicates here that she feels the need to situate people within pre-established, 
predictable categories to make sense of them, even though she seems to be aware that 
these stereotypical categories of identification can never be reliably definitive. In this 
way, Adair suggests that even though identity resists interpretation, we can always 
only think through and work with(in) these “clichés”.  
Nonetheless, Adair also proposes that there is an inherent productivity in such 
“clichéd” identificatory categories. As Freddie continues to work on her novel in End, 
she becomes increasingly aware that her writing engages in hackneyed formulations: 
she wonders whether she can “put in so many clichés” and comes to the conclusion 
that “[o]h well, two clichés in a story can make you laugh, a hundred clichés, she 
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laughed, they will move you. Sometimes, Freddie thought, extreme banality allows 
you to catch a glimpse of the sublime, the glorious incoherence of the sublime, the 
glorious incoherence of the prosaic” (12). This draws on, as Adair herself points out 
in the acknowledgements of End, Umberto Eco’s observation that Casablanca is an 
assemblage of clichés or archetypes. For Eco, this excessive use of clichés in the film 
is in fact productive and gestures towards the sublime: he argues that “[w]hen all the 
archetypes burst in shamelessly, we reach Homeric depths. Two clichés make us 
laugh. A hundred clichés move us. […] Just as the height of pain may encounter 
sensual pleasure, and the height of perversion border on mystical energy, so too the 
height of banality allows us to catch a glimpse of the sublime” (38). What Adair 
endeavours to achieve in setting up and problematising “clichéd” identificatory 
categories, then, is to bring about an unsettling jouissance which may disrupt the 
ways that identity, and thus relationality, has been conceived.  
Jean-François Lyotard indeed reminds us of the relation between the sublime and 
jouissance: informed by Immanuel Kant’s consideration of the sublime, Lyotard 
maintains that the sublime is “a strong and equivocal emotion: it carries with it both 
pleasure and pain. Better still, in it pleasure derives from pain” (77). Lyotard further 
proposes that the “postmodern” sublime is that which “puts forward the unpresentable 
in presentation itself” (81). In her engagement with notions of the sublime then, I 
understand Adair as attempting to textually perform the unrepresentability and 
indeterminacies of identity. In other words, through the “incoherence of the prosaic”, 
by which I understand Adair to mean literally the inability of “prose” – that is, 
language – to sufficiently articulate identity, Adair undermines the categories that 
have conventionally been used to understand the self. Moreover, Lyotard’s 
comment – that the work that the postmodern writer produces “are not in principle 
governed by preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged according to a 
determining judgment, by applying familiar categories to the text or to the work. 
Those rules and categories are what the work of art itself is looking for. The artist and 
the writer, then, are working without rules in order to formulate the rules of what will 
have been done” (81, emphasis in original) – informs my consideration of End’s 
metafictionality: Adair’s experimental “postmodern” novel undermines readers’ 
desire to make sense of the work in the terms available to them, and rather “searches 
for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger 
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sense of the unrepresentable” (Lyotard 81). That is to say, End narratively enacts the 
ambiguous potential of identificatory categories as delineated in language, however 
ineffectually, to convey the indeterminacies of the corporeal and of identity. In this 
manner, Freddie’s contention that “[r]eaders like a man with personal integrity, 
morality, intelligence. They want to be able to identify with the hero, they want an 
identity, they want to be saved from the obscurity of having a choice” (5) calls 
attention to how End allows for no easy identification but rather problematises this 
eagerness to identify and demands of the reader to see through this constructedness of 
identity. 
Just as End presents the corporeal and identification as constructs, especially as ones 
formulated by and through textuality – that is, signification – and in doing so effects 
an unsettled and unsettling understanding of the self, so it follows that “love”, the 
encounter between self and other, is recognised as a construct. Freddie articulates the 
novel’s central assertion about the nature of love in the following reflection: 
 
 
“Love,” Freddie mused, “that human construct. Love for a person, love for 
a country, love for a cause. Unrequited love, requited love that is dull 
enough to make a person search for another love, hope for love, the 
journey to find love and glory. After all, who said it? ‘What is the point of 
war without love?’ The love themes can go on and on. I wonder if there’s a 
novel in which this theme is not present?” She turned to him [the unnamed 
journalist]. “You can love X. I’ll let you love him, just for the moment, 
just for now.” (6) 
 
 
 
For Freddie then, love is a formulation which involves acts of interpretation, and in 
this way, the distinction between self and other is one that is imagined and can be 
reimagined. Not only does Freddie bring into question here the relationship of the self 
to other people, but she also draws attention to how a reimagined encounter between 
self and other necessitates a rethinking of the self’s relation to the imagined 
community that is the nation. Freddie in fact suggests that it is this inclination and 
aspiration to relate that drives us, and it is the failure to relate in a way that “requites” 
or responds to the other’s difference that results in “war”. Moreover, Freddie points 
out that all novels embody a sense of love, thereby acknowledging acts of reading as 
an encounter between reader and text, and thus also calling for a consideration of the 
ways that text(uality) may facilitate impersonal intimacy. 
The sinthomosexual en procès figured through the unnamed journalist calls for, as I 
84 
 
have been demonstrating, a hermeneutics of desire which foregrounds the body as a 
site of creative potentiality rather than a stable reification of knowable identificatory 
categories, even as it recognises that it is always already constrained within language. 
In this manner, the unsettled and unsettling politics of the self disrupts the “prosaic” 
clichés of love, the banal ways in which the self and the other have been construed to 
relate, such as within the logic of reproductive futurism. Adair in fact stages these 
tensions of relationality in End. When the unnamed journalist bemoans that there is 
“[n]o sex, no love, nothing” for him in Mozambique, Freddie observes that “love is an 
illusion – two old people holding hands together in front of a television screen. […] 
Love is always an illusion. We all think we love one another, but the lie is in the kiss 
that we exchange” (24-25). Freddie indicates here that the belief in the potential for 
relationality is a mistaken one as the affective intimacy experienced in touching 
another may be deceptive: touch may not facilitate that “incomprehensible closeness” 
(89) between two people that In Tangier seems to articulate, as Adair recognises in 
End that language mediates all encounters between self and other, and inscribes us 
within representational economies and identity politics in which interactions are 
negotiated through categories of identification. Language thus disrupts the radical 
openness to difference, the two-that-is-oneness embodied, as Irigaray intimates, in the 
kiss. The unnamed journalist nonetheless insists that “[l]ove is not an illusion; I’m not 
buying into this narrative. And anyway we can’t debate this now. Isn’t it already part 
of the story?”, to which Freddie responds that “love wasn’t in the story; he just liked 
to imagine that it was” (25). The unnamed journalist seems to resist the idea that 
relationality, especially one that attends nonviolently to difference, is unattainable and 
observes that love is rather “already part of the story”, implying that certain kinds of 
text(uality) inherently foster an intimacy in which the encounter with the other is not a 
subsumption of difference. Freddie, however, seems convinced that the unnamed 
journalist understands love conventionally as mere romance and “passion” (25), and 
thus dismisses his unexpectedly astute remark that literature enables an impersonal 
intimacy, proposing that he simply “wanted to believe in this game, he wanted to love, 
to believe in a truth” (31). Such sentimental, romantic love which normalises the 
comfortable certainty of reproductive futurism is exactly what Adair tries to challenge 
through Freddie, and hence her repudiation that “love” is not dealt with in the novel. 
Nonetheless, the unnamed journalist troubles Freddie’s assessment, conceding that 
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romantic love may perhaps also be a means, however problematic, of comforting 
ourselves with a consistent narrative or “truth” about the incoherences of being in an 
unbearable world. When Freddie decides to give the unnamed journalist the plane 
ticket so that they can leave South Africa together at the end of End, leaving the 
married couple X and Y behind, the unnamed journalist remarks that “[w]hat you did 
for X, […] that was a fairy tale to make him feel that it was okay to stay with Y and to 
keep watch over her no matter what happened. I think he knew you were lying” (154). 
As I proposed in the previous chapter, Freddie’s choice in leaving the heterosexual 
couple behind is symbolic of Adair’s refusal of the logic of reproductive futurism and 
her enunciation of a queer present continuous. Nonetheless, the sinthomosexual en 
procès figured through the unnamed journalist recognises that there cannot be an 
outright rejection of such “clichés” as we can always only work with and through 
these normative and normalising paradigms, and hence she acknowledges Freddie’s 
construction of a “fairy tale” narrative in which X selflessly tries to save Y from drug 
abuse: X indicates to the unnamed journalist that “I thought that Y, my wife, was 
descending into a different world to mine. I thought she was in some ways dead to me, 
dead to the world that I want and the world that I know. I was frantic. […] And then 
when I came back here I saw her again. I saw her hair and I saw her face, and I knew 
that I needed to stay with her so that I could help her” (145). 
It is this kind of “illusion of romance” (159), this appearance of relating to another, 
which the unnamed journalist eventually admits to preferring, and it is in this way that 
I make sense of her anxieties about the possibility of relationality expressed earlier in 
the novel. After her first encounter with X in Maputo, the unnamed journalist asks 
Freddie “[w]hy did you put him [X] in here? Things were just moving along at their 
own pace. I don’t need this emotional entanglement. In fact, I would prefer to be 
alone. Alone with thoughts of [the daughter of the blind guesthouse owner] Marina’s 
soft, girlish skin” (38). Here, the unnamed journalist conceives of relationality as 
“emotional entanglement”, suggesting that she does not want to or cannot bear the 
demands of this ensnaring intimacy, this intense commingling in which sameness and 
difference become indistinguishable. What she favours instead is loneliness, a solitary 
space in which she can think about touching and relating to another. Contrary to In 
Tangier, Adair appears to problematise the productive potential of loneliness in End. 
For instance, Freddie points out to the unnamed journalist that “[i]f you communicate 
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somehow with people, you can pretend that you’re not alone. And it is always nice to 
pretend. It makes you feel okay” (22), and this insinuates that not being able to form 
connections with others can be distressing as people tend to want to associate in some 
way with others. As Berlant claims, loneliness is “a kind of relation to the world 
whose only predictable is in the persistence of inaccessible love” (Berlant and 
Edelman 37): rather than brood over the failure to attain relation, End suggests that 
what is necessary is the gesture towards what Bersani terms a “love freed from 
demand” (28). Freddie indeed observes the urgency of such non-domineering 
encounters between self and other when she ponders “[b]ut what is loneliness [?] Is it 
when you hate your own company? Is it when you have a memory of not being lonely, 
of having someone to hold you? To hold you down” (113). Unlike Paul in In Tangier 
who is satisfied with being by himself and for whom loneliness appears to be the 
position from which impersonal intimacy is possible, Freddie expresses reservations 
about the world-making potentialities of loneliness, as people are inclined to forming 
attachments with others even though those interactions may often be unbearably 
oppressive. 
Adair indeed demonstrates in End that the failure to relate along a model of 
impersonal intimacy leads to colonisation and war, what she calls a “community of 
violence” (16). Similar to my reading of In Tangier, End suggests that it is this 
aggressive imposition of categories of identification in order to know and be able to 
relate to the other that Adair finds troubling. Freddie’s reflection on “modernity” upon 
seeing soldiers with machine guns in Maputo is instructive in this regard: modernity, 
Freddie wonders, “if this is what I must call it. What is a better word for what the new 
Western half of the world – although not all of it is in the West – has imposed upon 
people who are different” (43) and she further contends that 
 
 
people have given up a part of themselves for this slice of modernity. We 
have brought it to them and handed them a small piece of it. And if they 
have not wanted it we have forced it onto them. And now they want this 
Western world, now they want to push their world and culture behind them 
as if it is backward and retrogressive. There has been more than just the 
eradication of culture, family, religion and community. There has been the 
eradication of the spirit, a defeat of the soul. They want to be like us. And 
yet…and yet it is all so ill fitting, this modernisation, so ill fitting that it 
almost seems as if people are saying, maybe quietly, fuck it, fuck you. (44) 
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Freddie points first to the complexities of modernity, a concept which David Attwell 
acknowledges in Rewriting Modernity: Studies in Black South African Literary 
History is “a notoriously baggy concept that resists narrow definition” (3). According 
to Attwell, “[i]f a simple philosophical definition were available, it might be that 
modernity is the currently governing concept of what it means to be a subject of 
history” (3), and he corroborates Freddie’s claim that modernity is an 
overcommitment to a particular way of knowing foisted on others which does not 
account for difference when he notes that it “refers not only to technology and the 
emergence of an administered and industrialised society, but also to that fluid but 
powerful system of ideas that we inherit from the bourgeois revolutions of Europe in 
the late eighteenth century – ideas such as autonomy, personhood, rights, and 
citizenship” (3-4). Nevertheless, Freddie also recognises that everybody is implicated 
in this antagonistic politics of identification, this desire to situate and be situated 
within known and knowable categories of subjecthood. She thus remarks that despite 
the non-Western other’s attempts to assimilate into such Western paradigms of self-
knowledge, those categories are “ill fitting” – that is, they do not quite articulate the 
non-Western other’s sense of embodied specificity – whence their resistance. In this 
way, colonisation as the need to know, to locate oneself and others in “clichés” which 
foreclose difference, seems to inherently undermine itself, as the indeterminacies of 
the corporeal and the self mean that identity always already resists interpretation. 
One of the ways that modernity has presented for making sense of “what it means to 
be a subject in history” is “nationalism”. Indeed, Benedict Anderson proposes in his 
seminal work on the origin and nature of nationalism that “nationality, or, as one 
might prefer to put it in view of that word’s multiple significations, nation-ness, as 
well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind. [… T]he creation of 
these artefacts towards the end of the eighteenth century was the spontaneous 
distillation of a complex ‘crossing’ of discrete historical forces” (4). It is nationalism 
as a construct – which I understand as one of the regulated and knowable categories 
of belonging in which people situate themselves in order to interact with others – that 
End wants to unsettle. “And after all, what is nationalism?” Freddie ponders, “[j]ust 
another inane and stupid emotion, but at least it is an emotion. So you have love and 
you have a bit of national spirit. Absurd, but you have it anyway” (91). For Freddie 
then, nationalism and love are analogous in that nationalism is a useless feeling just as 
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love construed as a feeling of romance is unproductive, and because “you have it 
anyway” – that is, because both feelings persist despite their apparent inanity – Adair 
implies that it is necessary to rethink the productive potential of such emotions as 
nationalism for an impersonal model of relationality. Freddie’s further denunciation 
of the efficacy of emotions – that “[e]motions never seem to take one anywhere. I 
wonder why people have them. All they do is sustain an illusion. More emotion, more 
illusion, more illusion, more emotion, more illusion, and so it goes on. Useless” (98) – 
is thus illuminating, for it addresses Anderson’s concerns that the supposed 
community that is the nation is an illusion, and that “regardless of the actual 
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as 
a deep, horizontal comradeship” (7): what Freddie suggests is that these feelings of 
apparent connectedness seem to be used to perpetuate and to justify the violence that 
results from an inability to account for difference. 
Sara Ahmed’s The Cultural Politics of Emotion offers a productive paradigm for 
thinking about emotions and affect in a more transformative manner. According to 
Ahmed, emotions “should not be regarded as psychological states, but as social and 
cultural practices” (9) because feelings are engendered in the contact with others. In 
this way, Ahmed proposes that emotions should be thought about as “impressions”, 
arguing that “[w]e need to remember the ‘press’ in an impression. It allows us to 
associate the experience of having an emotion with the very affect of one surface 
upon another, an affect that leaves its mark or trace. So not only do I have an 
impression of others, but they also leave me with an impression; they impress me, and 
impress upon me” (6, emphasis in original). Moreover, in conceptualising emotion as 
impression, Ahmed does not distinguish between “bodily sensation, emotion and 
thought as if they could be ‘experienced’ as distinct realms of human ‘experience’” 
(6), thereby pointing to the integrality of affect to my articulation of an unsettled and 
unsettling politics of identity, as thinking about emotions with Ahmed necessitates a 
reconsideration of the nature of the encounter between self and other. Ahmed 
maintains that “emotions create the very effect of surfaces and boundaries that allow 
us to distinguish an inside and an outside in the first place. So emotions are not simply 
something ‘I’ or ‘we’ have. Rather, it is through emotions, or how we respond to 
objects and others, that surfaces or boundaries are made: the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ are 
shaped by, and even take the shape of, contact with others” (10). It thus seems to me 
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that emotions advance a kind of relationality that is about moving towards the in-
between where distinctions between self and other are renegotiated. For Ahmed, 
“emotions work by working through signs and on bodies to materialise the surfaces 
and boundaries that are lived as worlds” (191). If emotions work through signification 
to generate meanings through the histories and contexts that they may invoke, it then 
follows that it may be possible to resignify the material textuality – that is, the 
“clichés” – of emotions.  
It is in my view this potential for opening up a space for resignification that Adair 
explores in End. Nationalism, or rather the insistence on a nationality, as a “clichéd” 
category of identification is examined in a scene – intertextually referencing the scene 
in Casablanca in which German officers singing a patriotic anthem in German is 
drowned out by a fervent rendition of La Marseillaise by Victor Laszlo and the other 
patrons in Rick’s Café – in which a “khaki shirt” and his comrades belt out the South 
African national anthem of the apartheid regime Die Stem van Suid-Afrika which is 
drowned out by the rest of the bar singing the pan-African liberation anthem Nkosi 
Sikelel’ iAfrika (91-92). National anthems are for Anderson one of the mechanisms 
which facilitate the imagined communities that are nations, indicating that “[n]o 
matter how banal the words and mediocre the tunes, there is in this singing an 
experience of simultaneity. At precisely such moments, people wholly unknown to 
each other utter the same verses to the same melody. The image: unisonance” (145). 
Adair reveals here the problematic ideality of such unisonance, which the hybrid 
combination of Die Stem and Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika in the South African national 
anthem after 1994 attempts to realise, as people hold onto their identificatory 
categories and the emotions which work through the textuality of the national anthem 
seems to entrench the other as other. Adair nonetheless ambiguously suggests that 
such emotions as embodied in the impassioned contestation of anthems can move 
people into an in-between space, and this is symbolically represented in the “gilded 
whore” who “did not know the words to the song, but a small tear fell from her 
painted eye and made the mascara run down her face. It united with her white face 
powder and became beige, almost brown, as it moved downwards. She stood up and 
cried” (93). 
I think that, finally, Adair is aware that resignification can only happen within 
text(uality) and it is thus the novel End as a whole that attempts to bring about a 
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reconceptualisation of love as a space of the in-between in which the self and the 
other can relate nonviolently. Indeed, Edelman believes that the notion of “relation 
itself” is ultimately “a relation to the signifier” (Berlant and Edelman 114, emphasis 
in original) and proposes that a “radical encounter with the other, which is other than 
signification” (114, emphasis in original) is not impossible but “exists in the form of 
continuous exchange, in the openness of (and to) our questioning the forms of its 
possibility” (114). In deliberating over the ways that a hermeneutics of desire may 
enable a detachment from textual, “clichéd” categories of identification, Adair’s End 
continuously brings into question the impulse to know and to situate – that is, to 
colonise – the self and the other and the potential for the realisation of an impersonal 
mode of intimacy. Following Edelman’s articulation of queer as “less an identity than 
an ongoing effort of divestiture, a practice of undoing” (Berlant and Edelman 19), I 
understand End’s queering of love as an ongoing effort of undoing the known and 
knowable identificatory categories that we insist on in order that we may move 
beyond ourselves towards an encounter with the other which does not subsume 
difference. Chiuppani indeed claims that 
 
 
[i]t is precisely because Adair intends to see through the sense of 
“identity,” historically triggered by the spectacular nature of South African 
society, she is drawn to reconceive what may be regarded as the ultimate 
source of a perception of sameness—our appraisal of the body. This 
freedom from sameness, however, does not seem to point toward any sort 
of ideological horizon. No socio-political framework, clearly, could 
provide for it, as it can only exist in the fictional world realized by the new 
kind of literature Adair practices—as well creates—with her novel. (195) 
 
 
 
A significant observation that Chiuppani makes is the way that the context of South 
Africa informs End’s articulation of an unsettled and unsettling politics of identity, 
but what is necessary to note is that in specifically highlighting nationalism as a 
category of identification that needs to be renegotiated, Adair urges a broadening of 
our treatment of “nation” as an emotional collective, one in which we remain open to 
the possibility for, as Ahmed puts it, “learning to live with the impossibility of 
reconciliation, or learning that we live with and beside each other, and yet we are not 
as one” (39). 
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CONCLUSION, OR, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A “WOW FINISH” 
In his article “Learning to Squander: Making Meaningful Connections in the Infinite 
Text of World Culture”, Ashraf Jamal maintains that 
 
 
[f]reed from an identitarian hysteria, perhaps there could begin to be a 
reconfiguration of a more harlequinesque or syncretic subjectivity, 
founded not on a utopian embrace of otherness, or a mutinous relation to a 
preconceived or preordained selfhood, but, rather, upon a keenly wakeful 
grasp of the absurdity of both positions. In short: there is no a priori 
selfhood from which one diverges and no aspirational alterity which can 
be wholly absorbed. The trick, then, is to recognise the ruse of self and 
other, a dialectic which, while highly efficacious, is nonetheless a chimera 
or nonsensical illusion. (32, emphasis in original) 
 
 
 
In daring to think a space beyond the obsession with known and knowable categories 
of identification, Jamal’s reflection helpfully sums up my central argument in this 
dissertation, which is that Barbara Adair’s In Tangier and End enable us to engage 
with the notion of love in an impersonal and properly political manner to enunciate a 
queer present continuous be(com)ing, an in-between – albeit textual – space where the 
self and the other may be freed of stultifyingly (hetero)normative and teleological 
logics and begin to come toward one another in a non-“mutinous” manner. 
Furthermore, I have shown how the two novels enable us to respond to the kind of 
freedom that Jamal believes we may achieve once we are able to think beyond the 
narrow identity politics which circumscribe cultural production and reception in South 
Africa. For Jamal, a “harlequinesque or syncretic subjectivity” is one that refuses a 
simple, reified merging or glossing (over) of difference but is receptive to the 
indeterminate heterogeneity – the messy, borderless assemblage – of being, 
facilitating a negotiation of meaning which unsettles coherent categories of 
representation. Indeed, what I have demonstrated in my close reading of Adair’s In 
Tangier and End is the ways in which the two novels enable us to think through the 
possibilities of realising and sustaining that in-between space in which the self and the 
other are able to renounce certainties in order to attempt to approach each other: I 
have argued that even though Adair is keenly aware of the vexing contradictions and 
the eventual chimerical absurdity inherent in any attempt to make sense of the 
encounter between the self and the other, it is the (queer) potentialities opened by the 
effort to begin to come toward one another – despite the risk of abjection in not 
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knowing what will happen – that matters. 
In this way, it is clear that In Tangier and End enable us to think more broadly 
through the predicament of identity politics, especially as a mode of identification and 
categorisation. For Jasbir Puar, identity politics and the “intersectional model of 
identity, which presumes that components – race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, age, 
religion – are separable analytics and can thus be disassembled” (212) is problematic 
as it “simply wishes the messiness of identity into a formulaic grid” (212), disavowing 
the nebulous entanglement that is identity: Puar maintains that such identity politics 
“demands the knowing, naming, and thus stabilizing of identity across space and time, 
relying on the logic of equivalence and analogy between various axes of identity and 
generating narratives of progress that deny the fictive and performative aspects of 
identification: you become an identity, yes, but also timelessness works to consolidate 
the fiction of a seamless stable identity in every space” (212). As such, Puar contends 
that intersectionality becomes a “hermeneutic of positionality that seeks to account for 
locality, specificity, placement, junctions” (212, emphasis in original). 
In my close reading of Adair’s two novels, I have proposed a hermeneutics of desire 
in the place of a hermeneutics of positionality, and demonstrated that Adair’s novels 
articulate a queer be(com)ing, a textual space that fosters a sexual coming which 
facilitates the undertaking of a coming toward (an)other. In my formulation of 
be(com)ing as an expression of a hermeneutics of desire, what I foreground is the 
function of jouissance – that is, limitless and bewildering orgasmic pleasure – as it is 
this free play of libidinal, corporeal drives which continuously push against and 
threaten to undo symbolic structures of meaning-making, and which thus precipitate 
an unsettled and unsettling “border of the ‘I’” (Adair, End 11). My parenthesising of 
“come” further signals my concern with the textual and textuality, as it is only on 
reading the word “be(com)ing” that this emphasis is evident: I have argued that it is in 
engaging with Adair’s writing – especially with her novels’ inter- and metatextuality 
as well as the figure of the sinthomosexual en procès in End – that the reader is also 
put in process and on trial. According to Hélène Cixous, 
 
 
[w]riting is working; being worked; questioning (in) the between (letting 
oneself be questioned) of same and of other without which nothing lives; 
undoing death’s work by willing the togetherness of one-another, infinitely 
charged with a ceaseless exchange of one with another – not knowing one 
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another and beginning again only from what is most distant, from self, 
from other, from the other within. (“Sorties” 86, emphasis in original) 
 
 
 
Following Cixous, I have demonstrated through my close reading of In Tangier and 
End that Adair’s writing holds out such an in-between space in which the reader is 
working and being worked, in which a ceaseless and non-domineering exchange 
between the reader-self and the other – or, in Cixous’s formulation, the “further-than-
myself in myself” (Cixous and Calle-Gruber 56) – may take place, opening up 
transformative, world-making potentialities. 
Put differently, thinking Adair’s two texts through such conceptions of writing as 
Cixous’s has enabled me to engage with queer as an assemblage “attune[d] to 
movements, intensities, emotions, energies, affectivities, and textures as they inhabit 
events, spatiality, and corporealities” (Puar 215), especially in and against the South 
African context that, as I have shown, tends to dominate the reception of Adair’s work, 
and has, in particular, produced reductive ways of understanding the representation of 
sex(uality) in her work. It is in my view these essentialising versions of queer – or, 
more precisely, these conceptions of gay as a category of identification – 
instrumentalised for South Africa’s rainbow nationalism that Adair’s novels in their 
enunciation of a queer present continuous be(com)ing resist. 
In the preface of In Tangier dated 1993 that supposedly sets up the novel’s South 
African context, Adair claims that “[n]ow for the first time, with the announcement of 
the release of political prisoners and the unbanning of the African National Congress, 
we can travel. Is it for this reason that I welcome political change in my country or 
can I muster other reasons for my hopefulness?” (n.p.). As my close reading of In 
Tangier and End has indicated, I believe that the “other reason” for Adair’s 
hopefulness for political change lies in what I have understood as her gesture not only 
towards the impossibility of a teleological explanation of the nation that is South 
Africa, but also towards the indeterminate heterogeneity at the heart of South Africa 
and the impossible explanation thereof, which then precipitates, in Jamal’s terms, a 
“traduce[ment of] the hegemonic values of the time […] in a non-reactionary and 
non-antagonistic manner, the better to elide the constraints of the time and invoke an 
other and untimely moment which not only rethinks the human, but does so in the 
name of love” (“Billy Monk” 58, emphasis in original). This rethinking of the human 
in the name of love that I read through Adair’s two novels is expressed in the 
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possibilities for “travel”, which I understand in a more figurative sense, that she hints 
at in her preface to In Tangier: our making the effort to wend our way with a 
ceaselessly mobile and fluid be(com)ing opens a space for this hopefulness for 
impersonal intimacy as a properly political concept of love in South Africa. 
Moreover, my concern with the affective economies that In Tangier and End open is 
also signalled in Adair’s recognition of the opportunities for “travel”, albeit more 
figuratively. Affect, as Vilashini Cooppan points out, “[w]ith its flows through and 
across different subjects, objects, histories, and places, […] invites us to reach for new 
units of comparison and so to construct new histories of feeling that both recognize 
the force of violence and imagine a future beyond it” (71). The hermeneutics of desire 
that I have advanced in place of the conventional, stifling hermeneutics of 
positionality in my close reading of Adair’s two novels enables me to attend to the 
travelling or “flow” of affect, which, in its disruption of “clichéd” conceptions of the 
“border of the ‘I’” (Adair, End 11), (re)negotiates the insistence on nationalism and 
the “clichéd” borders of the nation. In this way, I am able to engage with the issues 
that Jamal raises about South African cultural production and reception. 
For Jamal, the lack of “experimentation” in South African literature is indicative of 
the predicament he observes, and he offers the following deliberation: 
 
 
Why has this experimentation not fully taken hold in South African fiction? 
Is this perhaps because we do not have the courage to write without 
witnesses? Because we believed it imperative that we must be witnessed, 
that we must be subject to a greater Western optic? Or because we 
believed that we could not truly know ourselves inside the beleaguered and 
bastardized orbit of our existences? (“Bullet” 16) 
 
 
 
It should be clear from my argument that In Tangier and End attest to the existence of 
such artistic experimentation which is willing to take the risk of abjection in their not-
knowing, and Adair’s two novels in fact compellingly articulate what Jamal calls 
“other logics of engagement and cultural practice”, which he believes is absent from 
South African cultural production and reception. “[I]n diffusing-and-bypassing the 
numbing imperatives of canonical literature,” such “other logics” would, in Jamal’s 
view, “issue forth different affective impulses” (“Bullet” 19). 
Even though I have endorsed Jamal’s diagnosis of South African cultural production 
and reception thus far and heeded some of his astutely innovative propositions, I think 
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that Adair’s two novels also offer an opportunity to critically reevaluate Jamal’s 
position, in particular its failure to account for the “different affective impulses” that 
literary productions such as Adair’s enunciate. This has to do, I believe, not only with 
the ways in which literary criticism necessarily and belatedly instrumentalises literary 
works in order to make meaning, but also with the way that Jamal’s literary criticism 
is situated firmly within a specific South African context. For this reason then, it 
seems inevitable that Jamal would be invested in a recuperative ethics in which love is 
reappropriated for a “wow finish” and offered as a way out of the restrictive sense of 
identity politics which informs cultural production and reception in South Africa. 
Despite his insistence on thinking through “an extra-moral and a-categorical realm, a 
realm that bursts and renders fluid all categories and […] challenge[s] a hegemonic 
drive to categorise, divide, and rule” (Predicaments 145), Jamal believes that a 
“recovery” from the predicaments he identifies in South African cultural production 
and reception only “arises from a psychic and epistemic rupture, from a place within 
rupture called love: a place that is immune” (Predicaments 162). In this way, Jamal 
appears to instrumentalise love for a location of the unthinkable and for an explication 
of the radical incommensurable heterogeneity that is South Africa. 
Such a reading that has as its impulse a desire for reparations for the violences of the 
past – which partly result from, as Jamal points out, the “sickly obsession with 
identitarian politics” which forecloses “the immense currency of a secular 
worldliness – the value of transience, cosmopolitanism, hybridity and improvisation” 
( “Billy Monk” 62-3) – problematically overlooks the ways that reading with affect 
and a hermeneutics of desire resignifies the national: as Cooppan demonstrates, 
“[i]nsofar as affect does not exactly erase temporality but instead layers and punctures 
it, simultaneously sedimenting the past and blasting it away, affect reorganizes the 
reading of national narratives around a set of questions for which historicism alone 
cannot provide the plot or the answer” (61). That is to say, reading with affect 
troubles teleological and redemptive narratives of the national, and what thus becomes 
consequential is, as Cooppan indicates, “not a question of simply moving on or living 
after but of living with” (61, emphasis in original). Living with implies, in my view, 
the impossibility of reconciliation as well as the continuous moving towards and 
taking up of the unknowable in-between. For Cooppan, “[a]ffect’s circulatory network 
suggests that a text’s meaning does not lie in the text, in the new national, postracial 
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subject it represents, in the reader, or even in the history that the text is understood to 
sediment, contain, or imaginarily resolve, but instead in the contact and passage 
among those entities and others” (69, emphases in original). This assertion is 
instructive in that it addresses my argument that In Tangier and End in their 
enunciation of a queer present continuous be(com)ing open the location of impersonal 
intimacy as the space of the in-between in which, following Sarah Dillon’s 
formulation again, not only the “reader and author” but also “co-readers” (60) may 
begin to move beyond the self toward – but not arrive at, as that would entail a 
knowing and thus an erasure of difference – the other. 
I am well aware that I have taken issue with precisely this kind of reading of “South 
African” texts which are (over)determined by and (re)instrumentalised for its South 
African contexts. Nonetheless, as Edward Said reminds us in The World, the Text, and 
the Critic, both literary texts and criticism are inextricable from the materiality of 
their contexts of production and consumption: for Said, “texts have ways of existing 
that even in the most rarefied form are always enmeshed in circumstance, time, place, 
and society – in short, they are in the world, and hence worldly” (35) and the “same 
implications are undoubtedly true of critics in their capacities as readers and writers in 
the world” (35). Furthermore, Said maintains that “texts are worldly, to some degree 
they are events, and, even when they appear to deny it, they are nevertheless a part of 
the social world, human life, and of course the historical moments in which they are 
located and interpreted” (4), and in this way “texts impose constraints upon their 
interpretation or, to put it metaphorically, the way the closeness of the world’s body to 
the text’s body forces readers to take both into consideration” (39). What Said implies 
here is the inevitability of the kinds of symptomatic reading that Jamal contends is 
part of the predicament of cultural production and reception in South Africa. 
While it would be naïve of me to disregard the worldliness of Adair’s texts, what I 
find problematic is the ways in which critics have read In Tangier and End as 
necessarily addressing the nation and its (dis)contents. Moreover, what my close 
reading has foregrounded is the ways in which the two novels resist the existing 
modes of reading through a hermeneutics of positionality which compel the 
reconciliation of texts with their contexts. In other words, I think that Adair is 
befittingly attentive to the necessary open-ended hesitancies of queer which refuse to 
entertain the kinds of voguish intersectional identity politics that, according to Puar, 
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“privileges naming, visuality, epistemology, representation, and meaning” (215), and 
I further believe that In Tangier and End in their enunciation of a queer present 
continuous be(com)ing attest to Jamal’s essential point, which is his call for “the 
commitment to the enabling power of questions aligned to an openness to the 
unconscious and unthinkable” (Predicaments 155). Heeding Jamal’s appeal for 
thinking queerly and for reinvigorating the notion of queer – as well as taking on 
board Lee Edelman’s suggestion that “[q]ueer theory might better remind us that we 
are inhabited always by states of desire that exceed our capacity to name them. Every 
name only gives those desires – conflictual, contradictory, inconsistent, undefined – a 
fictive border, a definition, that falsifies precisely insofar as the name takes us always 
back to the family as our culture’s exemplary site of naming and of allegiance to the 
name” (“Queer” 345) – has enabled me to engage with and embrace such 
indeterminate and nonsovereign hesitancies. 
It is indicative then that the name of Adair’s second novel End does not appear 
prominently on the book cover, but is rather embedded and highlighted in the word 
“depending”. This signals one of the central preoccupations of my dissertation, which 
is the ways that Adair’s two novels facilitate my articulation of the always already 
indeterminate and contingent in-between space of love as impersonal intimacy. In 
other words, this non-naming points to my concern with what Julia Kristeva calls “the 
hell of naming, that is to say of signifiable identity” (Powers 207) and with my taking 
up of Jamal’s call for thinking, or at least attempting to think, the unthinkable and the 
unsignifiable which, as I have indicated, is taking seriously the properly political 
concept of impersonal intimacy that, as Adam Phillips maintains, “asks of us what is 
the most inconceivable thing: to believe in the future without needing to personalize it. 
Without, as it were, seeing it in our own terms” (Bersani and Phillips 117). Ultimately 
then, what I am proposing, in drawing attention to the ways that In Tangier and End 
gesture towards a renouncing of the affirmation or personalisation of a signifiable 
identity, is an articulation of love as a poetics of not-knowing. 
In this I have been guided by Cixous, for whom, as I have already demonstrated, love 
is a nondomineering way of relating. Cixous further asserts that 
 
 
[t]here are things that we do not understand because we could never 
reproduce them: behaviours, decisions that seem foreign to us. This also is 
love. It is to find one has arrived at the point where the immense foreign 
98 
 
territory of the other will begin. We sense the immensity, the reach, the 
richness of it, this attracts us. This does not mean that we ever discover it. I 
can imagine that this infinite foreignness could be menacing; disturbing. It 
also can be quite the opposite: exalting, wonderful, and in the end, of the 
same species as God: we do not know what it is. It is the biggest; it is far 
off. At the end of the path of attention, of reception, which is not 
interrupted but which continues into what little by little becomes the 
opposite of comprehension. Loving not knowing. Loving: not knowing. 
(Cixous and Calle-Gruber 17) 
 
 
 
Cixous is keenly aware here of the paradox of love, that unbearable rapture in the 
tension between wanting to know and letting go of the desire to know. For Cixous, 
then, to love is finally to relinquish the desire to master and to colonise through the 
bombast of known and knowable categories of identification. As Cixous puts it in her 
most poetic pronouncement on love, 
 
 
[t]he supreme statement of love would be: I do not understand you. 1 do 
not want to understand you. I love from not understanding you. And love 
is the explosive, painful tension between not understanding and wanting to 
understand, between trembling at the very idea of understanding while 
passionately wanting to be understood and fearing above all any type of 
comprehension. (“Apple” 65-66) 
 
 
 
Adair’s In Tangier and End embody, in my view, this supreme statement of love, and 
for this reason, we need to accept the inconclusiveness of criticism, to suspend the 
need for a “wow finish” (Adair, End 1). Or, to embrace another of Cixous’s 
formulations, “[a] text has to be treated like a person, with its mystery. We must have 
in our relation to the text a position both active and passive, one of patience. One has 
to accept what one accepts from a person: not to understand” (“Egg” 99). 
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